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COMMENTARY
THE DRUG COURT SCANDAL
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN*
In this Commentary, Judge Hoffman criticizes state and local
jurisdictions for rushing to implement drug courts without
seriously evaluating their effectiveness or considering their policy
implications. After surveying the research on drug court
effectiveness and examining the policy issues that inhere in drug
courts, Judge Hoffman concludes that there is little evidence that
drug courts reduce recidivism and substantial evidence that they
create profound operational and institutional problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Drug courts are sweeping the country, a contagion fueled by
federal grants and sparked by well-intentioned state and local trial
judges frustrated by the lost war on drugs. These specialized courts
are changing the criminal justice landscape in fundamental ways.
They are affecting the arrest policies of officers on the street, the
charging policies of prosecutors, and the very nature of the judicial
function. They are changing the way judges deal with prosecutors,
defense lawyers, defendants, and each other. They are increasing the
already unhealthy interdependency of the judicial branch and the
burgeoning cottage industry of private treatment providers. They are
significantly altering the allocation of limited judicial resources. They
are filling our state prisons with drug users, despite promising to do
just the opposite. They are inviting comprehensive federal
involvement, thereby risking comprehensive federal meddling, in the
day-to-day operations of state and local courts. And they are doing
all of this with nary an intellectual shot being fired.'
1. Despite the fact that hundreds of drug courts have spread to jurisdictions all over
the United States and hundreds more are scheduled to spread, see infra text accompanying
note 114, they have been the object of almost no serious legal scholarship. Bar journals,
judicial journals, and, to a lesser extent, law reviews are filled with short articles about
drug courts, usually about recently adopted drug courts and often written by the judges
who founded the courts. See, e.g., Susan Gochros, Hawaii Drug Court, Ho '01a Hou
(Renewed Life), HAW. BJ., Mar. 1998, at 32 passim; Judge Stephen L. Henriod, Drug
Court in the Third District, UTAH B.J., Aug. 1997, at 35 passim; Hon. William D. Hunter,
Drug Treatment Courts: An Innovative Approach to the Drug Problem in Louisiana, 44
LA. BJ. 418passim (1997); Judith S. Kaye, Special Report: The State of the Judiciary, N.Y.
ST. BJ., May/June 1998, at 50 passim; Claire McCaskill, Combat Drug Court: An
Innovative Approach to Dealing with Drug Abusing First Time Offenders, 66 UMKC L.
REv. 493 passim (1998); Hon. Sheila M. Murphy, Drug Courts: An Effective, Efficient
Weapon in the War on Drugs, 85 ILL. B.J. 474 passim (1997). Most of these articles are
long on anecdote and self-congratulation, but painfully short on analysis. The one
exception I came across was a refreshingly restrained and thoughtful piece written by
William Keesley, who is a South Carolina Circuit Court judge. See Hon. William P.
Keesley, Drug Courts, S.C. LAW., July/Aug. 1998, at 32.
The few scholarly treatments addressing drug courts are aimed at broader issues
of "restorative justice" or "therapeutic jurisprudence," and their discussions of drug courts
tend to be quite clipped. E.g., Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's
Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAMn L. REV. 439 passim
(1999); David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 passim (1995). I am aware of only four scholarly pieces
discussing drug courts at length. Two of them can be described as fairly pro-drug court,
though both recognize and address some of the difficult empirical and institutional issues
raised in this Commentary. See James R. Brown, Note, Drug Diversion Courts: Are They
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The scandal of America's drug courts is that we have rushed
headlong into them-driven by politics, judicial pop-
psychopharmacology, fuzzy-headed notions about "restorative
justice" and "therapeutic jurisprudence,"2 and by the bureaucrats'
universal fear of being the last on the block to have the latest
administrative gimmick. We have embraced the drug court panacea
without asking, let alone resolving, even the most basic of questions:
What is the purpose of drug courts? Do drug courts work? Are the
costs of drug courts, including their costs in de-individualized justice,
worth their benefits? Should the sentencing philosophy of a single
drug court judge or group of drug court judges be institutionalized?
Beyond these basic questions, we have yet to examine several
profound policy shifts implicit in creating drug courts: Should judges
be making drug policy simply because elected officials lack the
political will to do so? Do we really want to stimulate the prosecution
of low-level possession and sales cases to such a great degree that we
fill our state prisons with those who cannot be treated successfully? Is
it an efficient use of limited judicial resources to have drug court
judges serving as glorified probation officers?
These are the kinds of hard, fundamental questions that, in a less
hysterical environment, careful judges, careful court administrators,
and, indeed, a careful body politic would insist on examining before
committing to such a serious undertaking. They are questions we all
should insist on asking before a single new drug court is created or a
single existing one is continued.
By this critique, I do not intend to disparage any of my
colleagues around the country who are committed believers in the
drug court concept. On the contrary, their energy, hard work, and
enthusiasm, together with a healthy dose of federal money, is what is
responsible for the drug court experiment becoming the drug court
orthodoxy.
Nor do I intend to deprecate the efforts of the many drug
defendants who have used the treatment opportunity provided by
drug courts to turn their lives around. I have attended several drug
Needed and Will They Succeed in Breaking the Cycle of Drug-Related Crime?, 23 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRlM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 63, 98 (1997); William D. McColl, Comment,
Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD.
L. REV. 467,518 (1996). The other two are mildly anti-drug court and focus on the ethical
challenges that drug courts pose to defense lawyers. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative
Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1216
(1999); Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug-Abusing
Offenders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1898 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 1, at 440; Wexler, supra note 1, at 220.
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court graduations and am always moved by the individual success
stories that abound there.
Nor do I hold myself out as any kind of drug court expert
pretending to have all, or indeed any, of the answers.3 But I do have a
few questions, and it should be troubling to us all that so few of us are
asking any of these questions. The drug court emperor may indeed
be wearing a fine set of clothes, but we cannot know if we refuse to
look.
I. DRUGS AND DRUG LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY
Drug courts are just the latest Band-Aid T' we have tried to apply
over the deep wound of our schizophrenia about drugs. It may,
therefore, be useful to take a moment to put our current thoughts
about drugs and drug laws into some historical perspective.
A. History of Drugs
Humans have used drugs4 for tens of thousands of years, and
3. I apologize in advance for what surely must be many technical oversimplifications
and misunderstandings that well-informed readers of this Commentary will no doubt
detect. I recognize that this apology contains no small amount of irony, given the fact that
one of the themes of this critique is that judges, who are the most general of all generalists,
are ill-equipped to understand the many difficult chemical, neurological, psychiatric,
cultural, and philosophical issues surrounding drug use and abuse. All I can say is that
sometimes it takes a thin-icer to rescue a thin-icer, and maybe my own ineptitude at
describing the ineptitude of others is the best evidence that judges simply should not be
engaged in the meta-judicial exercise that is the drug court.
4. The word "drug" comes from the Anglo-Saxon word dryge, which means "dry."
See THE NEW WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIC DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 266
(Virginia S. Thatcher ed. et al., 1971). The etymology apparently reflects that ancient drug
preparations were made by drying various plants. See id. Many drug preparations
continue to be made in by this method.
I use the term "drugs" in this Commentary in its broadest sense, to include all
substances, natural and synthetic, legal and illegal, that produce a recognized medicinal or
recreational effect when ingested. Pharmacologists typically divide drugs into twelve
primary categories: antidepressants, antipsychotics, cannabis, combinations, dissociative
anesthetics, hallucinogens, narcotic analgesic agonists, narcotic antagonists,
nonprescription analgesics, sedative hypnotics, stimulants, and volatile inhalants. See
ROBERT O'BRIEN ET AL., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DRUG ABUSE xxii, xxvii (2d ed.
1992). Some of the more common drugs discussed in the remainder of this Commentary
are classified as follows: Alcohol is classified as a sedative hypnotic, as are Benadryl,
Librium, Valium, and barbiturates. See id at xxv. Amphetamines, cocaine, caffeine, and
nicotine are classified as stimulants. See iL at xxvi. Cannabis, because it exhibits many
characteristics across several of the categories, is classified as its own category. See id at
xxiii. The so-called "opiates," which include the natural substances opium, morphine, and
codeine, as well as the synthetic and semi-synthetic substances heroin, percocet, percodan,
and Demerol, are classified as narcotic analgesic agonists. See id. at xxiv. The word
"narcotic" refers to drugs that are central nervous system depressants. See id at 202.
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there has always been a complex overlap between medicinal,
religious, and recreational uses.6 The earliest written record of any
drug is a reference by a Sumerian writer in 5000 B.C. to the "joy
plant," which historians now believe was the opium poppy.7 As early
as 3000 B.C., the Chinese used a shrub containing ephedrine to make
"Analgesic" refers to their historical, and in some cases current, use as painkillers that do
not cause loss of consciousness. See id. at 33. "Agonist" means the drugs work by reacting
at a receptor site of a cell, as opposed to antagonists, which work by blocking such
reactions. See id. at 13.
5. See generally DRUGS AND CIVILIZATION 19 (Sally Freeman ed., 1988)
(documenting the long history of drugs throughout different cultures). Indeed, some
anthropologists believe that the discovery of grain-based alcohol, particularly beer, may
have played a significant role in the decision by hunter-gatherer tribes in the Old Stone
Age to ensure a supply of grain by settling down in fixed villages to pursue agriculture.
See id. at 20. Thus, we may owe agriculture, and therefore civilization itself, to beer.
6. This overlap is what gives drug use an important cultural dimension. How drugs
have been viewed in various societies, and therefore how drug abuse has been viewed,
depends very much on the particular uses approved by a given culture, as well as on the
way in which a given culture views notions of addiction and free will. By this, I do not
mean at all to be adopting the moral relativism of many of the modem proponents of drug
legalization. On the contrary, I accept that there very well may be a fixed amount of social
and economic damage done whenever an individual decides to use drugs to disengage
from reality and that that damage may not be culture-dependent. The drunken textile
worker rendered unconscious in eighteenth century Birmingham was worthless to his
family and his factory in much the same way that the nineteenth century peyote-laden
Navajo warrior was worthless to his village. The cultural differences are not so much on
the debit side of the ledger as on the credit side: England in the throes of the industrial
revolution placed considerably less cultural value on drunkenness than the Navajo placed
on the purported ability of peyote to increase religious consciousness. I actually see our
increasing intolerance of recreational drugs of any kind as a healthy sign that we are
becoming enlightened, not to exaggerated dangers of drug use, but rather to the
exaggerated nature of its purported benefits. See, e.g., ALETHEA HAYTER, OPIUM AND
TiE ROMANTIC IMAGINATION 191 (1968) (providing a fascinating examination of this
idea in the context of the purported ability of opium to increase Samuel Coleridge's poetic
powers). In any event, anyone who doubts that culture is a critical component of the role
drugs play in a given society need only compare the ways in which alcohol and heroin are
perceived in most modem Western democracies. Compare infra text accompanying notes
18-27 (discussing the history of alcohol), with infra text accompanying notes 37-42
(discussing the history of heroin).
7. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at ix; see also ALFRED BURGER, DRUGS AND
PEOPLE: MEDICATIONS, TlEIR HISTORY AND ORIGINS, AND THE WAY THEY ACT 14-
15 (1986) (estimating 4000 B.C.). Opium is made by drying the juice from unripened seed
pods of the oriental poppy, Papavier somniferum. See HEROIN: THE STREET NARCOTIC
19 (Fred Zackon ed., 1992) [hereinafter HEROIN]; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 220.
In fact, the word "opium" is derived from a Greek word meaning "juice." See BURGER,
supra, at 15. The dried juice becomes a brownish gum, which is then formed into bricks or
cakes. The bricks or cakes then are dissolved in water to reform a sticky paste for
smoking. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 220. The pharmacologically active
ingredient in opium is morphine. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. Opium is
classified as a narcotic analgesic agonist. See supra note 4. It is either a Schedule I, II, III,
or V controlled substance, depending on its particular form and quantity. See infra note
86 (listing statutory classifications of various drugs).
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an intoxicating inhalant.' By 2700 B.C., the Chinese were using
cannabis to make tea, and they introduced it to the Indians in 2000
B.C., who were the first to dry it and smoke it.9
Of course, the use of wine as an intoxicant was central to both
Greek and Roman cultures. The Greeks not only drank lots of wine,
they also used cannabis and opium extensively.10 The Roman thirst
for wine was even more extreme, and Roman conquests of the
eastern Mediterranean further increased the classical use of opium."
8. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at ix. Ephedrine is a cardiac and central
nervous system stimulant. See supra note 4. Today it is produced synthetically and used
to treat asthma, allergies, hypertension, and narcolepsy, generally as a bronchial dilator.
See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 111; PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE: GENERICS
1027-29 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter PDR].
9. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at ix-x. Cannabis refers to the Indian hemp
plant, Cannabis sativa. The plant's resin, flowering tops, leaves, and stem all contain its
pharmacologically active ingredient, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). See id. at 62. Cannabis
is classified in its own pharmacological category, see supra note 4, because it exhibits so
many different characteristics, depending on its concentrations, see O'BRIEN ET AL., supra
note 4, at 63. In very high doses, it can produce psychedelic effects. See id. At lower,
more common doses it exhibits some characteristics of depressants (sedation), some
characteristics of narcotics (pain killing), and even some characteristics of stimulants
(enhanced perception). See id. Cannabis is a Schedule I controlled substance. See infra
note 86 (listing statutory classifications of various drugs).
10. Wine, of course, was central to the worship of the Greek god Dionysus and his
Roman version, Bacchus. There is no doubt that alcohol was widely used, and sometimes
abused, in ancient Greece, both as part of the cult of Dionysus and quite apart from it.
Other drugs were also well known to the Greeks and were central to their mythology and
religious practices. The residents of several Greek cities celebrated various rites of spring
by drinking kykeon, which is believed to have been a grain fungus containing lysergic acid,
later synthesized as LSD. See DRUGS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 5, at 32-33. Opium
also was well known to the Greeks, even in Alexander's time. Indeed, it was probably
Alexander who introduced opium to the Persians and Indians, who then introduced it to
the Chinese. See id. at 81. Hippocrates experimented with opium as a medicine, and
prescribed it for sleeplessness, epilepsy, and dropsy. See id. at 44. Drugs and their effects
on people were popular topics in Greek literature. The great Greek poetess Sappho
describes the effects of opium in some of her poetry. See id. at 63, 65. Homer reports in
The Odyssey that Helen of Troy gave two of Odysseus's crew members a drug, called
nepenthe, which was probably a mixture of wine, opium, belladonna, and perhaps
cannabis, to treat their grief over their lost commander. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 59-
60, lines 233-52 (Robert Fitzgerald transl., 1998). Homer also devotes a famous section of
The Odyssey to the drug-induced lethargy of three of Odysseus's crewmen in the land of
the Lotus Eaters. In what may have been the first example of compulsory drug treatment,
Odysseus recaptured his wayward crewmen, "drove them, all three wailing, to the ships,
[and] tied them down under their rowing benches." Id- at 148, lines 105-06.
11. The Romans took wine drinking and wine worship to such extremes in their
bacchanalia that by 100 A.D. their excesses produced the first classical laws against public
drunkenness. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at x; infra text accompanying note 62.
As Roman legions contacted drug cultures in the east, Roman opium use, primarily for
medicinal purposes, became more prevalent. Indeed, Egyptian opium remedies became
so popularized by Galen, the court physician to Marcus Aurelius, that such remedies were
known for centuries later as "Galenicals." See DRUGS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 5,
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The Crusades in the eleventh and twelfth centuries accelerated
medieval Europe's knowledge of, and appetite for, drugs. The
Crusaders returned home with many Asian drug preparations,
including the Persian variety of cannabis-hashish-as well as
distilled alcohol. 2
As the great explorer-nations of the Middle Ages began
expanding Europe's contact with the Far East and Far West, drugs
and drug knowledge became increasingly significant in commerce.
Marco Polo returned from China with detailed instructions on the
cultivation and use of opium and cannabis.13  Likewise, after
discovering the Americas, Europeans returned home with coca leaves
for chewing, morning glory seeds for eating, and tobacco for
smoking.' 4
From the end of the Dark Ages through the Renaissance and the
Age of Reason, European drug use in almost all forms became more
and more common as advances in chemistry isolated the relevant
compounds and produced cheaper and more potent forms of ancient
drugs.'5 But opium remained the king of all recreational drugs. In
China, opium use was widespread by 1600.16 By the 1800s, opium use
at 44; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at x-xi.
12. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xi. The word "hashish" is Arabic for "hemp-
eaters" and was introduced to the Crusaders when Saracen terrorists sent to assassinate
them were reportedly often under the influence of cannabis. See BURGER, supra note 7,
at 61; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xi.
13. See O'BRIENETAL., supra note 4, at xi.
14. See STEVEN B. KARCH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF COcAINE 1-9 (1998); O'BRIEN ET
AL., supra note 4, at xi-xii.
15. During the Dark Ages, many drugs began to acquire mythical auras, often fueled
by apothecary superstitions. Little was known about the makeup or active ingredients of
most medicinal drugs. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xi. Nevertheless, some
medieval drugs came to play important historical roles as tools in the endless political
intrigues that plagued Europe in the Middle Ages. Belladonna, for example, is the Italian
name given to an extract made from berries from the plant Solanum nigrum ("deadly
nightshade"). It was used cosmetically by Italian women in the Middle Ages to dilate their
pupils, hence the name "belladonna." By the late 1400s, however, Italian political figures,
like Cesare Borgia, used belladonna in concentrated forms to poison political foes. See id.
at xi. The active ingredient in belladonna, atropine, was not isolated until 1833, and,
because it is non-addictive, it was used at the beginning of the 1900s in "purge" therapy for
opiate addiction. See HEROIN, supra note 7, at 35. Atropine was named after Atropos,
one of the Greek Fates who cut the invisible threads of life, presumably in reference to the
drug's recognized ability to cause drastic effects, including death, with little evidence of its
presence. See BURGER, supra note 7, at 16. Today, atropine is used as an antispasmodic,
see O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xi; PDR, supra note 8, at 25-31, and is a Schedule V
controlled substance, see infra note 86 (listing statutory classifications of various drugs).
16. Opium was the subject of such important commerce by English shipping
companies transporting it from producers in India to consumers in China (and therefore
ensuring full cargoes for return trips in the spice trade) that England waged the First
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in Europe also reached epidemic proportions. 7
In America, however, our Puritan ancestors seem to have made a
significant, though perhaps unconscious, cultural turn. Alcohol
became the colonial recreational drug of choice, to the relative
exclusion of opium. Though opium continued to be popular in
Europe and Asia, it never took hold in colonial America, despite the
fact that it was widely available and widely used for medicinal
purposes.18
In the colonies, people of all stations, occupations, and ages
consumed alcohol freely and in large quantities. 9 Though distilled
alcohol had roots almost as old as opium,' America embraced it as a
kind of New World drug-clean and simple to consume, almost
Opium War on China when the Manchu rulers took steps in the 1830s to ban its
importation. See DRUGS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 5, at 82-85; HEROIN, supra note
7, at 25; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiii. See generally JACK BEECHING, THE
CHINESE OPIUM WARS (1975) (discussing the Opium Wars); PETER WARD FAY, THE
OPIUM WAR: 1840-42 (1975) (discussing the history of opium and China's first Opium
War).
17. In England in 1850, for example, it was quite common for women-especially
working-class women doing textile work at home-to give opium to their children to make
them sleep during the day. Several opiate elixirs were marketed specifically for this
purpose, with names like "Mother Bailey's Quieting Syrup." See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra
note 4, at xiv.
18. Cheap opiates were in widespread medical use in colonial America, but there is no
evidence that opium was used recreationally on any significant basis, as it had been and
continued to be in Europe and China. See JOHN RUBLOWSKY, THE STONED AGE: A
HISTORY OF DRUGS IN AMERICA 123 (1974). Indeed, there were probably no more than
120,000 opium addicts in the United States in 1875-when opium addiction had already
reached epidemic proportions in Europe-and these addicts were for the most part
unfortunate victims of Civil War field medicine. See BEECHING, supra note 16, at 178;
infra text accompanying note 29. But see infra note 29 (suggesting that reports of
morphine addiction of returning Civil War veterans were exaggerated greatly). Similarly,
though hemp was an important colonial crop for cloth and rope, there is no evidence that
marijuana was widely smoked in the colonies for recreation. See RICHARD LAWRENCE
MILLER, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS 85 (1991).
19. See Paul Aaron & David Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in America: An
Historical Overview, in ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF
PROHIBITION 127, 131 (Mark H. Moore & Dean R. Gerstein eds., 1981). Average annual
per capita consumption by colonial Americans was several times what is it today. See
STANTON PEELE, DISEASING OF AMERICA: ADDICTION TREATMENT OUT OF
CONTROL 35 (1989); see also WJ. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 8-10 (1979) (stating that in 1770, Americans drank three and a
half gallons of alcohol per year per capita; that number increased to four gallons in 1830; it
fell to less than one gallon by 1920; and even in the carefree 1970s, the number was still
less than two gallons). Colonial alcohol consumption was not only large, it was
widespread. Though there were some cultural differences, people drank pretty much
regardless of their age, sex, or class and did so everywhere they went. See RORABAUGH,
supra, at 11-16, 20-21.
20. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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democratic-not at all like the smoky, foreign substances used by
Asian potentates and European decadents. Indeed, Puritans called
alcohol the "Good Creature of God."21
Drinking alcohol was an important part of the fabric of daily
colonial life. The tavern was a significant social center, especially in
New England.z2 Alcoholism was not recognized as a problem,
probably due in no small part to powerful Protestant notions of free
will.23
The Industrial Revolution fundamentally changed America's
attitude toward alcohol. In the fifty years between 1785 and 1835,
alcohol came to be viewed as acutely disruptive to the growing
industrialized and increasingly urbanized work force.24 Per capita
alcohol consumption plummeted, dropping to one-third its colonial
levels2 5 Drinking became marginalized, and the people who drank
regularly tended toward overdrinking. Improved methods of
distillation, which made distilled spirits significantly more potent than
in colonial times, may have contributed to the pattern of fewer people
drinking more.
21. This description is usually attributed to the Puritan leader Increase Mather, who
wrote in 1673: "Drink is in itself a creature of God, and to be received with thankfulness."
RORABAUGH, supra note 19, at 23.
22. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN ThMPERANCE MOVEMENT 37 (1963) (describing the role of taverns in the
colonial social order).
23. See Harry Gene Levine, The Good Creature of God and the Demon Rum:
Colonial American and 19th Century Ideas About Alcohol, Crime, and Accidents, in
NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, RESEARCH MONOGRAPH No.
12, ALCOHOL AND DISINHIBITION: NATURE AND MEANING OF THE LINK 111, 121-22
(Robin Room & Gary Collins eds., 1983) ("Drunkenness was not so much seen as the
cause of deviant social behavior-in particular crime and violence-as it was construed as
a sign that an individual was willing to engage in such behavior.").
24. Peele has described this fundamental change this way:
[The colonial attitude toward drinking] changed dramatically in the fifty years
dating roughly from 1785 to 1835. During this period, drinking became a
disruptive force for many Americans. The tight-knit community tavern
disappeared, and instead the new industrialized work force and the western
ranch laborer went to boisterous saloons to get drunk. Imagine as a model of
nineteenth-century male drinking the Dodge City dance hall-where the only
women likely to be present were prostitutes and where gunplay and fights were
common. Middle- and upper-class Americans cut back their drinking drastically
because it was no longer considered appropriate for an industrious life. As
alcohol was eliminated from the ordinary daily routines of the middle class, when
people did drink, they were more likely to go on binges where they drank all out.
PEELE, supra note 19, at 36; see also RORABAUGH, supra note 19, at 167-69 (arguing that
the cyclical pattern of people abstaining then bingeing was consonant not only with
industrialization in general, but also with American industrial compartmentalization).
25. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 37; Aaron & Musto, supra note 19, at 136, 157, 164.
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This period also saw the beginnings of the temperance
movement, with its twin religious axioms: (1) alcohol is evil and
therefore bad for everyone in any amount; and (2) alcohol can
enslave a people against their will.F 6 Although the former has fallen
out of favor, the latter formed the moral foundation for the modem
disease theory of addiction and planted the seeds of a deep American
social ambivalence about alcohol use and abuse.27
In the meantime, science and medicine were creating new and
more powerful drugs. At the turn of the eighteenth century, chemists
isolated the active ingredient in opium and dubbed it "morphine."'
Doctors used morphine extensively during the Civil War to lessen the
suffering of wounded soldiers in field hospitals, thereby producing a
reported 400,000 morphine addicts.29 Cocaine-the principal alkaloid
26. See GUSFIELD, supra note 22, at 29-38 (discussing the political history of the
temperance movement); infra note 70 (discussing earlier American temperance efforts).
See generally JOHN KOBLER, ARDENT SPIRITS: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION
(1973) (discussing the social history of Prohibition).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 130-47.
28. A German pharmacist, F.W. Serturner, usually is credited with the discovery of
morphine. See HEROIN, supra note 7, at 24; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiv. He
named the substance after Morpheus, the Greek god of sleep and dreams. See id at xiv.
Morphine is an extraordinarily potent painkiller, and it remains the standard against which
other painkillers are measured. See HEROIN, supra note 7, at 24; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra
note 4, at 194; PDR, supra note 8, at 2182-94. Morphine first was synthesized in 1952. See
O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 195. It is, of course, an opiate, and, like opium and
heroin, it is classified as a narcotic analgesic agonist. See supra note 4. Because pure
morphine is not very soluble, it is commonly used, both medically and recreationally, in
sulfate forms. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 195; PDR, supra note 8, at 2182.
Morphine sulfate is an odorless white crystal, or crystalline powder, and is typically used
either orally or by injection (after rehydrating). See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 195.
Morphine is a Schedule II, III, or V substance, depending on its dose. See infra note 86
(listing the statutory classifications of various drugs).
29. See O'BREN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiv-xv. The hypodermic needle was
introduced into medicine in the early 1850s, and the remarkable painkilling effects of
morphine were made even more remarkable by its injection. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL 1 (3d ed. 1999). Physicians
wrongly believed that morphine's addictive qualities could be avoided entirely by
bypassing the digestive system. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiv-xv. Morphine
therefore was injected as an emergency analgesic in field hospitals during the American
Civil War and the Franco Prussian War of 1870-71. The resultant morphine dependency
was so widespread that it was dubbed "the soldier's disease," id. at 1-2, and "the army
disease," HEROIN, supra note 7, at 28.
Despite the conventional description of these returning soldiers as "addicts," Yale
psychiatrist and addiction theorist David Musto reports that there is actually little
historical evidence that such soldiers were in fact morphine "addicts." See MUsTO, supra,
at 1-2, 301 n.2. Indeed, he reports that Civil War field hospitals most commonly applied
morphine topically and only rarely injected it. See id. at 301 n.2. Musto contends that our
description of returning Civil War soldiers as morphine "addicts" is not supported by
contemporaneous evidence. See id.
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in coca leaves-was isolated in the 1850s0 By 1878, cocaine was used
extensively as a treatment for morphine addiction, and it quickly
became a popular surgical anesthetic.3'
In a rather strange twist on our Puritan heritage, as the
30. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 73. Cocaine is an alkaloid found in the
leaves of the coca plant, Ethroxylon coca, that grows abundantly in the Andes Mountains
of South America. See COCAINE: A NEW EPIDEMIC 20 (Chris-Ellyn Johanson ed., 1986)
[hereinafter COCAINE]. It is classified as a stimulant. See supra note 4. The German
chemist Albert Niemann first isolated and identified its active ingredient,
benzoylmethylecognine, in the 1850s. See COCAINE, supra, at 53; KARCH, supra note 14,
at 14-17; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 73. Cocaine can be ingested in a variety of
ways, including the chewing of coca leaves, application to any mucous linings of the body,
nasal inhalation (or "snorting"), and intravenous injection. See COCAINE, supra, at 20-27.
Because cocaine loses much of its effect if taken orally, because in its powdered
hydrochloride form it is not as effective as when smoked, and because the direct smoking
of coca paste is extremely dangerous because of the impurities in the paste, two methods
have been developed to allow for the smoking of cocaine. See id. at 26. The first, which is
called "freebasing," became popular in the early 1980s and involves heating dissolved
cocaine hydrochloride with ether (or lighter fluid or any other solvent) to convert the
hydrochloride form to a smokeable alkaloid form. See id; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4,
at 121. But because freebasing is time-consuming and dangerous, drug dealers developed
a process of cooking a mixture of cocaine hydrochloride, water, and bicarbonate of soda
into a crystallized and smokeable form, which is sometimes referred to as "crack." See
COCAINE, supra, at 26; Jerome H. Skolnick, A Critical Look at the National Drug Control
Strategy, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 75,98 (1990). The word "crack" may have been coined
to describe the crackling sound that the mixture makes during the cooking process, see
Skolnick, supra, at 98, or it may refer to the way in which the pancake-shaped residue that
is left after the cooking process is then cracked into smaller chips, see O'BRIEN ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 85. The cocaine consumed in both the freebase and crack forms is not
only substantially purer than its powdered predecessor, but is also much more rapidly
absorbed by being smoked, carried in just a few seconds from the lungs to the brain. See
KARCH, supra note 14, at 57; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 85, 121. Indeed, although
smoked cocaine produces blood levels comparable to injection, it appears to produce
effects, and risks of toxicity, greater even than intravenous use. See KARCH, supra note
14, at 57. Crack also is substantially cheaper per "high" than powdered cocaine. See
COCAINE, supra, at 27. Cocaine is a Schedule II substance. See infra note 86 (listing
statutory classifications of various drugs).
31. See COCAINE, supra note 30, at 30-33; KARCH, supra note 14, at 38-40; O'BRIEN
ET AL., supra note 4, at xv. Many other drug compounds were isolated in the veritable
renaissance of drug science that occurred between 1750 and 1900. A liquid form of ether,
dubbed "anodyne," was developed in 1730, and it became popular not only as a treatment
for a variety of ailments, but also as a recreational drug thought to be non-addictive. See
O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiv. Nitrous oxide was discovered in 1776, synthesized in
1777, and used thereafter both as an anesthetic and recreationally at "laughing gas"
parties. See id. The first synthetic sedative, chloral hydrate, was developed in 1869 and
was widely used recreationally, especially in potentially lethal combination with alcohol.
The mixture was dubbed "knockout drops" or "Mickey Finn." See id. In 1896, mescaline
was isolated as the active ingredient in peyote. See id- People used Chloroform, which
also was developed in this period, anesthetically. In fact, Queen Victoria's physicians gave
it to her during childbirth, and she hailed it as "blessed, soothing, quieting and delightful
beyond measure." Andrew A. Skolnick, Lessons from US History of Drug Use, 277
JAMA 1919,1919 (1997).
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temperance movement tried to push alcohol out of mainstream
America, old-fashioned Yankee commercialism introduced the
mainstream to opiates and to the newly developed alkaloid forms of
cocaine. All manners of potions, elixirs, and other products, including
perhaps the most famous, Coca-Cola, openly contained opiates or
cocaine, often in quite large doses.32
32. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiv. For example, Tucker's "Asthma
Specific," a popular elixir that touted itself as a cure for asthma and other respiratory
afflictions, contained 420 milligrams of cocaine per ounce. See KARCH, supra note 14, at
106. Powdered cocaine is generally "snorted" in "lines," and one line typically contains 50
to 75 milligrams of cocaine. See id. So one ounce of Tucker's elixir contained five to nine
times the amount of cocaine snorted in a single line. Coca-Bola, a popular cocaine-
containing chewing gum sold in the late 1800s and early 1900s, contained 710 milligrams of
cocaine per ounce, or the equivalent of 10 to 14 lines. See id
Despite the mythology surrounding Coca-Cola, it did not contain cocaine in
quantities nearly as great as many of the less famous cocaine elixirs of the time. As
originally produced in 1886, Coca-Cola probably contained no more than 1.5 milligrams of
refined cocaine per ounce. See id at 102. Sometime after 1901, the company dropped
refined cocaine from its formula entirely and began instead to use coca leaves that had
been de-cocainized. See id at 28.
The widespread use of elixirs of cocaine in the late 1800s was just as popular in
Europe as it was in America. One of the most popular European cocaine elixirs was a
mixture of liquid cocaine and wine, and the most popular of all the European cocaine-
wine products was Vin Mariani, named after its Corsican manufacturer, Angelo Mariani.
See id. at 23-29. Vin Mariani contained approximately six milligrams of cocaine per
ounce, which was four times the cocaine per ounce as Coca-Cola, though still substantially
less than elixirs like Tucker's. See id. at 27. Despite its relatively low levels, however, the
effect of the cocaine in Vin Mariani and comparable cocaine-wine mixtures was greatly
enhanced by the presence of alcohol. Though the effect has long been known to users and
emergency room personnel, in the late 1980s researchers at Yale and in Barcelona
simultaneously discovered that when alcohol is ingested with cocaine, the body
metabolizes a new substance, cocaethylene, which has the same stimulant properties as
cocaine, but lasts much longer. See id. at 101. Alcohol thus has the effect of multiplying
the effective dose of any cocaine with which it is taken. Some of the most famous drinkers
and touters of Vin Mariani included Pope Leo XIII, Jules Verne, and Thomas Edison. See
COCAINE, supra note 30, at 56-57; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xvi.
Straight cocaine also had its famous nineteenth century proponents. Sigmund
Freud began experimenting with it in the early 1880s as a treatment for his patients' and
friends' morphine addictions, and he published his famous monograph, On Coca, in 1884.
KARCH, supra note 14, at 40; see also THE COCAINE PAPERS OF SIGMUND FREUD
(Robert Byck ed. 1974) (compiling Freud's work on cocaine and suggesting that Freud
considered cocaine effective for certain therapeutic treatments). There is even some
indication that Freud's orders for cocaine may have stimulated the German
pharmaceutical giant Merck to begin the first efforts at large-scale cocaine production.
See KARCH, supra note 14, at 85-86. Freud also may have discovered cocaine's anesthetic
uses, though this discovery is usually credited to the German doctor Karl Kiler, who used
drops of a cocaine solution to prevent pain during eye surgery. See id- at 37-51. Freud
probably began taking cocaine orally in 1884 to treat his own depression. See id at 43;
O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xvi.
The most famous fictional cocaine user, of course, is Sherlock Holmes. Like
Freud, Holmes was described to have used the drug to treat depression-the depression
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By 1900, opiates and cocaine had achieved remarkably broad
medicinal acceptance in America. Regular users tended to be in the
middle and upper classes and tended to be white women in the
Northeast and white men in the South.3 Widespread home use was
not limited to oral consumption in the form of elixirs; the 1897 Sears,
Roebuck and Company mail-order catalog, for example, offered a
selection of syringe kits for intravenous morphine injections 4
Despite the efforts of the temperance movement, alcohol
remained the most common recreational drug in America throughout
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.35 Opium, cocaine, and other
drugs favored in mainstream Europe did manage to find recreational
niches in America, but by the 1930s, our social opprobrium drove
those drugs into the social margins. 6
Doctors developed heroin in the late 1800s, first as a substitute
for morphine and then as a cure for morphine addiction. 7 Americans
with which he became afflicted after solving a particularly challenging case-though,
unlike Freud, Holmes used cocaine intravenously. References to his use appear in several
stories, most prominently in The Sign of Four. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE SIGN
OF FOUR (1974). David Musto delightfully discusses the connections between Freud and
Holmes in his monograph. See David Musto, A Study in Cocaine, in THE COCAINE
PAPERS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra, at 357-70. Nicholas Meyer developed these ideas
even further in his novel. See NICHOLAS MEYER, THE SEVEN-PER-CENT SOLUTION
passim (1974).
33. See HEROIN, supra note 7, at 31.
34. See id. This widespread use of opiates and cocaine at the turn of the century does
not appear to have resulted in any significant reported public health problems. See
PEELE, supra note 19, at 233. This paradox of widespread use of commercial opiates and
cocaine, some with extraordinarily high drug content, see supra note 32, in the absence of
any evidence of widespread addiction or other public health effects, is just one example of
a pattern that seems to be repeated throughout history in many different cultures. The
cultural set and setting in which a drug is consumed seems to have as much or more to do
with whether it will be abused than its particular chemistry or dosage. These historical
examples form an important part of the argument against the disease model of addiction.
See infra text accompanying notes 130-47.
35. See O'BRIENETAL., supra note 4, at xv.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 39, 41,45.
37. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 139. Heroin, or diacetylmorphine, can be
produced from, and greatly resembles, morphine. See HEROIN, supra note 7, at 33;
O'BRIEN ET AL,, supra note 4, at 139. Like morphine, it is a narcotic analgesic agonist.
See supra note 3. The British chemist C.R. Wright first synthesized heroin in 1874. See
HEROIN, supra note 7, at 33. The German pharmaceutical company Bayer began to
produce heroin in commercial quantities in 1898 as an even more powerful and
purportedly non-addictive analgesic substitute for morphine. See HEROIN, supra note 7,
at 33; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 139. The word "heroin" comes from the German
word heroisch, which means "powerful" or "heroic" and presumably was meant to
describe the euphoric feeling that it can produce. See id. Heroin is most commonly traded
and consumed in its crystalline form and used intravenously after being dissolved in water.
See id. at 139-40. Although it can also be taken orally, sniffed like cocaine, placed under
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also used heroin extensively in the latter part of the 1800s, not only in
traditional medical treatment, but also as a medicinal-recreational
drug similar to the opium-cocaine elixirs. It sounds almost
unbelievable to us today, but by 1900, as many as one million
Americans regularly used heroin?8  Thanks in large part to a
remarkably intense public and medical education effort spearheaded
by President Theodore Roosevelt and his anti-narcotics advisor,
Hamilton Wright, and fueled with liberal dashes of pre-World War I
xenophobia, recreational and commercial opiate use-especially
heroin use-was driven from the mainstream in the United States
with astounding speed.3 9  By 1930, heroin use had become the
quintessence of criminality, and heroin addiction was not viewed as
any more significant a public health problem than murder, rape, or a
host of other organically criminal behaviors. ° By the end of World
War II, there were fewer than 50,000 heroin addicts in the United
States.4' As with many long-forgotten drugs, the counter-culture
revolutions of the 1960s reintroduced heroin to a new generation of
recreational users. By 1989, there were an estimated 500,000 heroin
addicts in the United States, and heroin continues to play a role in the
current picture of drug abuse.42
Much as the Civil War introduced Americans to morphine,
World War II introduced us to amphetamines, 43 which were regularly
the tongue, or smoked, these methods are not very efficient and, given heroin's high price,
are therefore relatively rare. See id. at 140. Heroin is a Schedule I controlled substance.
See infra note 86 (listing statutory classifications of various drugs).
38. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xx.
39. See HEROIN, supra note 7, at 36-43.
40. See id. at 42-44.
41. See id. at 44.
42. See id. at 47.
43. The word "amphetamine" refers to a group of related organic compounds, each
consisting of a phenyl ring, a methyl group, a two-carbon side chain, and an amino group.
See AMHETAMIEs: DANGER IN THE FAST LANE 28 (Scott E. Lukas ed., 1992)
[hereinafter AMPHETAMINES]. Amphetamines do not occur in nature; they must be
synthesized. See id at 19. They were first synthesized in 1887 in Germany, but were
largely forgotten until the 1930s. See id In 1932, the American drug company Smith,
Klein & French marketed a nasal inhaler containing an amphetamine under the trade
name Benzedrine, and many real and imagined medical uses for amphetamines quickly
followed. See id at 19-21. They commonly were used to treat schizophrenia, morphine
addiction, codeine addiction, tobacco smoking, infantile cerebral palsy, low blood
pressure, and hiccups. See id. at 21. Trade names for some popular amphetamines have
now become familiar, such as Dexedrine (which is a form of amphetamine called
dextroamphetamine sulfate), Methedrine (methamphetamine), and Ritalin
(methylphenidate). See BURGER, supra note 7, at 157-58. Amphetamines are stimulants,
see supra note 4, and are classified as either Schedule II, HI, or IV substances, depending
on their form, see infra note 86 (listing the statutory classification of various drugs).
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included in British, American, German, and Japanese mess kits as
tools to stay awake and as general energy supplements.44
Amphetamines quickly became popular in post-war America, both
medically and recreationally.45 It took until the 1960s for the forces of
social opprobrium, or some cynics would say the rediscovery of an
allegedly much safer stimulant-cocaine-to dampen the popularity
of amphetamines and drive their use, as with heroin, to the cultural
margins.46 Even today, however, amphetamine use does not carry
with it the levels of stigma associated with heroin.
Families of tranquilizers-like Valium and Librium-began to be
synthesized in the 1950s and 1960s,47 and they soon took their
temporary places in the pantheon of popular recreational drugs.
Glue sniffing appeared in the 1950s, disappeared in the 1960s, and has
been coming and going ever since.4  Lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD) and other hallucinogens were widely used in the
countercultures of the 1960s, fell quickly out of use within a decade,
and pop up now and then as part of the "other drug" background
noise.49  "Angel dust," or phencyclidine hydrochloride (PCP), a
particularly dangerous dissociative anesthetic, also became popular in
the 1960s, though its use has declined steadily as users apparently
became familiar with its bizarre and unpleasant side effects.50
44. See AMPHETAMINS, supra note 43, at 22; O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xix.
45. See AMPHETAMINEs, supra note 43, at 21-22. Medically, amphetamines were
used to treat everything from depression to obesity. See id Interestingly, post-war Japan
struggled with its own amphetamine epidemic. By 1954, two million of Japan's 88 million
people were taking amphetamines. See id at 23; BURGER, supra note 7, at 57-58.
46. Although amphetamines remain part of the overall drug problem in the United
States, they are a relatively small part, particularly among young adults. For example, in
the 14-year period from 1975 through 1989, the number of high school seniors who
reported ever having tried amphetamines decreased from a high in 1983 of 35.4% to
19.1% in 1989. See AMPHETAMINES, supra note 43, at 30-31.
47. See O'BRIENETAL., supra note 4, at xix.
48. See id.
49. LSD is a semi-synthetic hallucinogen derived from a fungus that grows on rye and
other grains. See i&L at 169. A Swiss chemist, Albert Hofmann, first synthesized LSD in
1943 and also was among the first clinical users, when he inadvertently ingested some of it.
See id. at 169-70. LSD is a Schedule I or Schedule III controlled substance, depending on
its particular form. See infra note 86 (listing the statutory classification of drugs).
50. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 231. PCP was developed in 1959 as one of a
new breed of analgesics called "disassociative anesthetics" because they disassociate the
patient from all bodily sensations, including pain. See id. Surgeons and anesthesiologists
soon discovered, however, that PCP frequently caused patients to become agitated,
delusional, and irrational during recovery, and its use as a human anesthetic was
discontinued. See id. at 232. It is cheap and easy to synthesize, and it became a popular
street drug in the 1960s. Recreational users eventually discovered what doctors had
discovered in the early 1960s, and PCP use has been steadily declining since 1979. See id.
It continues to be a problem, however, because it is frequently mixed or "dusted" with
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Like tranquilizers, cannabis also enjoyed a recreational
renaissance during the 1960s. Today, cannabis is the most widely
used illegal drug in America, outpacing all other illegal drugs
combined." By dollars spent, cannabis comprises the third largest
illicit drug market, behind only cocaine and heroin.52
In the 1960s, as public acceptance of amphetamines began to
erode, cocaine became the stimulant of choice. There was a broad
public and medical belief in the early 1970s that cocaine was
considerably safer than amphetamines,53 and there was a kernel of
truth in this consensus. In the 1960s and early 1970s, cocaine was
consumed almost exclusively through nasal inhalation and, by today's
standards, generally involved relatively low, and therefore relatively
safe, doses.' All of that changed dramatically in the 1980s.
The National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that American
demand for cocaine increased four-fold in the eight years between
1974 and 1982.51 Cocaine-related emergencies and deaths tripled in
the five years between 1976 and 1981.56 Many of these developments,
especially those relating to increased dosages and toxicity, were the
result of the introduction of two cheap, potent, and dangerous forms
of smokeable cocaine-freebase and crack. 7 The cocaine epidemic
seems to have plateaued in the mid- to late-1980s, 58 though even at
current rates most experts agree that cocaine remains the most
significant of the dangerous drugs.59
other drugs, and the adulteration is often not disclosed. See iL PCP is a Schedule II
controlled substance. See infra note 86 (listing the statutory classifications of various
drugs).
51. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 253
(1992).
52. See iL
53. See COCAINE, supra note 30, at 58-59.
54. See id. In fact, the low-level snorting of cocaine was described in 1973 by
President Nixon's National Commission on Marijuana and Cocaine as having insignificant
social costs. See id. at 58-59.
55. See id. at 60.
56. See id. It is important to keep a historical perspective on these statistics about
mushrooming cocaine abuse. Even at its height in recent years, the per capita levels of
cocaine abuse today are significantly less than they were at the turn of the century. See
infra note 128 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 30.
58. See KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 287-88. Actually, there seems to have been a
slight upturn in cocaine use in the early 1990s in the midst of a general and rather dramatic
downturn in the use of other illegal drugs. See The War on Drugs (Continued), U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Dec. 30, 1991, at 21, 21 (reporting the results of the 1991 survey done by
the National Institute on Drug Abuse).
59. Even ignoring lethal cocaine and alcohol mixtures, see supra note 31, deaths and
injuries related to cocaine use today still exceed those of any other illegal drug. See
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B. History of Drug Laws
The first law known to touch upon the issue of drugs was also the
first law known to touch upon most anything-the Code of
Hammurabi.60 It outlawed Babylonian "drunkenness" but not
alcohol.61  Throughout pre-classical and classical eras, most
civilizations seem to have recognized the social costs of
overindulgence, though their legal response, like Hammurabi's,
generally was to outlaw the overindulgence but not the indulgence.
Thus, for example, by 100 A.D., the excesses of the bacchanalia
inspired some Roman anti-drunkenness laws, but not laws outlawing
alcohol. 2
The first national attempt to ban drug use, as opposed to drug
abuse, was an edict issued in 1776 by the Manchu dynasty prohibiting
the use of opium in China.63 This first national drug law was
spectacularly unsuccessful, doing nothing to abate the Chinese opium
epidemic, despite making opium use a capital offense.
64
Interestingly, the first American drug laws also were aimed at
Chinese opium users. In 1875, San Francisco banned opium houses,
which were being used primarily by Chinese immigrants. 65 Other
jurisdictions quickly followed suit, and by 1914 dozens of state and
local laws not only banned opium houses, but also banned opium
smoking.66 The consumption of opium in its more occidentally
accepted liquid form remained legal and widely accepted. 67
Congress first expressed a mild reaction to commercial opium
and cocaine with its passage of the Federal Food and Drugs Act of
1906,1' which did not ban either substance, but merely mandated truth
KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 289.
60. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at x. The Code of Hammurabi was written
around 1700 B.C.
61. See iL
62. See supra note 11 (discussing the first Roman laws regarding drunkenness).
63. O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at xiii.
64. See L
65. See id. at xvi.
66. See iL
67. See idU The racial component to this difference in our legislative approach
between the smoking of opium and the consumption of liquid opium has not gone
unnoticed by historians and other commentators. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 18, at 88,
196-97 nn. 20-26.
68. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 1-3, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed
1938). The real target of the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was not so much opium
and cocaine elixirs in particular as it was food additives in general. One of the most
fascinating historical characters associated with the successful drive to enact early federal
food and drug legislation was Harvey Wiley, whose now discredited experiments on the
purported dangers of food additives such as benzoic acid, along with the publication of
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in labeling. Six years later, Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics
Act, which again did not ban either substance, but imposed licensing
requirements for dispensing certain drugs and taxed such dispensing.69
The political influence of the temperance movement reached its
apogee in America in 1919 with the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment, which outlawed the sale, manufacture, import-export
(but not use) of all intoxicating liquors70 and which granted
concurrent power to Congress and the states to enforce this
prohibition.7' Congress accepted the constitutional invitation to
adopt enforcing legislation with its passage of the National
Prohibition Act, which is commonly referred to as the Volstead Act.72
The conventional view of Prohibition as a deeply failed political
and social experiment driven by extremists is exaggerated. Most
historians agree that Prohibition enjoyed considerable support at its
inception.73 Moreover, although national alcohol consumption did
not decline during Prohibition-in fact, middle class consumption
Upton Sinclair's criticisms of the beef packing industry in The Jungle, did much to
energize the anti-additive hysteria that flourished in the first two decades of the 1900s. See
KARCH, supra note 14, at 106-09 (providing an intriguing discussion of Wiley's impact on
the adoption of the 1906 Act). Wiley later turned his misplaced but considerable energies
to Coca-Cola, although the object of his attentions, interestingly, was not cocaine, but
caffeine. See id at 111-14. Years of litigation followed, and the 1906 Act was eventually
amended to include caffeine as an ingredient that must be disclosed by manufacturers, see
Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (repealed 1938), and Coca-Cola eventually
agreed to reduce the amount of caffeine in its product. See KARCH, supra note 14, at 113-
14.
69. Pub. L. No. 63-223, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (superseded 1939).
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933). The Eighteenth Amendment
was ratified effective January 16, 1919. See 1 U.S.C. lxiv (1994) (reprinting the text of the
amendment and providing the date of ratification). The temperance movement by no
means lay dormant before its success with the Eighteenth Amendment. There was a first
wave of very successful state prohibition efforts in the 1850s, led by Maine and followed
quickly by a dozen other states and territories. This initial push for prohibition ran its
course in the 1860s, which most historians attribute to the rising sectional conflict over
slavery, but others attribute to a popular realization that state prohibition statutes simply
did not work. Compare NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN PROHIBITION 48-49 (1976) (contending that the early
temperance movement was displaced by the Civil War), with JACK S. BLOCKER, JR.,
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTs: CYCLES OF REFORM 59 (1989) (contending that
the early temperance movement was displaced by its own failures).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 (repealed 1933).
72. Pub. L. No. 66-66, ch. 82,41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935).
73. See KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE
FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 9 (1994). After all, the Eighteenth
Amendment not only was approved by the required two-thirds majority in both Houses,
but also was ratified by 46 states. The speed of state ratification and the margins of those
ratification votes suggest very broad popular support. See id
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increased-working class consumption declined significantly.74
Alcohol fatalities also decreased significantly.75 There is no doubt
that public support for Prohibition declined precipitously during the
late 1920s, but the onset of the Great Depression, during which
opponents argued that a vigorous liquor industry would aid in the
economic recovery, probably had more to do with repeal than any sea
change in our moral attitudes about alcohol use.76
In any event, whether an exaggeration or not, the Prohibition
experiment came to be viewed by the vast majority of Americans as
spectacularly and cathartically unsuccessful. 77  The Eighteenth
Amendment was repealed in 1933 by the Twenty-First Amendment,"
and the Prohibition experiment was dead for all time, just fourteen
years after its birth. Nevertheless, the failed experiment had two
profound cultural impacts on our view of drugs and drug laws.
First, it codified into a kind of national catechism the temperance
idea that alcohol can be a demon that some people simply cannot
control.79 This idea, though somewhat secularized and divorced from
the other temperance notion that all alcohol is evil, led directly to the
phenomenon of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) in the mid-1930s. The
credo of Alcoholics Anonymous-that certain people are
"alcoholics" who cannot control their drinking, who can stop their
uncontrolled drinking only through the support and acceptance of
other alcoholics, and who cannot ever take another drink without
falling back into the abyss of addiction-not only became national
74. See MERTON M. HYMAN ET AL., DRINKERS, DRINKING AND ALCOHOL-
RELATED MORTALITY AND HOSPITALIZATIONS: A STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM (1980);
PEELE, supra note 19, at 41. The criminalization of alcohol drove its price up and,
therefore, its availability to working class people down. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 41.
75. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 41.
76. See id. at 42.
77. Our sense of Prohibition's failure may have as much to do with the temperance
movement's unrealistic expectations as anything else. A radio sermon delivered on the
eve of Prohibition by the renowned prohibitionist Billy Sunday was typical: "The reign of
tears is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We will turn our prisons into factories
and our jails into storehouses and corncribs. Men will walk upright now, women will smile
and the children will laugh. Hell will be forever for rent." KOBLER, supra note 26, at 12.
With goals like these, all social experiments will fail.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The Twenty-First Amendment was ratified
effective December 5,1933. See 1 U.S.C. lxv (1994).
79. The crystallization of this axiom during Prohibition might well have been the
result of the way Prohibition changed our social perceptions of drinking. "[D]rinking was
not clearly differentiated from drunkenness .... People did not take the trouble to go to a
speakeasy, present the password, and pay high prices for very poor quality alcohol simply
to have a beer." Norman E. Zinberg & Kathleen M. Fraser, The Role of the Social Setting
in the Prevention and Treatment of Alcoholism, in THE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF
ALCOHOLISM 457,468 (Jack H. Mendelson & Nancy K. Mello eds., 2d ed. 1985).
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dogma, it also formed the modem basis for the disease model of
addiction that has controlled our view of drugs throughout the
twentieth century.80
Secondly, Prohibition reinforced the special cultural niche
enjoyed by alcohol, which our Puritan ancestors first created 300
years earlier.8 Alcohol is different. Alcohol may be an addictive
drug to a small, but mysteriously growing number of people labeled
"alcoholics,"' but for the vast majority of Americans it is a non-
addictive, socially accepted form of relaxation that has nothing to do
with all the other "bad" drugs, which are always addictive to all
people in any amounts and in all settings. This cleaving of alcohol out
of the drug universe not only freed us to drink without moral or legal
costs, but also freed us to turn our moral and legal attention to the
"bad" drugs with a zeal unmatched in the history of drug laws.8'
Within an astonishingly short period of time after the end of
Prohibition, states began adopting laws criminalizing the recreational
use of cannabis and opiates. 4 As dozens of new recreational drugs
came into vogue, states just as quickly criminalized their use.
Congress joined the fray with the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937,1 which
80. See infra text accompanying notes 130-47.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
82. See infra text accompanying note 127.
83. Murchison has suggested a whole host of other subtle and not-so-subtle influences
on our vision of federal criminal law exerted by Prohibition, including in the areas of
entrapment, double jeopardy, takings, and perhaps most notably, search and seizure. See
MURCHISON, supra note 73, at 23-153.
84. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of 1932, which outlawed the non-medical use of
opiates, cocaine, and cannabis, spread quickly through the states, beginning in 1933. UNIF.
NARCOTIC DRUG Acr, § 21, 9B U.L.A. 284 (1958); see, e.g., CALIF. GEN. LAWS CODE,
Act 5323, § 1 (Deering Supp. 1936) (current version at CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE,
§§ 11055-11058, 11350-11380 (West 1999)); FLA. STAT. ch. 15.3397(1)-(22) (Harrison
1933) (repealed 1973) (rewritten and incorporated as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (West
1997)); ILL. STATE BAR STATS., ch. 91, 1 157 (Callaghan 1935) (repealed 1971) (rewritten
and incorporated as 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22-1 (West 1999)); 1935 Md. Laws, 59,
§§ 283-285(Z) (1935) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 276-305 (1975));
1935 Mass. Acts 412, §§ 1-3 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, §§ 1-
47A (West 1999)); 1933 Pa. Laws 163, § 1 (current version at 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 780-102 to 780-127, 780-130 to 780-142 (West 1999) (amended 2000)); 1935 Utah Laws
80, §§ 1-50 (1935) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-1 to 58-37-21 (1953)).
85. Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970). Congress
was much slower than state legislatures to react to the perceived drug menace of the 1930s
because of profound constitutional doubts about federal police powers under the
Commerce Clause. See MUSTO, supra note 29, at 296-97. Indeed, the debate over the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 was more about the constitutional reach of Congress's powers
than the evils of marijuana. See id at 224, 226. Its supporters decided to model the Act on
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1994), which, in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920), recently had withstood constitutional attack based on
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outlawed most uses of marijuana. In 1970, in what amounted to the
non-alcohol version of the Volstead Act, Congress nationalized the
outlawing of virtually all non-alcohol recreational drugs with its
passage of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 6 Most state drug
laws are now patterned after the CSA, not only in terms of its
the federal treaty power, rather than the Commerce Clause. See MUSTO, supra note 29, at
224. Congress did not even begin to regulate the commercial production of opium poppies
until 1942, with the adoption of the Opium Poppy Control Act, Pub. L. No. 77-797, ch.
720,56 Stat. 1045 (1942) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 188-188n (1964)) (repealed 1970).
86. 21 U.S.C §§ 801-971 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The CSA divides the drug universe
into five "Schedules." Id. § 812(b). The particular Schedule in which a given drug is
categorized determines the extent to which that drug may be lawfully used and, if it may
be used, the extent of reporting and registration requirements, but the Schedule does not
necessarily establish the severity of criminal sanctions if the drug is misused.
Schedule I substances are defined as those substances with a high potential for
abuse and no accepted medical use. See id. § 812(b)(1) (1994). They include heroin,
cannabis, LSD, peyote, and some specific forms of opiates and amphetamines. See id.
§ 812(c), Schedule I(a), (b)(10), (c)(9)-(12), (c)(17). Schedule II substances are defined as
those substances with a high potential for abuse, but with a currently accepted medical
use. See id § 812(b)(2). They include various non-heroin opiates not listed in Schedule I,
including cocaine and methadone. See id. § 812(c), Schedule II(a), (c)(12). Schedule III
substances are defined as those substances with currently accepted medical uses and a
potential for abuse less than the Schedule I or I[ substances. See id. § 812(b)(3). They
include amphetamines, barbiturates, codeine in certain forms and limited amounts, opium
in limited amounts, morphine in limited amounts, and anabolic steroids. See id. § 812(c),
Schedule III(a), (d), (e). Schedule IV substances are defined as substances with a
currently accepted medical use and a low potential for abuse compared to Schedule III
substances. See id- § 812(b)(4). Schedule IV substances include chloral hydrate and
phenobarbital. See i&t § 812(c), Schedule IV(11). Schedule V substances are defined as
substances with a currently accepted medical use and a low potential for abuse compared
to Schedule IV substances. See id. § 812(b)(5). They include opium, morphine, and
codeine, all in amounts below the minimum amounts in Schedule II, as well as atropine
below certain amounts. See id. § 812(c), Schedule V(1)-(5).
The provisions of the CSA imposing criminal penalties are not organized, as one
might expect, entirely by Schedule, but rather by particular acts, drugs, and quantities. So,
for example, a conviction for the sale or manufacture of one kilogram (2.2 pounds) or
more of any substance containing any "detectable" amount of heroin, and a conviction for
sale or manufacture of 50 grams (1.74 ounces) or more of any substance that contains a
cocaine base, both carry a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum life
sentence, even though heroin is a Schedule I substance and cocaine is a Schedule II
substance. See id- § 841(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). Simple possession also is punished not by
Schedule but by type and quantity. Simple possession of any controlled substance other
than cocaine carries a one-year maximum, unless it is a second offense, which carries a 15-
day minimum and a two-year maximum, or a third offense, which carries a 90-day
minimum and a three-year maximum. See id. § 844(a). Contrast these penalties for
possession (which even include possession of heroin) with the penalties for possession of
cocaine. With respect to cocaine, a first offense in which the possession exceeds five
grams, or a second offense in which the possession exceeds three grams, or a third offense
in which the possession exceeds one gram, all carry a minimum prison sentence of five
years and a maximum of 20 years. See id This special federal treatment of cocaine and its
mimicry in the states is filling our penitentiaries with drug offenders.
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regulatory scheme, but also in terms of its mandatory minimum
sentencesY
Although federal and state drug laws have had little impact
either on supply or demand of drugs, they have had an enormous
impact on our criminal justice system and on our pocketbooks. Drug
prosecutions quadrupled in the twenty years between 1968 and 1988.88
By 1990, drug prosecutions accounted for an astounding one-third of
all state felony prosecutions. 9 In 1998 alone, there were 1.5 million
drug arrests in the United States, of which almost 600,000 were for
simple possession of cannabis.' In 1997, 42% of all felony
convictions in federal courts were for drug offenses. 91  The
combination of increased prosecution and stiffer sentencing laws,
especially mandatory minimum sentences for first-time cocaine
possession,92 culminated in an explosion in incarceration rates
unmatched in our national history. As of November 1999, an
astonishing 60% of all federal prisoners were being incarcerated for
drug offenses, compared to a mere 16.3% in 1970. 91 Drugs and drug
laws are the reason more people are incarcerated per capita in the
United States than in any industrialized country on Earth except
Russia. a
87. See supra note 86 (discussing the mandatory minimum sentencing of the CSA).
88. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 25 (1997).
89. See id.
90. See FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States-1998, at Section IV,
209-10 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.fbi.govlucr198cius.htm>.
91. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal
Justice Statistics, 1997, at 209-10 (last modified Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cfs97.htm>.
92. For an overview of the mandatory sentencing provisions under the CSA, see supra
note 86.
93. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Quick Facts: Federal Prison Population over
Time/Drug Offenders, at 3-4 (last modified November 30, 1999)
<http:llwww.bop.gov/factO598.html>.
94. In 1985, 424 out of every 100,000 U.S. adult residents were incarcerated. See U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Press Release: Probation and Parole Population Reaches Almost 3.8
Million (June 30, 1996) <http://www.ojp.usdog.govlbjslpublpresslpap95.pr>. Ten years
later, those incarcerations almost doubled-by 1995, 808 out of every 100,000 U.S. adult
residents were incarcerated. See id. As of 1996, 5.3 million Americans, or almost three
percent of the total adult population, were either incarcerated or on parole, probation, or
some other form of judicial supervision. See id. As of June 1998, more people were
incarcerated per capita in America than in any other industrialized country on Earth, with
the possible exception of Russia, and experts anticipate we will overtake Russia in this
dubious statistic in the next year or two. See Ann Gearan, Inmate Count Double 1985's,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 14, 1999, at Al; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release: The Nation's
Prison Population Grew by 60,000 Inmates Last Year: The Largest Increase Since 1995
(Aug. 15,1999) <http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/p98.pr>.
2000] 1459
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Quite apart from increased expenditures to build prisons to
house these drug users, state and federal governments are throwing
massive quantities of taxpayer money at the drug problem. In 1996,
the federal government spent more than $14 billion and the states
contributed $33 billion to fight the war on drugs.95 It was in this
atmosphere of increasing drug convictions, exploding penitentiary
sentences for drug defendants, and a bottomless pit of state and
federal expenditures that the first drug courts began to develop.
II. THE RUSH TO DEVELOP DRUG COURTS
New York City usually is credited with being the first jurisdiction
to handle drug cases in a separate designated court. 6 In the early
1970s, it created several "Narcotics Courts" to deal with the harsher
drug penalties imposed by the so-called "Rockefeller Drug Laws. ' 97
These early narcotics courts had no special treatment component;
they were formed purely as case management devices to handle, in
completely traditional ways, the anticipated increase in the number of
drug cases filed under the new laws. Although they served that
function in the beginning, a steady increase in non-drug felony cases
forced the narcotics courts to take on more and more non-drug cases,
so that by the mid-1980s, they had for all intents and purposes
reverted to traditional courts.98
In 1987, in response to growing concerns about the crack
95. See Barry R. McCaffrey, Fight Drugs as You Would a Disease, CH. TRIB., Mar.
31,1996, § 1, at 18.
96. See STEVEN BELENKO & TAMARA DUMANOVSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL DRUG COURTS: PROGRAM BRIEF 2
(1993) (Sup. Docs. No. J26.31:D84/2); Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A
Critical Review, 1 NAT'L DRUG Cr. INST. REV, 1, 3 (1998). Although the early 1970 New
York Narcotics Courts traditionally are credited as being the first drug courts, special
courtrooms designed to deal with drug offenses operated in both New York and Chicago
as early as the 1950s. See Belenko, supra, at 3.
97. The term "Rockefeller Drug Laws" refers to a set of laws enacted in New York
between 1969 and 1973 during the gubernatorial term of Nelson Rockefeller, in which
harsh penalties, including mandatory minimum prison sentences, were imposed for the use
and sale of heroin, morphine, methadone, and cocaine. See Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is It
Time to Change the Rockefeller Drug Laws?, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 613,
613-19 (1999). Although various aspects of the Rockefeller Drug Laws consistently have
withstood constitutional attack, see, e.g., Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369, 372-74 (2d Cir.
1979), they just as consistently have been described in reported opinions as "Draconian,"
e.g., People v. Stephens, 431 N.E.2d 972, 973 (N.Y. 1981) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The
principle features of the Rockefeller Drug Laws remain in effect today, see N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 220.00-.65. (McKinney 2000), and continue to be the object of considerable
academic and judicial criticism, see Tsimbinos, supra, at 634; Chief Judge's Proposals to
Reform Rockefeller Drug Laws, 3 N.Y. CRM. L. NEWS 16,16 (1999).
98. See BELENKO & DUMANOVSKY, supra note 96, at 3.
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problem in New York City, the narcotics courts were renamed "N
Parts" and were reconstituted in four of the five boroughs.9 As was
the case with their narcotics court predecessors, the N Parts were
specialized case management courts designed to handle a high
volume of drug cases in a traditional manner, with no special
treatment component.10
The first treatment-based drug court began in Dade County
(Miami), Florida, in June 1989. It targeted certain non-violent felony
drug offenders for a one-year diversion and treatment program.
Those targeted candidates who pleaded guilty generally received
deferred judgments or probation, conditioned on their completion of
the program. The program itself combined treatment, including
traditional treatment methods such as counseling, fellowship
meetings, education, and rather non-traditional (at least then)
methods like acupuncture and vocational services, with intense
judicial review, including frequent reviews of urinalysis results.'
The New York City N Parts and the Dade County Drug Court
became the two paradigms for future American drug courts. The N
Part model became known as the "differentiated case management"
(DCM) model, and the Dade County model became known as the
"treatment-based" model. In the early years, virtually every
American drug court was either DCM-based or treatment-based. It
soon became clear, however, that most treatment-based courts
needed to employ some case management techniques to deal with
their mushrooming dockets' ° and that by employing those techniques
they could achieve disposition rates similar to those enjoyed by
DCM-based courts, while still enjoying the supposed benefits of the
treatment model.0 3 Early studies also suggested that the benefits of
DCM-based drug courts could be achieved just as well by having
traditional courts identify their drug cases and manage them on an
accelerated basis, without the overhead and added bureaucracy of
99. See id. at 3-4.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 4.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 257-79 (discussing the massive net-widening
experienced by the Denver Drug Court).
103. For example, the Miami and Portland drug courts, each of which are treatment-
based, have case management components that enable them to handle significant active
caseloads of 1200 and 600 cases, respectively. These caseloads compare favorably to the
600-case and 2300-case active caseloads being run in the New York and Milwaukee drug
courts, both of which are DCM-only courts. See BELENKO & DUMANOVsKY, supra note
96, at 9-10.
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separate drug courts.1°4
After these patterns became clear, drug courts designed
exclusively as DCM courts or exclusively as treatment-based courts
fell out of fashion, and most recent drug courts are hybrids of the two
models. Although the variations among drug courts are innumerable,
most are generally organized as follows.
The drug court process begins before adjudication, as
participants are identified as early as their first court appearances
after arrest."5 Participants must meet certain eligibility guidelines-
typically, they must be charged only with a drug offense and must not
have any prior violent felonies."° They are released on bond,
conditioned on their participation in an outpatient drug treatment
program, or at the very least on submitting to regular urinalysis
testing." Most drug courts have multiple tracts with varying levels of
treatment intervention depending on the perceived level of the
defendant's addiction and prognosis for recovery. Defendants
typically plead guilty in exchange for receiving either deferred
judgments or probation, and in either case their continuing, successful
participation in their treatment programs become a condition of the
deferral or probation.
Treatment is coupled with a monitoring program consisting of
frequent drug testing and appearances before the drug court judge to
review the results of the tests and the defendant's general progress in
104. The early studies of drug courts were not published, except indirectly as part of a
compilation of meta-studies. For a discussion of these meta-studies, see infra text
accompanying notes 236-45.
105. Some drug courts are considered "post-adjudicatory," meaning their treatment
component kicks in only after a defendant is convicted. The Maricopa County (Phoenix),
Arizona, Drug Court is such a post-adjudicatory program. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN
ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF MD., NATIONAL INST. OF JuSTICE, A REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS: PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S
PROMISING 9-51 (n.d.) [hereinafter THE SHERMAN REPORT] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
106. Most drug courts have some eligibility standards; indeed, a few, such as the
Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona Drug Court, are limited to first-time felons. See id.
For the most part, however, eligibility standards are more lenient and are aimed at
reaching harder-core users who may well have extensive felony records, usually
eliminating only defendants with violent felony convictions. See infra note 181. A very
few, including the Denver Drug Court before its jurisdictional change in 1997, see infra
text accompanying notes 280-81, have an "all comers" philosophy.
107. The failure of drug courts to make particularized findings justifying the imposition
of such bail conditions may raise constitutional issues. See United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
because it required a particularized showing of governmental need). But cf. Richard B.
Abell, Pretrial Drug Testing: Expanding Rights and Protecting Public Safety, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 943, 956 (1989) (arguing pretrial drug testing is constitutional).
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treatment. Typically, the monitoring program proceeds in phases-
beginning with weekly drug testing and court appearances every few
weeks and, if the tests continue to be negative and the defendant
progresses in the treatment program, ending in infrequent tests, and
culminating in graduation. Most drug courts also require some good-
faith effort by defendants to pay some portion of their own treatment
and court costs as a condition of their graduation and as a continuing
condition of their deferral or probation.
Missed drug tests, positive drug tests, or other failures of
treatment are punished quickly-at the pre-adjudication stage with
the temporary revocation of bond and the imposition of short jail
sentences, and at the post-adjudication stage with the imposition of
short jail sentences as additional conditions of the deferred judgment
or probation and/or regression into a stricter monitoring phase.
Eventually, convicted defendants whose drug tests are repeatedly
positive, or who otherwise repeatedly fail to respond to treatment,
have their deferred judgments or probationary sentences revoked and
are sent to prison.108
Perhaps because it was focused on the non-traditional notion of
treatment rather than on mundane notions of how to speed a lot of
cases along, the Dade County experiment captured the imagination of
many reform-minded trial judges and prosecutors. More importantly,
it caught the eye of Congress.0 9 In 1994, as part of the amendments
to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,110
Congress authorized the Attorney General to make grants and loans
to state, local, and Indian tribal governments to establish drug
courts."' The Attorney General then created the Drug Courts
Program Office (DCPO), organized under the Office of Justice
Programs (OJP), to administer the federal grants and loans.
From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1997, the DCPO
awarded in excess of $47 million in drug court grants to
108. The number of positive urine analyses (UAs) or other treatment failures that will
be tolerated before a defendant is sentenced to prison is not typically written in stone and
instead is left to the discretion of the particular drug court judge who happens to be
presiding at the time. See infra text accompanying notes 310-13.
109. It did not hurt the political popularity of drug courts when the Florida Attorney
General, Janet Reno, who was an enthusiastic supporter of the Dade County Drug Court,
became Attorney General of the United States.
110. Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 50001(a), 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 3796ii (1994)) (repealed 1996).
111. See id. § 50002,108 Stat. at 1956 (reprinted as part of the notes following 42 U.S.C.
§ 3796ii (1994)) (repealed 1996).
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approximately 270 different jurisdictions. 2 Its appropriation for
fiscal year 1998 alone was $30 million."3
The speed and breadth with which drug courts have spread since
the Dade County experiment in 1989, and particularly since the large
injection of federal funds began in 1995, has been truly remarkable.
As of June 1, 1998, there were 430 drug courts in various stages of
planning or operation."4 These 430 drug courts are located or are to
be located in forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
Guam, several Native American tribal courts, but, interestingly, in
only one federal district."5
Yet, in the rush to jump on the drug court bandwagon, we have
failed to consider four basic types of questions: (1) What is the
purpose of drug courts? (2) Do drug courts work? (3) Even if they
do work, do their benefits outweigh their costs? and (4) Are drug
courts an appropriate institutional response to what is fundamentally
a legislative question? Before I address each of these questions, let
me touch on two critical assumptions that form the foundation of all
drug courts and about which there is substantially more doubt than
the drug court orthodoxy seems willing to admit.
Il. UNANSWERED SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL QUESTIONS: IS
THERE A DRUG EPIDEMIC, AND Is DRUG ADDICTION A
TREATABLE DISEASE?
Drug courts are grounded on two assumptions: (1) drugs have
become an epidemic about which something must be done; and (2)
112. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS
PROGRAM OFFICE FACr SHEET 1 (n.d.) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
This $47 million drug court appropriation was part of the more than $3 billion in grants to
state and local law enforcement agencies that Congress appropriates annually.
113. See id.
114. As of June 1, 1998, two drug courts were about to start, 151 were being planned,
13 were being considered, 124 had been operating for more than two years, and 140 had
been operating for less than two years. See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE &
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJEC, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOOKING AT A DECADE OF
DRUG COURTS 8 (1998) (Sup. Docs. No. J1.2:C83/7) [hereinafter A DECADE OF DRUG
COURTS].
115. See id. at 3. It is interesting to consider why drug courts have found their way into
48 of 50 states at various state and local levels, but only into one of 93 federal district
courts. The most obvious explanation is that the lure of federal funds is absent at the
federal court level because drug court grants are available only to state and local courts
(and Native American courts), not to federal courts. Also, what I have called the
accounting siren-or the lure of drug courts to boost a court's filing statistics, see infra text
accompanying note 256-also is absent at the federal level. Finally, I suspect that the life
tenure of federal judges makes them substantially less susceptible to the considerable
political forces that are driving drug courts.
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drug addiction is a disease that can be treated. In fact, however, these
two assumptions are far from settled and continue to be the subject of
considerable debate among the experts.116 A full discussion of these
controversial questions is beyond the scope of this Commentary, but
a brief summary may help to put the hysteria of drug courts into some
perspective.
A. Rates of Drug Use
The actual data on American drug use is, and has always been,
substantially less clear than either the political generals of the drug
wars or the advocates of legalization would have us believe. Part of
the problem is methodological-it can be extremely difficult to obtain
reliable data on this subject. For legal drugs, such as alcohol, one can
at least look at production rates and retail consumption rates to get
very broad parameters on use. More detailed demographics suffer
from the inherent unreliability of asking people about their personal
relationships with demon rum and the increasing social opprobrium
surrounding it. Statistics concerning illicit drug use are, of course,
even more elusive. There is no reliable production information to fix
the outer boundaries of potential use, nor, obviously, any retail
consumption records to assess actual use.117  Demographic
information is even more difficult to come by. Users of illicit drugs,
especially those who have not been ensnared by the criminal justice
system, are very difficult to identify for the very reason that their use
is a crime. The so-called "victimless" nature of drug use also makes
resort to collateral criminal data sources impossible."'
The most common, and in some ways the most flawed, method of
116. By summarizing what I understand to be the general outlines of these scientific
controversies, I certainly do not mean to suggest these are issues that judges ought to be
deciding. On the contrary, one of the problems with drug courts is that they amount to a
judicial, rather than a legislative, resolution of these difficult scientific issues. See infra
text accompanying notes 329-41 (discussing the impropriety of judicial intervention into
these areas).
117. The problems with estimating cocaine production are illustrative:
The total amount of cocaine produced today is not known with any
certainty.... [Virtually all cocaine production is clandestine, and production
estimates are a matter of guesswork ....
The Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) production estimates for Bolivia,
which were based on direct observations and measurements, illustrate how
widely divergent these figures may be. For example, the average annual yield in
the Chapare region of Bolivia is 2.7 tons of leaves per hectare, while the yield in
Yungas, the other prime Bolivian growing area, is only 1.8 tons.
KARCH, supra note 14, at 168.
118. This is in contrast to crimes such as domestic violence, where the reports by
victims of domestic violence provide sources for statistics.
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gathering demographic data about drug use is to gather it from
people in drug treatment programs. This method has the benefit of a
relatively small and traceable control group, but it measures the
habits only of those undergoing treatment, thus ignoring a whole class
of users for whom use has not, at least in their own minds or in the
eyes of the criminal law, become abuse.
There is also a comprehensive and powerful political overlay to
the problem of drug statistics. Truth is the first casualty in any war,
and it has fared no better in our war on drugs. The federal
government and its therapeutic minions119 have been the sources of
most of the statistics on drug use for the last sixty years; for this same
period of time, these sources have had considerable political and
economic interests in inflating those statistics. The literature widely
supports the proposition that drug statistics have been inflated by a
self-sustaining, public-private partnership interested in keeping use
statistics high to justify enormous public expenditures. 10 One of the
political architects of our new national preoccupation with
alcoholism, the late Senator Harold Hughes, expressed doubts later in
119. There is a veritable alphabet soup of public, quasi-public, and private
organizations devoted in some fashion or other to spending taxpayers' money in pursuit of
a solution to the drug problem: ACDE (American Council for Drug Education); ACAP
(American Council on Alcohol Problems); AMERSA (Association for Medical Education
and Research in Substance Abuse); ASAM (American Society of Addiction Medicine);
CASA (Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse); CATI (Chemical Awareness and
Training Institute); DAWN (Drug Abuse Warning Network); DEA (Drug Enforcement
Administration); DUFS (Drug Use Forecasting System); DCCTAP (Drug Court
Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project); DCPO (Drug Courts Program Office);
DCFS (Drug Court Forecasting System); IBCA (Institute on Black Chemical Abuse);
ICPA (International Commission for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Drug
Dependency); NACOA (National Association for Children of Alcoholics); NADCP
(National Association of Drug Court Professionals); NAPAFASA (National Asian Pacific
American Families Against Substance Abuse); NASADAD (National Association of
State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors); NCADAI (National Clearinghouse for
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Information); COSSMHO (National Coalition of Hispanic
Health and Human Services Organizations); NCA (National Council on Alcoholism);
NCAADD (National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Inc.); NFP (National
Family Partnership) (formerly the National Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth);
NHFADA (National Hispanic Family Against Drug Abuse); NIAAA (National Institute
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism); NIDA (National Institute on Drug Abuse); PRIDE
(National Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education); ONDCP (Office of National
Drug Control Policy); OSAP (Office of Substance Abuse Prevention); OWI (Office of
Workplace Initiatives); and YTY (Youth to Youth), to name a few.
120. See, e.g., PEELE, supra note 19, at 46-52; STANTON PEELE, THE MEANING OF
ADDICriON: AN UNCONVENTIONAL VIEV 6-12, 145-50 (2d ed. 1998). Some have even
argued that drug enforcement has evolved to the point that it has become, by way of
federal aid and asset forfeitures, economically self-sustaining. See Eric Blumenson & Eva
Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
35,40-41 (1998).
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his life about the therapeutic Frankenstein he had helped unleash,
labeling it "the alcohol and drug industrial complex."''
One of the principal pathways of the political contamination of
drug statistics is through the idea of "abuse." In contrast to simple
production and consumption statistics, one can manipulate
sociological constructs such as "abuse" to generate statistics pretty
much on order. Pre- and post-hysteria statistics on American alcohol
consumption dramatically illustrate this point.
As discussed above, colonial Americans consumed several times
the per capita amount of alcohol as modem Americans do.'2 Post-
World War II studies estimated that between five to six million
Americans were "alcoholics," based on projections grounded on the
number of deaths caused by cirrhosis of the liver.'23 In the late 1960s,
the first modem statistics on alcohol "abuse" were generated by a
series of studies conducted at the University of California at Berkeley
and commissioned by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (NIAAA). The Berkeley group estimated that there
were nine to ten million "problem drinkers," from which the NIAAA
arbitrarily concluded that half, or five million, were "alcoholics,"
corroborating the cirrhosis studies.2 4
These rather modest early estimates soon exploded with a series
of pronouncements from the therapeutic community about the
burgeoning alcohol problem; however, none was supported by any
studies. The National Council on Alcoholism-the political arm of
Alcoholics Anonymous-promptly announced after the Berkeley
study that there were actually ten million alcoholics in America, twice
121. Senator Hughes drew the following comparison: "'We have, in effect, a new
civilian army that has now become institutionalized. The alcohol and drug industrial
complex is not as powerful as its military-industrial counterpart, but nonetheless there are
some striking similarities."' CAROLYN L. WEINER, THE POLIcs OF ALCOHOLISM:
BUILDING AN ARENA AROUND A SOCIAL PROBLEM 3 (1981) (quoting Senator Harold
Hughes's Address Before the North American Congress on Alcohol and Drug Problems
(Dec. 13, 1974)). Thomas Szasz, Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry at the State University
of New York, is one of the most articulate and virulent critics of drug disinformation, or
what he calls the "scandal of drug education," which he has described this way:
The belief that our drug regulations rest on a rational, scientific basis is one of
the root causes of our drug problem. On the contrary, they rest on
pseudoscience, create pseudomedical diagnoses, and employ pseudotherapeutic
interventions.... Drug education is a campaign of pharmacological
disinformation in the service of justifying the government's War on Drugs.
THOMAS SZAsz, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET 82 (1992).
122. See supra notes 19,25 and accompanying text.
123. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 47.
124. See DON CAHALAN, PROBLEM DRINKERS 137 (1970); PEELE, supra note 19, at
47.
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the number suggested by the NIAAA.'1 In the 1980s, as federal
funds began to flood the landscape and literally hundreds of alcohol
treatment programs sprouted, the ten million figure made up by the
NCA in the 1960s, even adjusted for population increase, began to
look too small for the committed resources. Overnight, the estimates
doubled again, as treaters tossed out wholly unsubstantiated numbers
in the twenty million range.2 6
The permanent therapeutic-industrial complex was flush with
treatment dollars, and it needed people to treat. Although per capita
alcohol consumption remained rather steady for thirty-five years after
World War II, per capita treatment for alcoholism grew geometrically,
multiplying twenty-fold in that same period of time.'2
Statistics on most other drugs, and the political manipulation and
exaggeration of those statistics, have followed a similar pattern. For
example, despite the recent hysteria about cocaine, per capita
consumption of cocaine is lower in America today than it was at the
turn of the twentieth century, when great numbers of Americans
regularly bought cocaine-laced elixirs at their local drugstores. 12
There may be no area of public policy in which raw statistics-
especially raw production or consumption statistics-tell so little of
the story than in the area of drug use and abuse. Despite decreasing
125. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 47.
126. The particular origin of these made-up figures is a fascinating example of the
general phenomenon of the unreliability of drug statistics. George Douglas Talbott, a
physician and recovering alcoholic who now heads his own drug and alcohol program,
relates those origins:
The old figure was 10 million alcoholics. I was interested in where that figure
came from and found it was thought up one night in Washington when the first
alcohol support bill was presented to Congress. Senator Harold Hughes asked
his staff what a good number was. They said 10 million, and that figure got
frozen into literature. It is way beyond that now, and, as far as we are concerned,
22 million people have an alcohol problem related to the disease of alcoholism.
G. Douglas Talbott, The Beginning, in DENNIS WHOLEY, THE COURAGE TO
CHANGE: HOPE AND HELP FOR ALCOHOLICS AND THEIR FAMILIEs 18,19 (1984).
127. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 49.
128. "[T]he total number of heroin and cocaine fatalities in 1912 exceeded 5000. The
number is slightly more than twice that today, but our population is four times what it was
then." KARCH, supra note 14, at 65. Admittedly, drug fatalities are not the best measures
of drug abuse trends over a long period of time because of advancing medical techniques,
especially emergency room techniques. Nevertheless, other measures confirm the general
notion that the cocaine and heroin problems at the turn of the century were considerably
worse, and certainly substantially more common, than they are today. As discussed above,
an astonishing one million Americans regularly used commercial elixirs of heroin in 1900,
see supra text accompanying note 38, compared to the estimated 500,000 heroin addicts in
1989, see supra text accompanying note 42. By these measures, and adjusting for the four-
fold increase in population, per capita heroin use today is one-eighth of what it was in
1900.
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levels of per capita consumption, there are pockets of drug abuse in
our country that everyone, with the possible exception of the most
extreme libertarians and legalizationists, can agree are a significant
social problem deserving of some attention. Nevertheless, the one set
of statistical trends upon which nearly everyone agrees is also the
most paradoxical: despite the fact that fewer of us are consuming
drugs, more of us believe we are addicted to drugs.129 This paradox
brings us to the second controversial assumption of drug courts: that
drug addiction is a treatable disease.
B. The Disease Model of Addiction
A substantial controversy exists regarding the accuracy of the
assumptions, on which the whole notion of a judicially enlightened
approach to drugs is based, that drug addiction is a disease and that it
is treatable. Scientific evidence supporting either of these
assumptions is remarkably sparse.
The disease model of addiction has its roots in eighteenth
century liberal metaphysics, not in science. The founder of the
disease model of alcoholism, Benjamin Rush, also believed that lying,
murder, and political dissent were diseases treatable by an
enlightened society. Although the disease model was thrust into
conventional popular wisdom by the public relations success of
Alcoholics Anonymous, scientific evidence of the effectiveness of
twelve-step programs has been remarkably scant.' Due in part to
129. As Peele has put it, "Overall, Americans do not drink and consume narcotics or
cocaine as much as they have done at peak levels in the past. Despite these data, however,
more Americans-and particularly more young Americans-either declare themselves or
are declared by others to be drug- or alcohol-dependent." See PEELE, supra note 19, at
234.
130. See id. at 54. Peer-reviewed controlled studies are virtually unanimous in their
conclusion that there is no evidence that Alcoholics Anonymous produces results better
than clinical treatment, or indeed better than no treatment at all. See, e.g., id. at 57-58
(quoting Frederick Baekeland et al., Methods for the Treatment of Chronic Alcoholism: A
Critical Appraisal, in 2 RESEARCH ADVANCES IN ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS 306
(Robert J. Gibbons et al. eds., 1975)); see also William R. Miller & Reid K. Hester, The
Effectiveness of Alcoholism Treatment What Research Reveals, in TREATING ADDICrIVE
BEHAVIORS: PROCESSES OF CHANGE 121, 135-36 (William R. Miller & Nick Heather
eds., 1986) (reviewing all controlled studies of the effectiveness of alcohol treatment
programs and finding only two on Alcoholics Anonymous's effectiveness, both of which
showed that members of Alcoholics Anonymous did worse in terms of arrests and binge
drinking than the control group of untreated alcoholics).
The absence of evidence that twelve-step programs actually work is hardly
counterintuitive. After all, it is an odd "disease," even in our post-Freudian world, that
afflicts some but not all, has no known etiology, has no meaningful diagnostic criteria, can
never be cured, and can be treated only in quasi-religious meetings of like-afflicted
volunteers. As for the diagnostic criteria, it is true that the American Medical Association
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this nagging lack of evidence, 3' there has been a steady stream of
scientific criticisms of the disease model of addiction for the last
twenty-five years.132 These criticisms have focused on the lack of
effective treatment, the lack of any identifiable disease mechanism,
and the fact that history is full of examples of cultures in which
certain drugs have been widely used, yet appear to have posed no
addictive threat.33
Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence against the disease
theory of addiction is the well-recognized fact that many people cure
their addictions on their own, with no intervention at all. Ironically,
this phenomenon, which the experts call "natural remission,"'"M was
demonstrated convincingly by one of the most famous modern
proponents of the disease theory of alcoholism, George E. Vaillant.
Vaillant's 1983 study of alcoholics showed that a majority was in
remission, that hardly any of the people in remission previously had
received any kind of treatment, and that his own hospitalized
patients' outcomes, measured two and eight years post-discharge,
were no better than the outcomes of the people who were not
hospitalized.135 The data on drug abuse is the same.'36
and American Psychiatric Association, no friends of the Alcoholics Anonymous
movement, belatedly have accepted the idea that alcoholism may be a disease, in 1956 and
1952, respectively. See 3 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 370 (Silvano Arieti &
Eugene B. Brody eds., 2d ed. 1974); 1 id. at 1128 (Silvano Arieti ed., 2d. ed. 1974);
O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 20; PEELE, supra note 19, at 46. In subsequent editions
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), "alcoholism" has
been broken down into "alcohol abuse" and "alcohol dependence" and framed as specific
diagnoses within the more general categories of "substance abuse" and "substance
dependence." E.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 176-83, 195-96 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
But of course its allegedly objective diagnostic criteria are, as they often are in the case of
complex behaviors forced into the simplifying pigeonhole of "mental disease," merely a
description of symptoms. See, e.g., THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS
12-13 (2d ed. 1974) (discussing the invention of mental illnesses that purportedly are
detected through observing a person's behavior).
131. See, e.g., PEELE, supra note 19, at 1-29; WEINER, supra note 121, at 100; Stanton
Peele, A Moral Vision of Addiction: How People's Values Determine Whether They
Become and Remain Addicts, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION, 201-02 (Stanton Peele ed.,
1988); David Robinson, The Alcohologist's Addiction: Some Implications of Having Lost
Control over the Disease Concept of Alcoholism, 33 Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 1028, 1032
(1972); see also DON CALAHAN, PROBLEM DRINKERS 2 (William E. Henry & Nevitt
Sanford eds., 1970) (noting that treating alcoholism as a disease improves the problem
drinker's chances of not receiving jail time, but the disease theory "has not as yet made
material inroads" in the approach of the medical community).
132. See Peele, supra note 131, at 219-22.
133. See id. at 227.
134. See id. at 219-22.
135. See GEORGE VAILLANT, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM 284-94
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Likewise, contrary to many of our exaggerated beliefs about the
addictive power of many drugs, most people exposed to even the
most allegedly addictive of substances do not develop dependencies.
In one study, for example, only 15% of the people who used
powdered cocaine developed dependencies, which was roughly equal
to the percentage of drinkers who developed drinking problems, but
less than half the addiction rate of crack users.3 7
Thus, it is the rule, and not the exception, that people experiment
with even the most allegedly of addictive drugs without becoming
addicted and that even people whose experiments evolve into some
form of abuse tend to outgrow that abuse, with or without treatment
intervention. 3 8 Still, the disease model of addiction, and even our
most "enlightened" drug policies based on that model (such as drug
courts), ignore this reality. By constructing our drug policies to deal
with the minority of classically dysfunctional addicts and ignoring the
vast majority of people who take drugs without developing
destructive dependencies, we ignore the complex social, cultural, and
economic forces that breed true drug abuse. More subtly, we devalue
individuals' ability to control their drug use, thereby paradoxically
excusing and encouraging individual loss of control. It is what Peele
calls "infantilizatiz[ing] the drug-using population."'13 9 In the end, the
critics of the disease model point to an array of evidence suggesting
that the particular setting in which a drug is used, including the
strength of a society's or relevant social group's view of the role of
free will, has as much or more to do with whether a person will find it
difficult to stop using a drug as does the drug's particular chemistry.
It is true that recent advances in neurobiology are being touted
by some as the long-sought biochemical foundation for the disease
model of addiction.14 Some addiction theorists suspect, however,
(1983); Peele, supra note 131, at 219-20. In fact, the alcoholics in Valliant's study who
recovered on their own had a lower rate of relapse than those who recovered through
Alcoholics Anonymous. See VAILLANT, supra, at 220. Mark Kleiman has made similar
observations. See KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 179 (noting that most people manage their
drinking problems without professional help or any outside intervention).
136. Peele, supra note 131, at 219-20. Cannabis, for example, has been used on a daily
basis literally by millions of people who no longer use it, yet only a tiny fraction received
any treatment. See KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 179.
137. See Skolnick, supra note 30, at 98.
138. See, e.g., PEELE, supra note 19, at 173-76.
139. IL at 227. Mark Kleiman has made a similar point, but cautions us at the
other end of the "crime-disease" continuum not to think of the word "addiction" as a
synonym for "evil." KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 34.
140. See, e.g., CHARLES F. LEVINTHAL, MESSENGERS OF PARADISE: OPIATES AND
THE BRAIN 153-56 (1988); Susan Greenfield, Brain Drugs of the Future, BRIr. MED. J.
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that these neurological foundations will be as fleeting and
unsatisfactory an explanation for addiction as they have been for
many mental diseases, most notably depression and schizophrenia.1 41
Even as late as 1995, a group commissioned by the National Institute
on Drug Abuse to examine the prospects of treating drug addiction
pharmacologically soberly described the current state of scientific
knowledge about the neurological bases of addiction as "not well
characterized" and "rudimentary."142 Solomon Snyder, one of the
most prominent neurobiologists doing opiate receptor and endorphin
research today, has said that although there is now broad consensus
about the salient properties that addictive substances all share, a "full
consensus on a definition [of addiction] has yet to emerge.' 1 43
One of the most thoughtful and balanced contributions to the
debate about the nature of addiction has come not from a physician,
psychiatrist, or neurobiologist, but from a philosopher, Francis
Seeburger, who is actually a proponent of sorts of the disease
model."4 Seeburger does not shy away from addiction's central moral
conundrum-where exactly does free will end and compulsion take
over?145 He sees the disease model of addiction as an enlightened
reaction to what historically has been the only other alternative: the
view that all drug use is simple, willful misconduct.46 Even Seeburger
admits, however, that drug addiction is a strange sort of "disease"
because no evidence exists establishing a "simple physical cause for
1698, 1698 (1998); David Julius, Another Opiate for the Masses?, 386 NATURE 442, 442
(1997); Kelly Morris, Seeking Ways to Crack Cocaine Addiction, 352 LANCET 1290, 1290
(1998). These recent advances include the discovery of various drugs that mimic the
receptor sites for neurotransmitters like dopamine and norepinephrine, as well as the
discovery of naturally produced opiates called endorphins and the effect of many allegedly
addictive substances (or behaviors, for that matter) on the stimulation of endorphin
production.
141. See PEELE, supra note 19, at 14-15 (discussing the fact that advances in
neurochemistry had virtually no impact in treating many mental "diseases," including
depression and schizophrenia).
142. DIVISION OF BIOBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & MENTAL DISORDERS, INST. OF
MEDICINE, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICATIONS FOR THE
TREATMENT OF OPIATE AND COCAINE ADDICTIONS 3 (Carolyn E. Fulco et al. eds.,
1995).
143. Solomon H. Snyder, Chemistry of Desire, in SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN TRIUMPH OF
DISCOVERY: A CHRONICLE OF GREAT ADVENTURES IN SCIENCE 5,5 (1995).
144. See FRANCIS F. SEEBURGER, ADDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE ADDICTIVE MIND 65-69 (1993).
145. Seeburger recognizes that "the tempting quality of addiction immediately
engenders a paradox," in that addiction "is at one and the same time both unintentional
and tempting." let at 8.
146. See id. at 68-70.
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addiction" to drugs.147 By thinking about drug addiction as a disease,
with no social, psychological, or moral component, we commit the
same errors of enthusiasm that our predecessors did when they
considered the word "addiction" as being synonymous with the word
ccevil."1
In any event, and regardless of one's views on these difficult
statistical, scientific, and philosophical issues, it is important for all of
us to recognize that the twin pillars upon which the popular rush to
drug courts rests-the alleged drug epidemic and our alleged ability
to treat drug addiction-have beguiled the experts for decades. They
are hardly as unassailably sturdy as conventional political and judicial
wisdom would have us believe.
IV. UNEXAMINED JURISPRUDENTIAL CONCERNS: WHAT Is THE
PURPOSE OF DRUG COURTS?
Our ambivalence about drugs is not unique to America and is
not new. For as long as drugs have been used to alter people's
consciousness, they have evoked two powerful but potentially
antithetical notions: drugs can help us disconnect temporarily from
pain (whether physical or emotional), but too much disconnection can
be damaging both to our individual potentials and to the social fabric.
The resulting public policy questions-at what point does the use of a
particular drug break the social contract and become punishable by
the criminal law, and even then, at what point is that particular drug
use so involuntary as to become a medical issue rather than a legal
one'48-have no easy answers.
Perhaps in part because of our Puritan segregation of alcohol
147. IL- at 74. Because he recognizes the moral component of addiction and the
importance of focusing on the internal power of the addict's free will as opposed to the
external power of the addictive substance, Seeburger's views of addiction are associated
closely with Alcoholics Anonymous. See id at 69 (stating that "recovery" from alcoholism
requires that addicts make a moral commitment "to be responsible, caring, ethical
individuals"). Of course, Alcoholics Anonymous focuses not only on the worldly power of
individual free will, but also on the ultimate power of a higher being. This religious aspect
of Alcoholics Anonymous, inherited to some extent from the temperance movement, see
supra text accompanying notes 26-27, is disturbing to some critics of Alcoholics
Anonymous. See, e.g., PEELE, supra note 19, at 43-46. Nevertheless, whether one focuses
on the secular power of free will or on its claimed theological roots may be beside the
point, as long as one is still moving away from the allegedly irresistible addictive powers of
a particular substance to the resistive powers of the individual user. See generally
GERALD G. MAY, ADDICrION AND GRAcE (1988) (providing a particularly thought-
provoking discussion of the spiritual aspects of addiction).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 130-47 (discussing the disease model of
addiction).
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from the universe of other drugs,'149 Americans in particular seem to
be conflicted when we try to deal with these difficult issues.150 We
have tended to react to the perceived drug crisis du jour-whether it
involves opium dens in San Francisco in 1885 or crack cocaine in New
York City in 1985-with the same predictable, and ultimately
unsuccessful, response: make the laws stricter, put more dealers and
users in jail, and attempt to reduce the supply by interdiction. These
reactions, like the Manchu edict in 1776 making Chinese opium use a
capital offense,' have done nothing to decrease either our thirst for
drugs or their availability.
What can we do with a perceived social problem of allegedly
epidemic proportions, which darts so frustratingly between the
medical and legal worlds and seems so entirely immune to any
medical or legal solution? How can we punish drug use when our
self-described experts have been telling us for so long that addiction is
a disease? The disease model of addiction and the realities of the
failed war on drugs are driving us to two unpalatable policy choices-
either continue to fill our prisons with drug users or legalize drugs.5 2
Out of this depressing and completely unacceptable state of
affairs came the idea of the drug court. It seems to be the perfect
antidote for our troubling schizophrenia. Drug courts appeal to the
medical horn of the dilemma because they offer, and indeed
149. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28, 71-84 (discussing favorable Puritan
views on alcohol, the temperance movement, and Prohibition).
150. The cultural impacts on addiction are felt not only at the consumption end-some
societies simply do not believe that drug use destroys free will and therefore do not
recognize the idea of addiction-but even at the behavioral end. That is, how individuals
behave while under the influence of drugs appears to have a surprisingly important
cultural component. In a fascinating survey of drinking practices of different societies
around the world, Craig MacAndrew and Robert Edgerton discovered that rather than
invariably becoming disinhibited, aggressive, sociable, or sexually promiscuous when
drunk, drunk people behave according to fairly well-defined cultural norms, which are
quite different from society to society. See CRAIG MACANDREW & ROBERT B.
EDGERTON, DRUNKEN COMPORTMENT: ASOCIAL EXPLANATION 165-73 (1969).
151. See O'BRIEN ETAL., supra note 4, at xiii.
152. As I have suggested elsewhere in this Commentary, this alleged choice between
irrational drug laws and complete legalization may be a false choice if the model of drug
addiction as a disease is inaccurate. See supra text accompanying notes 130-47. That is,
we should be entirely capable of distinguishing between sale and use, identifying those
drugs that are so irresistible and destructive that their mere use should be a crime,
distinguishing further between those that deserve significant jail or prison time and those
that do not, and, in any event, spending more than lip-service resources on in-custody
treatment programs. See infra text accompanying note 333 (discussing the need for in-
custody treatment). Finally, regardless of the choices we eventually make on the issue of
legalization, an overall lowering of the decibel level would be a pleasant alternative to our
current political and judicial hyperventilation.
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compel, 5 3 treatment. But they also appeal to the legal horn of the
dilemma by recognizing that drug use is still, at heart, a crime,
punishable if defendants do not take advantage of their treatment
opportunities.
It is tempting to view drug courts as a magic solution to the
ancient dilemma about drugs. Indeed, this temptation, fueled by an
enormous injection of federal money, may have much to do with the
great popularity of drug courts. I submit, however, that the drug
court as a public policy solution to the drug dilemma is no solution at
all, but rather a conflicted, and some would say cynical, appeasement
of two powerful political forces-the law enforcement community
and the treatment community.
If drug use is truly uncontrollable, then refusal to take advantage
of treatment is also uncontrollable. Indeed, the treatment community
teaches us that recovery is a continuing process of failures and
successes. Yet, to appease the law enforcement community, drug
courts typically impose an arbitrary number and quality of excusable
failures before the drug defendant is treated like any other criminal
defendant and sentenced accordingly.'54 If drug addiction is truly a
disease that manifests itself in uncontrollable behavior until treated,
why is the criminal law involved at all as a backup to failed
treatment? Do we give cancer patients three tries at chemotherapy
before sending them to the penitentiary? Or, perhaps more
analogously, do we give insane criminal defendants three tries at
being cured before we forget about the requirement of mens rea and
move them from the state hospital to the state penitentiary? I suggest
that the reason most of us are against the outright legalization of all
drugs is that we do not really believe, with the kind of breadth and
depth required of such matters, that much, if any, drug use is really
the involuntary product of a disease mechanism.
Even if we believe some drug use is involuntary, why not at least
make efforts to separate those few who may really be diseased from
those who simply choose to take drugs? I suspect the answer is that
we recognize the complex and fundamentally intractable problem of
separating voluntary from involuntary drug use. At what point does
the mere desire to disengage from life's pains by taking drugs become
153. One of the most troubling aspects of treatment-based drug courts is that their very
function is to compel treatment. This is an oddly paternalistic and ham-fisted approach to
take when so many in the treatment community have spent so many years teaching us that
the first step toward recovery is for addicts to recognize their addictions and to decide for
themselves to begin the journey toward recovery.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
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an uncontrollable compulsion? Despite all of our modem bluster
about how much is known about the biological bases of addiction,"'
the answer to this fundamental moral question is unknown, and might
be unknowable. For all its weaknesses as the precursor to the disease
model of addiction,156 at least the Alcoholics Anonymous model
recognized this central moral component to addiction. 7
Drug courts, whatever their benefits, do not serve this function of
moral screening. On the contrary, their unstated central assumption
is that modem treatment modalities are so effective that if a
defendant fails them three or four times, it must be the defendant's
"fault," and that particular defendant therefore must be one of those
"volunteer" addicts against whom the sword of the criminal law may
morally swathe and not a truly "diseased" addict. We compassionate
judges can then sentence that defendant to prison, smug with the
knowledge that our experts, by the simple device of offering
treatment a certain arbitrary number of times, can separate the
diseased from the criminal.
Everyone is satisfied, except the incorrigible drug user. We
satisfy the experts because they get paid for the failed treatment; we
satisfy the law enforcement community because we take a hard
approach to the incorrigibles; and we satisfy our own internal sense of
justice by reminding ourselves that our experts have performed the
Solomonic miracle of separating out the diseased unintentional drug
user from the criminally intentional drug user.
But of course this whole approach is a charade. Our treatment
efforts are hardly so effective that a mere three or four failures
indicate some kind of intentional failing.5 1 In any event, a case can
be made that if addiction is really a disease, then the most diseased
defendants are precisely the defendants most likely to fail many, and
perhaps even all, treatment attempts. Drug courts thus may be
performing a kind of reverse moral screening-those defendants who
do not respond to treatment, and therefore may be the most diseased,
go to prison, while those defendants who respond well and whose use
of drugs truly may have been voluntary, escape prison.
This half-crime approach to drug use also makes no sense at the
crime end of the disease-crime axis. Once we have made the social
decision that crack, for example, is such an addictive, dangerous drug
155. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
158. On the contrary, compulsory treatment efforts in the drug court context have been
embarrassingly ineffective. See infra text accompanying notes 167-249.
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that smoking it should be a crime, it makes little moral sense to
excuse that crime for a certain number of times in order to try to treat
it. We do not do that with shoplifting or with sexual assault on a
child, despite the psychiatric labeling of some extreme forms of those
behaviors as "diseases."'15 9 Instead, we have made the social choice
that shoplifting and sexual assaults are behaviors that we simply will
not tolerate, regardless of their etiology. Issues related to
kleptomaniacal or pedophilial compulsion are left to be dealt with
where they should be-at sentencing. We should treat drug crimes no
differently.
By existing simply to appease two so diametric and irreconcilable
sets of principles, drug courts are fundamentally unprincipled. By
simultaneously treating drug use as a crime and as a disease, without
coming to grips with the inherent contradictions of those two
approaches, drug courts are not satisfying either the legitimate and
compassionate interests of the treatment community or the legitimate
and rational interests of the law enforcement community. They are,
instead, simply enabling our continued national schizophrenia about
drugs.
There is another philosophical problem with drug courts, related
both to the doctrinal schizophrenia discussed above and to some of
the institutional issues discussed below:"6 courts simply should not be
in the business of forcing medical treatment on people convicted of
crimes as a condition of a favorable sentence. They most certainly
should not be in the business of forcing treatment on defendants who
have not yet been convicted as a condition of being released on bond.
Yet that is exactly what drug courts are all about.
One of the principal purposes of the judicial branch, and of all
the procedural and evidentiary protections attached to that branch, is
to insure that the force of the criminal law is wielded soberly. I
sympathize with drug court proponents who see the filing of criminal
charges as a special opportunity to "get the attention" of drug users
and intervene meaningfully in their lives. Of course, it is precisely
because drug defendants face the wrath of the criminal law that we
may be in the best position to "get their attention" and force
treatment that will benefit everyone if it is successful. But we are
judges, not social workers or psychiatrists. We administer the
159. Kleptomania is a recognized mental disorder, and its diagnostic criteria are
currently set forth in DSM-IV, supra note 130, at 612-13. Pedophilia is a recognized
mental disorder, and its diagnostic criteria are currently set forth in id at 527-28.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 327-41.
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criminal law because the criminal law is its own social end. It is not,
or at least ought not be, a means to other social ends.
I am well aware that in many other non-drug criminal contexts it
is common for even the most reluctant judges to sprinkle some social
tinkering in with our traditional judicial actions. I admit that I have
succumbed to the lure of regularly imposing as conditions of felony
probation such requirements as finishing high school, getting a
Graduate Equivalency Diploma, getting a job, or even, alas,
completing a drug treatment program. The judicial temptation to
intrude into the private lives of litigants is not limited to the criminal
law. Some of my colleagues order all divorcing parents with children
to take parenting classes as a condition of obtaining their divorce
decree, though I have not given in to that particular temptation.
I suffer no illusions that the imposition of any of these kinds of
social conditions does much good, but most of us are willing to
impose them because we are also sure they will do no harm.161 But
there is real institutional harm in this kind of social tinkering. Judges
have the right to exercise only those powers necessary to dispose of
the cases before us. When we succumb to the very human temptation
to do more-to fill the void that is so achingly apparent in so many of
the dysfunctional people we see every day-we not only risk being
wrong, but we risk being imperial.
The moral authority of our most cherished institutions comes
from their voluntary nature: the value of advice from a priest, a
teacher, or a loved one depends in large part on the fact that we are
free to ignore it. But judges' pieces of "advice" are court orders,
enforceable ultimately by the raw physical power of imprisonment. It
is precisely because of the awesomely enforceable nature of our
powers that we must be so circumspect in exercising them. It is one
thing for a co-worker, family member, doctor, or clergyman to
confront someone about a perceived drug problem;16' it is quite
another thing for a judge to compel drug treatment. Drug courts not
only fail to recognize this important institutional distinction, but their
very purpose is to obliterate it.163
161. See supra infra text accompanying notes 246-49 (discussing the Chicken Soup
Approach to court reform).
162. Those confrontations can run the gamut from gentle persuasion to so-called
"interventions."
163. Mark Kleiman, no foe of compulsory treatment-in fact, he emphasizes the
importance of drug treatment in prisons, coupled with the carrot of parole, see infra text
accompanying note 334-cogently and candidly summarizes the dilemma:
Any drug policy beyond simple persuasion entails an attempt to make a class of
people-drug users and potential drug users-better off by limiting their range of
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In a jurisprudential context, these battles are part of a larger war
about so-called "restorative justice," or what some commentators
have called "therapeutic jurisprudence."'16 These ideas emanate from
the proposition that the judiciary can be a powerful force for social
change, not just in the traditional way of applying the law in
individual cases, or even by pushing the existing law to new
enlightened boundaries, but by actively intervening in the day-to-day
lives of litigants in an infinite variety of non-traditional ways. 165 A full
discussion of these broad and controversial ideas is beyond the scope
of this Commentary. Suffice it to say that, if they are intended to free
judges not only from the constraints of the separation-of-powers
doctrine but even from the limits of our own expertise, they are
dangerous ideas indeed. I cannot imagine a more dangerous branch
than an unrestrained judiciary full of amateur psychiatrists poised to
"do good" rather than to apply the law.166
V. UNEXAMINED EFFECTIVENESS: Do DRUG COURTS WORK?
Perhaps the most startling thing about the drug court
personal choices. Being thus coerced for their own good is supposed to make
them more responsible citizens and neighbors. Described so baldly, drug control
is revealed for what it is: a particularly tricky piece of social engineering. Its
wide acceptance among those who otherwise abhor the policies they call "social
engineering" should not blind us to the fact that drug control is subject to the
frailties of its kind, including a propensity for unexpected and unwanted side
effects. Using coercion in a free society is not for the faint of heart.
KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 14.
164. E.g., Hora et al., supra note 1, at 440; Wexler, supra note 1, at 220.
165. The idea behind the growing movement of "therapeutic jurisprudence" is that
because the experience of coming before our courts is having therapeutic consequences
for defendants, our courts should capitalize on the moment when a person is brought
before us and use it as a starting point for improving the defendant's overall lifestyle. See
Sheila M. Murphy, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Its Time Has Come, TRIAL JUDGES NEWvS,
Winter 1997/1998, at 3, 3.
166. Actually, these ideas are attempts to repackage and revive what criminologists
have described generally as "the rehabilitative ideal," in which the focus of the criminal
law was to change the attitude and, ultimately, the behavior of convicted criminals.
FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2-3 (1981). The
rehabilitative ideal gained popularity between the World Wars and remained pre-eminent
through the 1970s. See id. at 2-31. By 1980, however, as criminologists began to take a
closer empirical look at the whole issue of the effectiveness of rehabilitation, many began
to repudiate the rehabilitative ideal, replacing it with penal notions that put more
emphasis on retribution and on the short-term protection of society than on rehabilitation.
See id at 32-59. Drug courts represent a quaint, and some would say naive, attempt to
revive long-repudiated notions that state criminal power can efficiently change the
behaviors, let alone the attitudes, of individuals. See generally Boldt, supra note 1, at
1035-36 (arguing that some aspects of drug courts represent a dangerous return to the
rehabilitative ideal at the expense of due process).
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phenomenon is that drug courts have so quickly become fixtures of
our jurisprudence in the absence of satisfying empirical evidence that
they actually work. Although many studies and many kinds of studies
have examined drug courts, none has demonstrated with any degree
of reliability that drug courts work.
There are three kinds of drug court studies.167 The most common
evaluate operational processes and deal with statistics like filings,
drop-out rates, and other data shedding light on the actual drug court
process.' 1 The second type of study is the cost-savings analysis,
which aims to compare the operational and sentencing costs of drug
courts to the operational and sentencing costs of traditional courts. 169
The third, and for our purposes the most meaningful, studies have
been the so-called "impact evaluations," which attempt in some
fashion to assess the impact of drug courts, most often by comparing
recidivism rates between some drug court population and some non-
drug court population. 70
Impact evaluations have taken three forms: (1) informal surveys
of a single drug court conducted by that drug court's personnel;"' (2)
formal studies of a single drug court conducted by outside
professionals, but commissioned by that particular drug court; and (3)
formal studies of one or more drug courts conducted by outside
professionals and not commissioned by the drug courts being studied,
though often funded by the federal Drug Courts Program Office. The
informal impact surveys done by drug court personnel typically make
outlandish and unsupportable claims of massive reductions in
recidivism rates. The formal studies-both commissioned and non-
commissioned-provide quite different and rather mixed results.
Most have concluded that drug courts are effective in speeding drug
cases through the system, but that drug courts have only a marginal
impact, if any, in reducing recidivism.
167. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 9.
168. See id. at 11, 17.
169. See id. at 17-18. As of June 1998, there had been no completed cost-savings
analyses done for any drug court. See iU at 18. Since then, there have been only two
studies of which I am aware that include some cost-savings analysis-the 1999 study of the
Riverside (California) drug court and the Portland County (Maine) drug court. See
Michelle Shaw & Kenneth Robinson, Reports on Recent Drug Court Research, 2 NAT'L
DRUG COURT INST. REV. 107, 116 (1999) (reviewing the 1999 study of the Riverside drug
court, which was conducted by Dale K. Sechrest & David Schicor); id. at 119 (reviewing
the 1999 study of the Portland County drug court, which was conducted by Donald F.
Anspach & Andrew S. Ferguson).
170. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 16-17.
171. These surveys often are called "internal impact surveys."
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A. General Methodological Issues
All but a handful of drug court impact studies have been infected
by various methodological defects. Any complete discussion of drug
court impact studies must therefore include a discussion of these
general methodological issues.
1. Selecting the Control
What we really want to know about drug court effectiveness is
whether drug courts are more effective than traditional courts in
handling drug cases. In the language of the scientific method, the
traditional courts are the control against which drug courts should be
compared to test the hypothesis that drug courts are effective. Thus,
all investigators performing impact evaluations seem to agree that
once they settle on some particular statistical measures of
effectiveness, those measures should be applied to compare the way
drug courts handle cases with the way traditional courts handle drug
cases.
172
This kind of comparison, however, is hampered by a serious
practical problem: most drug courts, particularly those that have
come into existence in the last few years, have not been adopted as
pilot segments within a whole court. Instead, they have immediately
taken over all drug cases in that particular court.73 As a result, it is
impossible to make contemporaneous comparisons between drug
courts and traditional courts because the traditional courts are no
longer handling drug cases. Investigators are then forced to resort to
less comparable controls.
Some studies have compared drug courts in one jurisdiction to
traditional courts in other jurisdictions, but this approach risks having
-important differences between the jurisdictions interfere with the
legitimacy of the comparison. Other studies have compared existing
drug courts in one jurisdiction with the traditional courts in that same
jurisdiction prior to the adoption of drug court, though this
comparison risks being distorted by temporal differences between the
two systems.
Once a control court is selected, one of the most difficult
172. Because drug courts handle drug cases, but traditional courts handle more than
just drug cases, meaningful comparisons between the two should be limited to looking at
the way traditional courts handle drug cases. Indeed, that is what all the formal studies of
which I am aware have done. See infra text accompanying notes 211-44 (discussing these
formal studies).
173. See BELENKO & DUMANOvSKY, supra note 96, at 6-7.
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challenges that any impact study faces is selecting the control
population within that court. Because most treatment-based drug
courts have criteria that a defendant must meet before becoming
eligible for drug court, and because that screening process itself may
affect the particular effectiveness measure being studied,174 similar
screening mechanisms must be used when identifying the control
group. Thus, for example, the study of the Riverside County,
California, drug court used a control group composed of randomly
selected drug defendants who had committed their offenses before
the adoption of the drug court, but "who were identified as possible
candidates for drug court had it existed." 75 To the extent this
identification of possible candidates involved any kind of subjectivity,
it is not a truly random sample, and it has the potential of affecting
the study results.
Even in drug courts like Denver's, which do not impose
eligibility criteria,176 there is a problem with comparability. As
discussed in more detail below,177 low-level transactions are being
prosecuted as felonies in drug courts, whereas, in the past, these same
transactions would have been substantially less serious matters, if
prosecuted at all, in traditional courts. That is, drug courts, by the
very operation of this feedback phenomenon, tend to deal with less
serious drug offenses than their traditional control courts, and this
difference also threatens meaningful comparisons between the tWo. 178
Post-adjudicatory drug courts present unique problems in
selecting the control group.179 Because treatment in post-adjudicatory
drug courts is by definition a condition of probation, all drug
defendants in those treatment programs receive probation. The
control group against which they are compared therefore typically is
limited to traditional defendants who received probation, rather than
all defendants. Using this control measure, however, will artificially
reduce control group recidivism. 80 Comparisons made on this basis
174. For example, screening may have some impact on recidivism. See infra text
accompanying notes 190-95.
175. Belenko, supra note 96, at 29.
176. At least it did not impose eligibility criteria until February 1997, when two-time
felons and illegal aliens were made ineligible for the Denver Drug Court. See infra text
accompanying notes 280-81.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 261-64.
178. In addition, one must be careful not to select the control group from those
defendants who were convicted, because one could expect that group to exhibit dampened
measures of effectiveness-higher recidivism, for example-than the universe of all
defendants.
179. See supra note 105 (discussing post-adjudicatory drug courts).
180. Probation-eligible defendants, who by definition have less significant criminal
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therefore are valid only if drug court defendants who received
probation would also have received probation had they been in
traditional courts. That assumption is unlikely to be true because the
whole thrust of most drug courts is to give probation, coupled with
treatment and close supervision, to hardcore drug defendants who
otherwise would be sentenced to prison."'
2. Selecting the Target
Some controversy also exists over the appropriate target group
against which to compare the control and the way to identify
individual defendants within that target group. Most informal
studies, and even many formal studies in the early years, targeted
defendants who graduated from the drug court treatment programs,
rather than all defendants who entered drug courts. Presumably, this
method was used because the data on graduates was retrieved easily
and inexpensively. It is now well-recognized, however, that such
comparisons are of little statistical value, at least as far as impact
evaluations are concerned, because drug court graduates can be
expected, by definition, to do significantly better than their traditional
court cohorts. Instead, most evaluators now agree that the most
meaningful target group against which the control group must be
compared is all drug court defendants, not just drug court
graduates.m
Once the target group is identified, it is important that the
individuals to be studied within that group are selected randomly.
Randomly selecting targets is just as important, statistically, as
randomly selecting control defendants, and many impact studies have
been criticized for not selecting their subjects randomly.Y83
records than their probation-ineligible cohorts, and who in fact have been screened in one
way or another as less likely to reoffend, will as a group be less likely to reoffend.
181. As Belenko notes:
[A]lthough it is generally thought that drug courts target "first-time offenders,"
many drug court clients have substantial criminal histories and many years of
substance abuse histories.... It is the older more "experienced" offender for
whom successful treatment intervention can have the greatest impact on prison
populations and generate the most substantial savings in reduced crime and
criminal justice system costs.
Belenko, supra note 96, at 21.
182. See id. at 19 (stating that many of the informal drug court studies are flawed
because they "compare only drug court graduates [rather than all drug court attendees] to
a comparison sample, which tends to inflate the overall effect of the intervention").
183. See infra note 236 (discussing the Riverside Drug Court's failure to select its
control defendants at random).
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3. Selecting the Impact Measure
Once the control groups and target groups are agreed on,
independent investigators typically have looked at two measures of
effectiveness to reflect both the case management and treatment
aspects of most drug courts. They first analyze how fast drug courts
process the target drug court defendants compared to the control
non-drug court defendants. They then examine how "successfully"
drug courts process the target drug court defendants compared to the
traditional control court.
Case-processing speed is fairly straightforward, and, as discussed
in more detail below, most studies show that drug courts with DCM
components significantly decrease the total time from filing to
disposition." Relying on these time savings as a measure of
effectiveness, however, has several significant shortfalls.
First, case-processing speed is a particularly slippery and
dangerous slope for judges to step on.'" Eliminating the right to
counsel and the right to trial might also speed things along quite
nicely, and, as a practical matter, some would argue that is precisely
how drug courts have achieved whatever success they have achieved
in terms of speed. In any event, it should not be at all surprising that
most studies have shown that systems designed specifically to speed
cases along do just that, although the amount of savings attributable
to speed alone may of course be illusory if treated defendants
reoffend' 86 or if sloppy convictions are overturned.'8
Indeed, the supposed time savings simply may stem from the fact
that most drug courts depend even more on plea bargains than their
plea-bargain-addicted traditional court counterparts. Nothing slows
down case processing like a bunch of trials, and treatment-based drug
courts are designed precisely to encourage defendants to go into
treatment by discouraging them from going to trial. Because drug
courts by design have fewer trials than traditional courts,", drug
courts obviously should show a shorter case-processing average than
184. See infra note 216.
185. One study notes that "there is little dispute over the increased efficiency gained
through the introduction of drug courts. This is not to suggest, however, that speedy case
processing alone renders 'good' justice. Increased efficiency is more of a measure of
bureaucratic operation than of justice." Robert Granfield & Cindy Eby, An Evaluation of
the Denver Drug Court: The Impact of a Treatment-Oriented Drug Offender System 10
(1997) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 215-44 (discussing recidivism).
187. See infra text accompanying notes 300-07 (discussing quality concerns).
188. The Denver Drug Court does not handle any trials; rather, it transfers its trials to
other divisions of the Denver District Court. See infra text accompanying notes 271-75.
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traditional courts.
Instead of lumping dispositions and trials together, a more
appropriate measure of speed might be to look at these two very
different processes, trials and dispositions, separately. Is the average
case that goes to trial in a drug court processed more quickly than the
average drug case that goes to trial in a traditional court? Is the
average case that ends up in a plea bargain processed more quickly in
a drug court than the average drug disposition in a traditional court?
I am unaware of any drug court impact studies that address these
more meaningful questions about drug court speed.
The question of drug court success, as opposed to speed, is of
course even more complex. The traditional measure of drug court
success has been recidivism-that is, the rates at which drug court
defendants, as compared to drug defendants in traditional courts,
reoffend. The impact studies have looked at two kinds of recidivism:
rearrests and probation violations. 189 Rearrest recidivism is probably
the more accurate of the two. Measuring drug court success by
comparing probation violation rates undervalues the effect of drug
courts because drug court probationers are, at least in treatment-
based models, much more closely supervised and therefore much
more likely to be detected violating their probation than their
traditional court cohorts. Nevertheless, even relying on traditional
rearrest rates as a measure of recidivism poses some methodological
challenges in the drug court context.
Arrest records can be notoriously inaccurate. As with probation
violations, rearrest rates are likely to be understated for traditional
drug defendants as compared to drug court defendants because the
traditional system is much more likely to lose track of defendants.190
189. See Granfield & Eby, supra note 185, at 11.
190. Traditional supervision in the form of reporting, as well as more intensive kinds of
probation that might even include drug testing, ordinarily are done on a much less
frequent basis than drug court supervision. A study done by American University in 1997
revealed that 55% of surveyed drug courts required at least two drug tests per week
during the first phases of treatment, 35% required one test per week, and 10% required
one test every two weeks. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 21-22. By comparison, drug
testing in these same courts prior to the adoption of drug courts was considerably less
frequent: 52% required monthly testing, 8% required weekly testing, 33% required
random testing on an unspecified as-needed basis, and 6% required no testing at all. See
id. at 22.
Quite apart from drug testing, drug courts impose significantly more demanding
reporting obligations than do traditional courts. This same American University study
revealed that only 8% of surveyed traditional courts required regular court appearances
for those under community supervision, contrasted to the regular court appearances
required in drug courts. See hi. As for probation, 73% of traditional probationers meet
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The lack of accuracy of traditional court records becomes an even
greater problem when the traditional control court is a historical
court-a court that existed five or six years ago but since then has
been supplanted by a drug court.'
Of course, the value of recidivism measures depends a great deal
on the length of the follow-up period. It is one thing to ask whether a
drug court defendant is rearrested within six months after his drug
court disposition, and quite another to ask whether he is rearrested
within six years after the disposition. Because most drug courts are
relatively new, most impact studies use relatively short follow-up
periods. Twelve to eighteen months seems to be customary, though
most experts agree that truly meaningful recidivism studies need
considerably longer follow-up periods.192
Most impact studies express recidivism rates as a simple
with their probation officers less than once per month. See id.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74 (discussing the relative newness of drug
courts, as compared to the courts they are replacing).
192. Belenko makes a similar suggestion regarding the need for longer follow-up
periods:
[D]ata should be collected on post-program outcomes for a longer follow-up
period. Only one study thus far has tracked multiple outcomes for as long as
three years with a comparison group (RAND Maricopa County evaluation);
another study has collected recidivism data for up to four years after program
entry, including reconvictions as well as rearrests, although no comparison group
was included (National Center for State Courts Oakland evaluation).
Belenko, supra note 96, at 34. In fact, of the nine impact studies in Belenko's meta-study
that use the appropriate target group of all drug court participants, the follow-up periods
range from a low of six months (Gottfredson study of the Baltimore Drug Court), see id. at
31, to a high of 36 months (RAND study of the Maricopa County Drug Court and Tauber
study of the Oakland Drug Court), see id. at 29. The nine follow-up periods are:
COURT AUTHOR PERIOD (MONTHS)
Maricopa, AZ RAND 36
Oakland, CA Tauber 36
Riverside, CA Sechrest 21
Denver, CO Granfield 12
Wilmington, DE Miller 12
Dade, FL Goldcamp 18
Baltimore, MD Gottfredson 6
Multnomah, OR Finigan 24
Travis, TX Kelly 12
See id. at 29-31. Needless to say, it is important for the follow-up period of the target
group to be the same as the follow-up period of the control group. The study of the
Riverside Drug Court used a 21-month follow-up period for the drug court group, but
used a 27-month follow-up period for the control group, with the result that control group
recidivism is over-reported compared to drug court recidivism. See id. at 29. The other
eight studies correctly used the same follow-up periods for both target and control.
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percentage, representing the portion of subjects studied who have
been arrested at least once over a set follow-up period.' Even with a
sensible follow-up period, this kind of recidivism measure is rather
unsophisticated because it does not distinguish between the
defendant who is rearrested a single time in the follow-up period
from the defendant who is rearrested ten times in the follow-up
period. And, of course, society benefits not only when criminals are
permanently reformed, but also when their criminal activity is
dispersed over time. Indeed, an important argument in favor of drug
courts is that even if defendants are not being cured of their
addictions in numbers justifying the costs of drug courts, frequent and
comprehensive police and judicial intervention will result at least in
injecting more time between defendants' criminal episodes."4 To
reflect this social benefit, some impact studies express recidivism rates
not as the simple percentage of defendants rearrested in the follow-up
period, but rather as the average number of rearrests per defendant
within the follow-up period. 95
Finally, in a perfect world, recidivism probably should be
measured by subsequent convictions rather than subsequent arrests.
Of course, using convictions requires a longer follow-up period, is
more complicated, and is probably more expensive.
After early formal impact studies showed that drug courts were
having virtually no impact in reducing recidivism,96 many drug court
proponents suggested that other measures of drug courts' success
might be more meaningful, such as future employment or future drug
use.197 But these other, less traditional impact measures are fraught
193. See id. at 17.
194. See infra note 263.
195. Only two of the nine studies compiled by Belenko used this more sophisticated
measure of recidivism: (1) Tauber's study of the Oakland Drug Court, see Belenko, supra
note 96, at 31; and (2) Finigan's study of the Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon Drug
Court, see id. at 33. There are even more sophisticated measures of recidivism that, for
example, focus on so-called "time-at-risk" by discounting or ignoring any time in custody.
As of Belenko's and Dumanovsky's meta-study in June 1998, no impact studies of
treatment-based drug courts had used "time-at-risk" recidivism, although the 1991 ABA
study used a time-at-risk adjustment in examining recidivism in the New York City N
Parts. See infra note 216.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 211-44 (discussing those formal studies).
197. For example, a study of the Wilmington, Delaware Juvenile Drug Court used
employment and school enrollment as the impact measure and found that after a one-year
follow-up period, 79% of all drug court graduates were either employed, in school, or
both, compared to 62% of non-graduates. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 28. Although
comparing drug court graduates with drug court non-graduates is not nearly as distorting
as comparing drug court graduates with all drug defendants in traditional courts, see supra
text accompanying note 181, it is important to recognize that such a comparison does not
2000] 1487
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
with their own methodological problems. Employment can be an
elusive and misleading measure. As discussed above,'98 most drug
courts are in a different locale or in a different point in time than their
traditional control courts, and geographic and temporal differences in
economic conditions make it hard to gather accurate employment
statistics as a measure of drug courts' success.19 9 Future drug use is
also a difficult comparison to make, again because one would be
comparing groups of closely monitored drug court defendants, whose
drug usage, at least during their bond and probation supervision, is
well documented, with traditional drug defendants, whose drug usage
is substantially less well known. Moreover, because most drug use is
itself a crime, studies based on drug use are in effect looking at a
narrow kind of recidivism. Finally, because most control courts are
no longer operating, it is either impossible or impossibly costly to
measure things like employment or drug use histories. Presumably
because of these issues, independent evaluators generally have
resisted the call to look at non-traditional measures of drug court
effectiveness, and virtually all have stuck with the two traditional
measures: speed and rearrest recidivism.
Although much has been written about so-called "retention
rates"-the percentage of drug defendants who complete their
treatment program-this statistic is really an operational measure and
not an impact measure.20 What matters is not whether drug court
defendants complete their treatment programs, but whether the
measure drug court effectiveness; it measures only the effectiveness of the treatment
programs within a given drug court. It is an operational study and not an impact study.
See supra text accompanying notes 167-70 (discussing these two types of studies).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
199. Belenko notes that gathering information about drug courts' effect on
employment is difficult due to limited data, but "[a] few evaluations have gathered
employment data, and these generally found that drug court participants are more likely
to gain employment while participating and upon graduation." Belenko, supra note 96, at
28.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70 (discussing the difference between
operational studies and impact studies). But even as an operational statistic, retention
rate studies have been done so poorly that they are of little value. See Belenko, supra note
96, at 20 (noting that studies' retention rates are flawed due to "limited observation,
unclear time periods .... [different] cut-off period[s] .... and clients [with] varying
amounts of time in the potential program"). The effects of these fundamental statistical
defects are readily apparent from retention rates published regularly by the Drug Courts
Program Office. These rates vary wildly, from 100% to 35%, spanning programs of vastly
different, and indeed incomparable, sizes. For example, a drug court program in Wichita,
Kansas with a total enrollment of four people is listed along with Dade County's (with an
enrollment of 14,561) and Denver's (6011). See DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE,
DRUG COURT ACrTvITY: SUMMARY INFORMATION (1998) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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programs are effective in breaking their drug dependence and their
other criminal activity. Informal impact surveys2°' often commit the
mistake of parading glowing retention rates as evidence of success,
when in fact those rates simply reflect the compulsory nature of drug
court treatment and its regimen of graduated punishments designed
expressly to keep defendants in treatment. 2
B. Informal Impact Surveys
Most new drug courts are simply too busy dealing with the
enormous challenges of implementing and maintaining their courts to
pay much attention to gathering meaningful impact statistics. Yet few
have been able to resist the temptation to compile unrealistically
optimistic statistics in some form or another. These informal impact
surveys are almost always done by drug court personnel themselves
or by staff in the other two institutions that form the drug court
triangle-police departments and district attorneys offices. As a
result, the drug court literature is full of informal, unpublished, and
untested impact surveys done by people who are untrained in the
scientific method, but who arguably have a vested interest in
continuing drug courts. Not surprisingly, virtually all of these
informal impact surveys report astounding rates of success. But their
measures are almost always deeply flawed, and their methods are
rarely statistically appropriate.
Informal impact studies suffer from a host of statistical defects.
Many of them, and even some of the formal studies, lack sufficient
data. Most drug courts are new, have short operating histories, and
therefore are unable to produce impact surveys with anything but the
shortest of follow-up periods.203 Good studies are also time-
consuming, and the one resource most drug courts do not have is
time.2 4  Meaningful impact studies can be expensive,2" and it is
201. Informal impact surveys are discussed in the next Section. See infra text
accompanying notes 203-10.
202. As Belenko remarks, "Elements of the drug court model that may increase
retention in treatment (such as graduated sanctions and rewards, judicial supervision[,]
and acceptance of relapse) have not been studied[,] but merit further research." Belenko,
supra note 96, at 20.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 257-84.
205. See W. Clinton Terry III, Prosecutors and the Evaluation of Dedicated Drug
Treatment Courts, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 32, 32. Formal impact studies can
cost from 10% to 25% of a drug court's entire budget. See id. at 34. In a pattern that
seems typical of the rush toward drug court implementation, the Denver Drug Court
formal impact study originally called for an ambitious evaluation of 1500 defendants, but
was cut back to a modest 100 defendants when the investigators discovered that
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perfectly understandable that any judge presiding over an operating
drug court will choose to spend resources on treatment instead of
evaluation.
More significantly, most informal impact surveys (and indeed
most formal studies) commit the mistake of comparing traditional
drug defendants with drug court graduates, rather than with all drug
court defendants. This mistake has a grossly distorting effect because
drug court graduates, who by definition have spent many months
successfully completing a treatment program, obviously will be less
likely to be arrested in the follow-up period after their graduation
than drug defendants who drop out of the program before
graduation.2°6 The short follow-up periods typical *of most informal
impact surveys magnify this distortion.20 Studies of the Denver Drug
Court dramatically illustrate both the fact and magnitude of such
distortion.
Two years after the formation of the Denver Drug Court, its
coordinator issued a three-page "study" reporting a colossal drop in
recidivism from the control group of probationary drug defendants in
traditional courts (58.3% recidivism) to the target group of drug court
graduates (10.6% recidivism) 08 The "study" was accompanied by an
impressive pie chart showing a thick wedge of traditional recidivism
and a thin slice of drug court recidivism.20 9 But, as discussed in more
detail below,210 when the formal study of the Denver Drug Court was
done using the proper target group of all drug court defendants,
instead of just drug court graduates, the results were quite different:
58% recidivism for the drug defendants in traditional courts and 53%
for the drug defendants in drug court.
The bottom line is that the informal impact surveys that have
flooded and come to dominate the drug court literature have virtually
no value, except perhaps as morale boosters to rally the drug court
troops. Their exaggerated claims do a substantial disservice to the
credibility of the drug court movement.
"automated court records were not available, nor particularly accurate." Granfield &
Eby, supra note 185, at 1.
206. If the time in which the drug court graduate is in the program is counted as part of
the follow-up period, then this distortion is even greater. See supra note 195 (discussing
"time-at-risk" recidivism).
207. See supra text accompanying note 192 (discussing the follow-up periods).
208. Shannon L. Gaskill, Office of the Drug Court Coordinator, Denver Drug Court
Project: Initial Study: Drug Court Graduates, 1994-1996, at 2 (1997) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
209. See id. at 4.
210. See infra text accompanying note 237.
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C. Formal Impact Studies
There also have been dozens of formal, academic studies of drug
court effectiveness' These studies range from independent national
studies covering many different jurisdictions to studies of individual
drug courts commissioned by the very drug court to be studied. Most
of these studies, although considerably more formal than informal
surveys, are not published in peer-reviewed or other professional
journals.212 Despite the dozens of formal studies, and despite
congressional directives in the mid-1990s for more comprehensive
and meaningful impact studies,21 3 only a handful have made the
proper comparison between all drug court defendants-rather than
only drug court graduates-and all traditional drug defendants.214
The recidivism results in that handful of studies are substantially less
promising than the wild claims regularly made in informal surveys, as
the following summary of those studies illustrates.
1. 1991 American Bar Association Study
The American Bar Association (ABA) sponsored the first
significant independent study of drug court effectiveness and
published it in 1991.215 This study examined four urban drug courts:
(1) Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; (2) Milwaukee; (3) Philadelphia;
and (4) Dade County (Miami), Florida. The first three are DCM-
based models, and, of course, Dade County is treatment-based.
Not surprisingly, the ABA study found that the DCM-based
courts achieved significant reductions in case-processing times, but no
reductions in recidivism.216 The ABA study also concluded that the
211. See infra text accompanying notes 215-44.
212. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 8.
213. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322,
§ 50002, 108 Stat. 1796, 1958-59 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796ii (1994)) (repealed 1996).
The 1994 Amendments to the Act, in part, stated:
The Comptroller General of the United States shall study and assess the
effectiveness and impact of grants authorized by part V of title I of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as added by [this subchapter] and
report to Congress the results of the study on or before January 1,1997.
IcL; see also supra text accompanying notes 110-11 (discussing this directive).
214. See supra text accompanying note 182.
215. See BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STRATEGIES FOR
COURTS TO COPE WITH THE CASELOAD PRESSURES OF DRUG CASES (1991); see also
BELENKO & DUMANOVSKY, supra note 96, at 13-15 (describing and discussing this study
in detail).
216. The DCM-based drug courts in Chicago, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia
significantly reduced disposition times from their traditional predecessors:
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savings in case-processing time could be achieved without isolating
drug cases. In other words, the study found that because it is how the
drug case is managed rather than where it is managed, the benefits of
DCM-based drug courts can be achieved without having special drug
courts, simply by identifying drug cases (or any cases, for that matter)
and managing them accordingly.217
The most significant, and troubling, finding of the ABA study
was that the Dade County treatment-based drug court was no more
effective than traditional courts in reducing arrest recidivism. It
found that over a one-year follow-up period drug court defendants
suffered a 32% recidivism rate compared to the 33% recidivism rate
suffered by drug defendants before implementation of the drug
DISPOSMON TIME (DAYS)




See BELENKO & DUMANOVSKY, supra note 96, at 13.
According to a study done in 1993 by the New York Criminal Justice Agency in
Manhattan, the New York City N Parts achieved similarly dramatic results, reducing
disposition time by an average of 85 days, see id at 14, but that same study concluded that
the N Parts had no impact in reducing recidivism. In fact, N Part defendants suffered a
53.5% rearrest rate during the study's two-year follow-up period, while non-N Part
defendants suffered a 50.5% rearrest rate during the same two-year period. See id. To be
fair, recidivism in DCM-based courts like New York City's N Parts is inherently higher
than traditional recidivism precisely because traditional defendants spend more time in
custody awaiting disposition. When the New York evaluators adjusted for time-at-risk, see
supra note 195, and measured number of arrests instead of simple recidivism, see supra
text accompanying notes 193-95, the results were more favorable: 3.3 rearrests per year
for N Part defendants, compared to 5.6 for non-N Part defendants. See BELENKO &
DUMANOVSKY, supra note 96, at 14. On the other hand, it appears that the traditional
control group used in this study was not limited to drug defendants and that there may
have been other significant and infecting differences between the target and control
groups. According to Belenko and Dumanovsky, when one adjusts for these differences,
the N Parts "had little independent effect on the likelihood of rearrest." Id.
217. Many of the case management techniques employed by these three drug courts
were applied to other criminal cases by their traditional counterparts for non-drug cases,
with similar results:
DIsPOSITION TIME (DAYS)




See BELENKO & DUMANOvsKY, supra note 96, at 13. As Belenko and Dumanovsky put
it, "[T]he ABA findings suggest that 'fast track' drug courts can yield reduced processing
time for both drug and nondrug cases." Id.
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court.2 18
The ABA study also confirmed the suspicions of many
prosecutorial critics of the drug court experiment: drug courts result
in more lenient sentences.219 In theory, neither treatment-based drug
courts nor DCM-based drug courts should have any impact on the
lengths of sentences that defendants eventually receive. Treatment-
based drug courts should involve fewer defendants receiving jail or
prison time, and the time they do receive may be dribbled out at the
front end in the form of short jail stays for violating bond or
probation conditions.220 But for drug court defendants who violate
their probations and eventually are sentenced, the fact that they came
through a treatment-based drug court ought to have no bearing on
the length of the sentences they ultimately receive. DCM-based drug
courts also should have no impact on sentencing. They are just
traditional courts processing drug cases in an accelerated fashion.
Yet the 1991 ABA study found that both in Cook County and
Philadelphia, quicker dispositions resulted in reductions in the
average length of prison sentences.22
2. 1994 Maricopa County Study
The impact study of the Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona,
drug court compared traditional court drug defendants given
218. See Granfield & Eby, supra note 185, at 11 (describing the 1991 ABA Study).
These dismal results from Dade County improved in a subsequent study done in 1994. See
infra text accompanying notes 224-27.
219. See BELENKO & DUMANOvSKY, supra note 96, at 13. Belenko and Dumanovsky
observe:
The ABA study also concluded that more lenient sentences were associated with
quicker dispositions. In Philadelphia, shorter average prison sentences were
imposed more often after the introduction of the DCM system. Similarly,
Chicago has an increase in the use of probation sentences and a decrease in
prison sentences. Only Milwaukee showed no evidence of changes in sentencing
patterns with the introduction of the speedy trial drug court.
Id. This has certainly not been the experience in the Denver Drug Court, where
substantially more drug defendants are going to prison and are going there for a longer
period of time than before drug court. See infra text accompanying notes 292-97.
220. Although the percentage of prison sentences may go down as a result of some
drug courts, the actual raw numbers of prison sentences, and even the total amount of
prison time given, may well go up if drug courts stimulate large increases in case filings.
See infra text accompanying notes 290-95.
221. See SMrrH ET AL., supra note 215, at 4, 10-11. One explanation for more lenient
drug court sentences is that judges who volunteer for drug court may just be easier drug
sentencers than their traditional counterparts, though I am aware of no studies confirming
such a hypothesis. If this hypothesis is true, it highlights the general concerns, articulated
below, that drug courts dangerously institutionalize the sentencing philosophy of a single
judge or group of judges. See infra text accompanying notes 350-53.
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probation to drug court defendants over a thirty-six month follow-up
period. Because the Maricopa County Drug Court is post-
adjudicative, and because the control group was therefore limited to
probationers, the Maricopa County study arguably understates the
traditional recidivism rate.m Even so, the results were moderately
more encouraging than the 1991 ABA study: 43.7% traditional court
recidivism versus 33.1% drug court recidivism.'
3. 1994 Dade County Study
In 1994, evaluators studied the Dade County Drug Court a
second time to see if they could improve on the dismal results from
the 1991 ABA Study. 4 Over an eighteen-month follow-up period,
traditional recidivism was measured at 48.7%, compared to drug
court recidivism measured at 33.2%.P There was, however, a
remarkable, and unaccounted for, difference in failure-to-report
rates-with drug court defendants failing to report 52% of the time,
compared to 9% for drug defendants in traditional courts? 6 More
significantly, the target groups were not randomly assigned. 2 7
4. 1996 Baltimore Study
Evaluators examined both the county and district drug courts in
Baltimore, using a very short follow-up period of six months. They
reported modest drops in recidivism in both courts: from 27.1% to
22.6% in district court, and from 30.4% to 26.5% in county court.M
The short time period used for this study significantly decreases its
reliability.229
5. The 1996 Congressional Directive and the 1997 Sherman Report
In 1996, as part of the 1994 amendments to the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act,230 Congress directed the Attorney
General to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness
222. See supra notes 179-81.
223. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 31. The Sherman Report later characterized this
reduction as statistically "non-significant." THE SHERMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 9-
51.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 215-21.
225. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 30.
226. See THE SHERMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 9-52.
227. See supra note 183 (discussing the problem of non-random assignment).
228. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 31.
229. See supra text accompanying note 192.
230. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 50001(a), 108 Stat. 1796,1956 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3796ii (1994)) (repealed 1996).
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of the more than three billion dollars in federal funds annually doled
out under the Act to state and local governments for crime
prevention. In 1997, Lawrence W. Sherman and other authors, in
collaboration with the University of Maryland, reported to Congress
on the state of those evaluations.231 One small part of that report
dealt with drug court evaluations. It pointed out that despite
Congress's command for meaningful evaluations, there had been only
four drug court evaluations-the three evaluations discussed above of
the Maricopa County, Dade County, and Baltimore drug courts232 and
an uncompleted evaluation of the drug court in Washington, D.C.
The report was critical of many of the methodologies used in these
evaluations and characterized most of the claimed reductions in
recidivism as "non-significant." 3  Although it summarized the
existing data as "early results" that appear "hopeful,"' '  it concluded
the section on drug court evaluations by explaining that "[t]here is yet
little research to examine how effective the programs are in reducing
crime."235
6. Post-1996 Studies: The General Accounting Office and Belenko
Meta-Studies
Since the time of the Sherman Report, only six additional impact
studies have been conducted. Like the previous research, the studies
had quite mixed results, ranging from huge drops in recidivism rates
reported out of the drug court in Riverside, California, (33% to
13%)1 6 to statistically insignificant differences reported out of the
231. See THE SHERMAN REPORT, supra note 105.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 222-29.
233. The report criticized the 1994 Dade County study on methodological grounds,
alleging that the 1994 study failed to randomly assign groups and that the study produced
significant differences in failure to report rates "between the drug court participants (55
percent) and the comparisons (9 percent)." THE SHERMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 9-
51.
As for the other two studies, the report characterized the Maricopa County
numbers as "non-significant" for a reduction in rearrest recidivism, but "significant" in
terms of a reduction in incarcerations, id, corroborating the hypothesis that drug courts
tend to impose more lenient sentences. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21. It
characterized the Baltimore study as being "quite small" and noted its results "suggest
that the program may have very different impacts depending upon the court and
characteristics of the offender involved." THE SHERMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 9-
51.
234. THE SHERMAN REPORT, supra note 105, at 9-51.
235. IL
236. But the evaluation of the Riverside Drug Court did not use random controls. The
control subjects, though initially selected at random, were then screened as "possible
candidates for drug court had it existed at that time." Belenko, supra note 96, at 29; supra
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drug court in Denver (58% to 53%)P7
In addition to evaluations of particular drug courts or groups of
drug courts, the literature is becoming increasingly filled with so-
called "meta-studies"-studies of drug court studies. 38  The most
significant meta-study to date is probably the one delivered to
Congress in July 1997 by the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO).2 9 The GAO report is based on twenty evaluations
done through March 1997, covering sixteen different drug courts.
After expressing several concerns about the design and scope of many
of the evaluations, 240 the GAO concluded that there was insufficient
data and research to definitively determine whether drug courts were
effective in reducing recidivism and drug relapse.2 41
text accompanying note 175. In addition, the Riverside study used a longer follow-up
period for the control group than for the target group, inflating control group recidivism.
See supra note 192.
237. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 29; Granfield & Eby, supra note 185, at 26.
Granfield and Eby also examined the more sophisticated measure of average number of
arrests, see supra text accompanying notes 193-95, and the results were even less
promising: defendants suffered an average of 0.8 arrests in the one-year follow-up period
regardless of whether they came out of regular courtrooms or out of the drug court. See
Granfield & Eby, supra note 185, at 25. To be fair to the Denver Drug Court, it is, or at
least was at its inception and at the time of the Granfield and Eby study, a drug court that
does not screen or exclude participants, which probably goes a long way toward explaining
its dismal recidivism performance. The recidivism results for all six studies are
summarized in the following table:
IRECIDIVISM %
CITY TRADITIONAL COURT [DRUG COURT
1. Denver, CO 58.0 53.0
2. Multnomah County, OR
(Portland) 1.53' 0.59a
3. Oakland, CA 1.33 a  0.75'
4. Riverside, CA 33.0 13.4
5. Travis County, IX
(Austin) 41.0 38.0
6. Wilmington, DE 51.1 33.3
Expressed not as a percentage, but rather as the average number of arrests suffered
during the follow-up period. See Belenko, supra note 96, at 29-31.
238. The Sherman Report was one of the first such meta-studies, see THE SHERMAN
REPORT, supra note 105.
239. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS (1997) (Sup. Docs. No. GA1.13:GGD-97-106).
240. The GAO study details a number of problems found in the evaluations, including
concerns regarding short observation periods, flawed recidivism data, a lack of comparison
groups, and different target populations and treatment services, all of which make it
difficult to accurately compare different drug courts. See id. at 7-8.
241. See id.
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One of the most recent meta-studies of which I am aware is
Steven Belenko's June 1998 review of thirty evaluations representing
twenty-four different drug courts.242 The Belenko study is by far the
most optimistic meta-study done to date.2 43 But even Belenko
concedes that most drug court evaluators continue to target drug
court graduates instead of all drug court participants, that only a few
studies have tracked recidivism for more than a one-year follow-up
period, and that only two of the studies used a random method of
identifying target drug court defendants.2"
Treatment-based drug courts have been in existence now for
eleven years-more than enough time to generate reliable data on the
$64,000 question of whether they work. Despite an enormous
reservoir of data, enormous federal financial incentives to prove
effectiveness, and an express congressional directive to undertake
meaningful effectiveness studies, the evidence on drug court
effectiveness remains breathtakingly weak.245
Nevertheless, court administrators and judges continue to
stumble over themselves lining up for federal monies to start more
and more drug courts, and federal officials cannot dole out the money
fast enough. Informal internal surveys continue to claim
preposterous results, and formal outside studies continue to belie
those preposterous claims. Still, the drug court train rolls on,
242. See Belenko, supra note 96.
243. Belenko summarizes his conclusion this way:
Despite the different drug court structures, jurisdictional compositions, methods
used by drug courts evaluators and the limitations of some of the data, a number
of consistent findings emerge from the available drug court evaluations. Drug
courts have been more successful than other forms of community supervision in
closely supervising drug offenders in the community.... Based on more limited
data and to a lesser but still significant extent, drug courts reduce recidivism for
participants after they leave the program.
Id. at 17-18.
244. See id at 34-36. The most recent meta-study of which I am aware is a 1999
compilation of studies funded by Correctional Counseling, Inc. (CCI), a private criminal
justice research organization based in Alexandria, Virginia. See Shaw & Robinson, supra
note 169, at 107-19. The CCI summary examined five drug court studies: (1) the
Riverside study; (2) the Delaware study; (3) a study done on the drug courts in Escambia
and Okaloosa Counties, Florida, between 1994 and 1996; (4) a study of the juvenile drug
court in Salt Lake City, Utah, between 1995 and 1997; and (5) a study of the drug court in
Portland, Maine, covering 1998. The three new studies suffer from the same frailties as all
the other studies: they target the wrong group-graduates instead of all drug court
defendants; they involve selection criteria that render the control group not random; and
two of them (Salt Lake City and Portland) use unacceptably short follow-up periods.
245. As one of the most recent formal impact evaluations noted, research on recidivism
rates is ambiguous and conflicting, necessitating further research. See Granflield & Eby,
supra note 185, at 12.
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undeterred by the utter lack of evidence of its effectiveness.
Some drug court proponents even have been emboldened by the
fact that none of the studies conclusively shows that drug courts
increase recidivism!246 This attitude is a particularly virulent strain of
what I call the Chicken Soup Approach to court reform: let's change
for the sake of change-or, more precisely, so we can show the world
(and the electorate) that we care about what we are doing-governed
only by the Hippocratic directive that we do no palpable harm.4 7 In
the drug court context, the Chicken Soup Approach is completely
understandable. Well-intentioned trial judges, soldiers fighting in the
trenches of the drug war, see the terrible scourge that drugs have
become in our society,24 see that the war on drugs is lost, and are
desperate to find another way. They perceive the situation to be so
terrible that any proposed solution is quickly embraced with virtually
no critical analysis, believing that it cannot do any harm to try a
different approach.249
Perhaps the Chicken Soup Approach was appropriate when New
York City and Dade County conducted their original experiments
decades ago, but drug courts are no longer experiments. What
started as pilot programs have become, in the blink of an eye,
conventional judicial wisdom. We owe it to the citizens we serve,
including the criminal defendants who appear before us clothed with
the presumption of innocence, and, perhaps most of all, to our own
traditions of quiet rationality, to resist the hysterical dash toward drug
courts and to re-examine the conventional wisdom. The post-pilot
burden should now be squarely on the proponents of drug courts to
demonstrate their effectiveness in reducing recidivism. So far, they
have failed to meet that burden, and on that basis alone we should
consider abandoning the experiment.
But drug courts not only do no demonstrable good, I believe
there are cogent arguments that they are inflicting serious injuries to
the institution of the judiciary and to the way in which that institution
relates to the other two branches of government.
246. Two commentators write, "What is clear from this data is that Drug Court
offenders are not rearrested for offenses at a higher rate than drug offenders in previous
courts." Id at 25.
247. I am afraid much of the recent Arizona-style jury reform is a Chicken Soup kind
of reform. See, e.g., Mark Curridan, Jury Reform, ABA LJ., Nov. 1995, at 72,75-76.
248. But see supra 122-30 and accompanying text (discussing the exaggeration of the
drug epidemic).
249. See infra text accompanying notes 254-56.
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VI. UNEXAMINED OPERATIONAL CONCERNS: How Do DRUG
COURTS REALLY WORK, AND WHAT IMPACrS ARE THEY HAVING
ON THE REST OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM?
Having witnessed the birth and development of the Denver Drug
Court firsthand, 0 I also have witnessed firsthand a whole series of
what I will loosely call operational problems. I do not know whether
these problems are anything but anecdotal, because the self-
generated literature in this area, as discussed above, tends not to be
very soul-searching35 ' Nevertheless, I suspect that several of these
problems are so systemic in nature that they are likely to crop up, and
likely have cropped up, in many jurisdictions.
A. The Organization of the Denver District Court
District courts in Colorado are the state courts of general
jurisdiction. Colorado is divided into twenty-two judicial districts,
and the boundaries of the City and County of Denver form the
Second Judicial District, sometimes more informally called the
Denver District Court. There are twenty judges on the Denver
District Court. We are, by internal custom, a non-integrated court,
meaning that we are divided into divisions by subject matter. We are
divided into three divisions-a civil division of ten courtrooms, a
criminal division of seven courtrooms (six regular criminal
courtrooms plus the drug court) and a domestic division of three
courtroomsP 2 None of the twenty district court judges stays in any
one division more than a few years. We have unwritten rules about
the presumptive length of our rotations: three years in civil, two years
in criminal, and one year in domestic. These presumptions are
rebuttable, except that no judge must stay in domestic court more
than one year against his will. Our chief judge makes all courtroom
assignments. Drug court is not part of the rotation; it is filled on a
strictly volunteer basis. As discussed in more detail below,23 except
for its founder, who stayed two and a half years, no judge has stayed
250. I was appointed to the Denver District Court in December 1990. The Denver
Drug Court began operations on July 1, 1994. I served in one criminal division from
January 1995 through January 1998, and, although I have never volunteered to be the drug
court judge, like most of my colleagues, I have taken many transfers of drug court trials
and motions hearings.
251. See supra note 1 and text accompanying notes 203-10.
252. Juvenile and probate cases are handled in Denver by entirely separate district-
level courts. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-8-101 to -126 (West 1997) (establishing
the requirements for the Denver Juvenile Court); id. §§ 13-9-101 to -122 (establishing the
requirements for the Denver Probate Court).
253. See infra text accompanying note 308.
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in the Denver Drug Court for more than one year.
B. The Rush to Formation
The Denver Drug Court was approved at a single en bane
meeting, during which the entire debate consumed less than thirty
minutes. The "debate" consisted of the drug court proponent, Judge
William G. Meyer, presenting the proposal as a sort of functional fait
accompli. I do not at all fault Judge Meyer for his approach. A vast
array of institutional and financial commitments needs to be in place
before any drug court will work, and Judge Meyer had invested
enormous amounts of time and energy putting that array into place
before the idea was presented at our en bane meeting. He had met
with cadres of federal officials and obtained provisional commitments
for funding. He had met with our police, district attorney, and public
defenders and had obtained their operational commitments.
In this atmosphere it was understandably difficult for most of us
to analyze the proposal critically, for fear that any criticism would be
interpreted as criticism of a very talented, hardworking, committed
colleague. I am concerned that this sort of personalizing of drug
courts, coupled with the Chicken Soup approach,5 makes it more
common than not that drug courts are being adopted across the
country with no meaningful discussion or debate. This rush to
formation might be avoided in several ways.
We should insist that the debate occur before the proponent
gathers steam with financial and operational commitments. While it
is necessary that those commitments be in place before a drug court
begins operations, there is absolutely no reason they need to be in
place before the decision to proceed with a drug court is made. After
all, it is not as if these commitments are difficult to obtain in the
current environment, in which federal officials, police, and
prosecutors are jumping on the drug court bandwagon in record
numbers. 5 If we put the financial and operational carts behind the
decisional horse, where they belong, it will be substantially more
likely that we will be able to have a quiet, rational discussion of the
issues in an atmosphere free of the feeling that we will let all sorts of
people and institutions down if we decide not to adopt a drug court.
We should also all do what we can to educate ourselves about
drug courts and not defer our own good judgment to the views of a
handful of active proponents (or active critics, for that matter). The
254. See supra text accompanying notes 246-49.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15.
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more we know about how drug courts actually work, what they do
and do not do, their history, and the forces that have come together
to promote them, the more discriminating we will be able to be.
Armed with some different viewpoints and the kind of fierce
independence we are all supposed to bring to this job, we can respect
the motives and efforts of the proponents, but still challenge some of
their assumptions and arguments.
We also must be prepared to resist the considerable political
pressures that come together to drive the adoption of drug courts.
Because drug courts are, by their very design, all things to all people,
they have tremendous support from people of all political
persuasions. I do not have any particularly useful advice for
colleagues faced with intense political pressure to adopt drug courts,
except to say that the very function of the judicial branch is to resist
political pressure.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must resist what I call
the siren of accounting. Most state judicial districts are involved in a
fierce competition for statewide funds. Many allocation schemes
depend in part on easily determined measures of judicial demand-
such as the number of cases filed per judge per year. Drug courts
present an almost irresistible opportunity for urban courts to
significantly boost their filings per judge. Chief judges, concerned
about the allocation of state funds to their particular judicial districts,
understandably feel the lure of this drug court accounting sirenY 6
But, of course, it is a siren we must all resist. It is not only dishonest
and unseemly to adopt drug courts because they boost a system's
statistics, but it is ultimately unfair to rural judicial districts, which
have not historically been part of the rush to drug courts and thus will
be shortchanged when it comes time to allocate statewide judicial
resources.
C. The Popcorn Effect
In Denver, we grossly underestimated the enthusiasm with which
our police and prosecutors would embrace the idea of the drug court.
As a result, our projections of the number of drug filings in the new
drug court were woefully understated. We expected that the drug
court would stimulate some modest increases in the number of drug
filings, but instead of modest increases, we got massive increases.
256. In Denver, one example of our submission to the temptations of accounting is the
misleading manner in which our clerk's office counts the number of drug filings. See infra
note 257.
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Filings nearly tripled after the drug court's first full year and have
remained at that many-fold level since.
There were 1047 drug cases filed in the Denver District Court in
1993, the last full year before implementation of the drug court5 7 In
1995, the first full year of the drug court, that number jumped to
2661. 8 The following year, drug filings increased to 3017P 9
This increase in drug filings was not merely a reflection of an
overall increase in criminal filings. On the contrary, from the
moment the drug court was created, the percentage of drug cases filed
in our court has exploded. In 1993, the first full year before the drug
court, drug filings represented 28.6% of all criminal filings.2 60 In 1995,
the first full year after the drug court, that percentage skyrocketed to
51.5% and has remained at that high level.261
It is clear that there is a significant feedback phenomenon going
on between the arrest and prosecution end of the process on the one
257. Denver District Court's Criminal Filings Statistics for 1991-98 from Miles M.
Flesche, Clerk of the Denver District Court, to the Judges of the Denver District Court 1
(May 10, 1999) [hereinafter Criminal Filings Statistics for 1991-98] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). It is important to recognize that the case filing figures from our
clerk's office are higher (up to 30%) than the figures published by the district attorney's
office and given by the district attorney's office to other agencies studying the Denver
Drug Court. Though there was initially some confusion about this difference, we now
realize that the clerk's figures include all drug arrests from the first advisement in county
court, even if those cases are dismissed without ever having actually been filed in district
court. This has the effect of dramatically boosting district court filings, perhaps in
response to the siren of accounting discussed above. See supra text accompanying note
256. In any event, even the more conservative filing figures from the district attorney's
office reflect a more than two-fold explosion in filings between 1993 and 1995.
258. See Criminal Filings Statistics for 1991-98, supra note 257, at 1.
259. See id.
260. The following table depicts the number of criminal cases filed in the Denver
District Court from 1991 through 1998, the number of drug cases filed in that same period,
and the percentage of the total number of criminal cases that the number of drug cases
represented:
YEAR [ CRIMINAL CASES [DRUG CASES % DRUG CASES
1991 3795 958 25.2
1992 3790 1014 26.7
1993 3762 1047 27.8
1994 3907 1260 32.2
1995 5154 2661 51.6
1996 5814 3017 51.9
1997 5458 2825 51.8
1998 5089 2585 50.8
See id.
261. See i
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hand and the adjudicatory end on the other hand. The very presence
of the drug court, with its significantly increased capacity for
processing cases, has caused police to make arrests in, and
prosecutors to file, the kinds of ten-and twenty-dollar hand-to-hand
drug cases that the system simply would not have bothered with
before, certainly not as felonies. It is not just a matter of intensifying
existing arrest and charging policies; since the adoption of the drug
court, the Denver police have engaged in an extensive,
unprecedented campaign of undercover "buy-bust" operations.262
This is not at all to say that these cases are not deserving of
felony prosecution, or even that efforts focused on these low-level
possession cases are not paying larger social dividends in terms of
cleaning up our streets.2 3 Nevertheless, it is clear that the mere
presence of the Denver Drug Court has stimulated a demand that will
probably always outpace our capacity to deal with it.
262. As the Denver District Attorney noted, "[The explosion in drug filings is] not
because drug usage has increased but because law enforcement has stepped up efforts to
address the community concerns." A. William Ritter, Denver Looks to Hire Drug Czar,
DENV. POST, Apr. 1,1999, at 38.
263. As mentioned earlier, drug court proponents insist that drug courts are having
dramatic impacts in reducing crime, not necessarily by curing addicts, but rather by
decreasing the frequency of their criminal activities. See supra text accompanying note
194. Such alleged benefits, even if real, are of course the result of making the kinds of
low-level arrests that were not made before the days of drug courts; they are not the result
of drug courts themselves. That is, these alleged clean-up benefits presumably would be
enjoyed if we arrested all the same people who are now being funneled into drug court,
but handled them traditionally. It is the fact of their arrest, and not any claimed treatment
successes, that arguably accounts for these collateral benefits.
To a great extent, these claimed collateral benefits are a special version of the
broader and much-popularized "broken windows" theory of crime prevention. The
broken windows theory holds that visible disorder breeds crime and that by re-asserting
visible order-by fixing broken windows, cleaning up trash, removing graffiti, and
removing people who look like gang members or drug dealers-crime will necessarily be
reduced. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 29-31; see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,367-73 (1997) (discussing the application of
the theory in New York City). The broken windows theory is not without its critics. See,
e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 215--
44; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order Maintenance Policing
New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292-389 (1998); Toni Massaro, The Gang's Not
Here, GREEN BAG 2D, Autumn 1998, at 25, 29-34. The broken windows theory recently
may have suffered a fatal constitutional blow when the Supreme Court struck down
Chicago's gang loitering ordinance in City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1852
(1999). In any event, one would think that drug courts would have generated more than
anecdotal evidence supporting broken windows-style claims. I am unaware of any such
evidence.
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This popcorn effect-called "net widening" in some of the
literature-is a well-recognized phenomenon whenever law
enforcement resources are targeted at designated kinds of cases:
[A] number of 1970s-era reform efforts [have] followed this
pattern: Legislatures created a low-cost case-processing
mechanism with the idea of diverting some offenders from
the more expensive prison system; prosecutors then used the
low-cost mechanism not to reallocate existing categories of
cases (as intended), but to add new cases to the system-to
widen the system's net.2"
The popcorn effect caused by the Denver Drug Court has had a real
and deleterious impact on our bench, both in and out of the drug
court itself.
The sheer number of defendants run through the drug court mill
every day is taking an enormous toll on the drug court judge, the drug
court staff, sheriffs, prosecutors, and public defenders. In 1997 and
1998, there were an average of ninety-one defendants on the drug
court docket each day, with a high of 140 per day in January 1997 and
a low of about eighty-eight per day in April 1998.265 By contrast, non-
drug court felony courtrooms in Denver handle an average of eight to
twelve defendants per day.2 6 Even our county and municipal courts
do not see daily numbers anywhere approaching the numbers seen in
the drug court.267
Except for its Herculean founder, no judge has been able to
remain in the Denver Drug Court for more than one year, and even
then it has been necessary for them to take regular and substantial
breaks. The stresses on staff are just as bad. At the time of this
writing, in an effort to avoid burnout by drug court judges and their
staffs, our court is considering a formal rotation system of substitute
264. Stuntz, supra note 88, at 26 n.93.
265. See Denver Drug Court Statistics Sheets for 1997 & 1998 1-2 [hereinafter Drug
Court Statistics Sheets] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
266. In the Denver District Court, judges in the criminal divisions of traditional courts
typically set aside one or two days each week for "docket" or "board" days. During these
days, all manner of miscellaneous criminal matters are taken up-reviews of doctors'
reports regarding a defendant's competence or regarding mental defenses, probation
revocation hearings, pleas, trial settings, sentencings, motions hearings-pretty much
everything a criminal court does other than trials. In the three years I was in the criminal
division, I set aside Mondays and Fridays as my docket days, and we averaged anywhere
from 40 to 60 cases on our dockets each week, which, had we spread it over the whole
week, would have translated to 8 to 12 per day.
267. Denver's four county misdemeanor criminal courts handle roughly 70 cases per
judge per day. See Interview with Robert L. Patterson, Presiding Judge, Denver County
Court, in Denver, Colo. (May 27, 1999).
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drug court judges to relieve the drug court judge at regular intervals
throughout the year.
It seems to me that no judge, and no judge's staff, should be
expected to deal effectively with the kinds of numbers we are seeing.
Pretending that they can will only lead to demoralized and ineffective
drug courts.m
One of the most daunting problems associated with the explosion
of the drug court's docket is the cumulative problem of bench
warrants. As in any other criminal court, bench warrants issue when
drug defendants fail to appear. Because warrants issued years before
may be returned at any time, usually when a defendant is picked up
on another charge, there is a constantly accumulating pool of
warrants that demand the judge's attention. In the drug court, the
problem of bench warrants is greatly magnified by three factors.
First, the sheer size of the dockets means more bench warrants.
Second, the likelihood of a failure to appear in drug court is, by
definition, substantially greater than in traditional courts because
drug courts require many times the numbers of appearances in any
given case than do traditional courts. Finally, drug court judges
already spend so much time in court handling their massive dockets
that the additional burden of bench warrants is unbearable.
In fact, the amount of time our drug court judges were devoting
to bench warrants became so great that several of them decided to
cap the number of returns they would see in any one day, with the
result that it was not uncommon for defendants arrested on bench
warrants to spend two to three weeks in jail before being brought into
court.269 The 1999 drug court judge reversed that policy, but his
defendants still spent three to five days in jail on bench warrants
before he could get to themY0 He expressed concerns to me that
unless something is done, as the backlog of outstanding bench
warrants increases year after year, future drug court judges will be
spending a significant amount of their time doing nothing but returns
on old bench warrants.271
The popcorn effect also has affected the rest of us on the Denver
District Court. When the drug court was first approved, the idea was
that other judges on our bench would assist in handling drug court
trials when the drug court needed that assistance. But before the ink
268. See infra text accompanying notes 277-80, 300-07 and accompanying text.





NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
was dry on the drug court's formation, it became clear that the
enormous number of drug filings would make it necessary for all drug
trials to be tried outside of drug court. A similar, though slower
developing, result has occurred with respect to motions. By the end
of 1998, the lion's share of all drug court motions also were being
heard outside of the drug court. Although the 1999 drug court judge
was hopeful that the addition of a second magistrate would free him
up to hear motionsz 2 that has not been the case.?73
In transferring drug court trials and motions hearings, resort is
made first to other criminal courts. If no criminal courts are
available, resort is made to the civil courts and then to the domestic
courts. Thus, all divisions of the Denver District Court have been
impacted by the drug court's inability to handle its own trials and
motions.
As a result, the rest of us have less time to devote to our regular
dockets, because we are doing all the drug court trials and many of
the drug court motions hearings. I do not mean to suggest that we are
all so overworked that we cannot occasionally devote some time to
drug court matters, but the problem is a problem of institutional
accountability and of sheer volume.
A drug court that neither conducts trials nor hears motions is not
really a court,274 and a drug court that is too busy to conduct trials or
hear motions should suggest to us that there is something terribly
wrong with the whole arrangement. Moreover, when we consider the
broad question of whether drug courts are working-especially their
speed in processing cases7-we artificially inflate their efficiency if
we ignore the fact that the most time-consuming and inefficient
aspect of any true court-the job of conducting trials-is not even
being performed in the drug court. All of us could process a lot more
cases a lot faster if we did not have to bother with those troubling
trials.
Nor is it a matter simply of the rest of us now trying the same
number of drug cases we used to try before the drug court took them
from us. Again, it is a matter of the popcorn effect. Because the drug
court itself has stimulated a many-fold increase in the number of drug
272. See id.; Interview with Gregory F. Long, Chief Deputy District Attorney, in
Denver, Colo. (May 19,1999).
273. In fact, two of the three domestic judges have volunteered to set aside one
afternoon every week to do nothing but hear drug court motions. See Interview with J.
Stephen Phillips, Chief District Judge, in Denver, Colo. (Jan. 27, 2000).
274. See infra text accompanying notes 328-37.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
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cases filed, there has been a corresponding increase in the number of
drug trials, causing non-drug courts to try significantly more drug
cases than they were trying before the adoption of the drug courtY6
The impacts of the Denver Drug Court on the rest of this bench
are not limited to the inconvenience of taking transfers of drug trials
or motions hearings. The drug court's inability to do its own trials
and motions has had a dramatic impact on the heretofore generous
willingness of judges on this bench to accept transfers from other
judges. We have a long tradition of helping each other out when one
of us has more than one matter set to begin on the same day, and that
tradition has always cut across criminal, civil, and domestic lines. We
have kept statistics on these transfers, and, prior to drug court, our
chief judges have always proudly announced with regularity that the
likelihood of litigants in need being able to find a transfer court
hovered around 80%.277 Since the implementation of the drug court,
that number has plummeted to roughly 50%.78 As a result, both civil
and criminal litigants in Denver are substantially more likely than
they were five years ago to have their trials continued, simply because
276. Our clerk's office did not keep track of the number of drug cases tried prior to the
1994 adoption of the drug court. But I cannot imagine that the plea bargaining rate in the
drug court is so much higher than in traditional court (where it is already awfully high)
that any increase in the disposition rate could overcome the doubling or tripling of cases
filed.
277. See Interview with John N. McMullen, District Judge, in Denver, Colo. (Apr. 6,
1999). Judge McMullen served as our Chief Judge from August 1988 through December
1993. During that time period, he kept statistics on transfers-the total numbers of
transfers sought and the total number of transfers accepted-and announced those
statistics each year at our annual Term Day. Although such transfer statistics are not kept
currently, they can be derived from monthly transfer records that we do keep. For
purposes of transfers, our court is divided in halfl-north and south-and each month two
courtrooms (one courtroom from each half) are designated as the transfer courts. Those
courts receive all the transfer requests from all the courts in their half of the building, and
then attempt to locate transfer courts, first in their half then in the other half. Each
transfer court keeps a log of the transfer requests-called Case Transfer Forms-by date,
requesting court, case number, type of matter (court trial, jury trial, motions hearing),
anticipated length, and whether any court accepted the transfer and if so, the identity of
the accepting court. The kinds of statistics mentioned earlier, see infra note 278, are
derived from these monthly Case Transfer Forms.
278. For the six months between November 1, 1998 and April 30, 1999, there were a
total of 226 transfer requests made formally in our court. See Transfer Request Forms for
Denver District Court, Nov. 1, 1999-Mar. 31, 1999 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Of these 226 requests, transfer courts accepted 121, or 53.5%. Not surprisingly,
of these 226 transfer requests a whopping 105, or 46.5%, came from the drug court. In a
bit of surprise, however, of these 105 requests for transfers from the drug court only 46, or
43.8%, were accepted. Thus, during this six month period at least, it was less likely that a
judge on our court would accept a transfer from the drug court than from a non-drug
court.
2000] 1507
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the drug court cannot handle its own docket. The situation has gotten
so bad that, as of mid-1999, drug cases are no longer even set for trial
until the deadline for disposition passes. Then, they are simply
assigned to one of the regular criminal courtrooms without waiting.
for a reluctant volunteerY 9
These impacts on the colleagues of a drug court judge can be
profound and are something that all judges should consider carefully
before deciding whether to cross the drug court Rubicon.
D. Trying to Deal with the Popcorn Effect
Even after sloughing off all of its trials and most of its motions
hearings, the Denver Drug Court still could not keep its head above
the rising tide of filings. So other solutions were contemplated.
Two and one-half years after the drug court's inception, Judge
John Coughlin, Bill Meyer's successor in the drug court, decided that
the increased filings required a drastic cutback in the drug court's
jurisdiction. In an attempt to reduce drug court cases by 25%, Judge
Coughlin decided, effective February 18, 1997, to exclude from drug
court all cases in which the defendant was either a two-time felon
(and, therefore, under Colorado law, ineligible for probation without
the district attorney's consent) 280 or was a non-citizen against whom
there was an existing hold by the Immigration and Nationalization
Service (INS)? 81 It appears that these cutbacks reduced drug court
filings by approximately 25%,2 and it also appears that these
279. See Interview with H. Jeffrey Bayless, Presiding Criminal Judge, District Court, in
Denver, Colo. (Jan. 24, 2000). The new system of assigning drug court trials to criminal
courtrooms should help insulate the civil and domestic divisions from the drug court's
mess, but, of course, it will only increase the stresses in the regular criminal courtrooms.
Before this change, the criminal judges, just like the civil and domestic judges, retained
their right to refuse to accept drug court transfers, and, as discussed in the previous
footnote, all judges in all divisions became increasingly reluctant to take drug court
transfers. Now, the criminal judges have no choice but to take drug court trials because
they get assigned directly to them (on a rotating basis) once no disposition is reached. Of
course, if criminal judges cannot conduct their newly assigned drug trials because of
regular caseloads, then they can try to get a criminal, civil, or domestic court to take the
transfers.
280. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-11-201(2), (4)(a)(ll) (West 1998). Actually,
under these statutes the district attorney may waive this so-called two-felony rule and
instead consent to a probationary sentence, but only if the current offense is non-violent
and none of the prior offenses was a crime of violence, manslaughter, second-degree
burglary, robbery, certain kinds of theft, or a crime against children. See id. § 16-11-
201(4)(a)(II).
281. See infra text accompanying notes 315-26.
282. See Memorandum from Robert J. Whitley, Deputy District Attorney, to Gregory
F. Long, Chief Deputy District Attorney (Oct. 15, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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reductions have been permanent. But the cutbacks were made only
at the drug court level-by district attorneys filing the excluded cases
in regular courtrooms rather than in drug court. No change was made
at either the street level in terms of who was arrested or at the
charging level in terms of who was prosecuted. The nets stayed wide,
and 25% of the catch was thrown over to the traditional courts. So
even though the drug court enjoyed a 25% reduction in filings, total
drug filings continued to accelerate without any reduction, with the
regular non-drug court courtrooms now bearing the brunt of 25% of
the popcorn.
Moreover, trying to reach an arbitrary 25% reduction by slashing
so broadly as to exclude all two-time felons and illegal aliens
drastically changed the original "all-comers" philosophy of the
Denver Drug Court.s Every two-time felon is not an unacceptable
drug court risk; indeed, before February 1997 two-time felons were
regularly given drug court dispositions if they were otherwise deemed
appropriate."' The original concept of the Denver Drug Court as an
"all-comers" court, as is the case with a handful of other ambitious
drug courts, was to reach the hardcore addict who, more often than
not, has been through the revolving doors of prison on many other
drug or drug-driven convictions, and who is therefore quite likely to
have two or more prior felony convictions. 8 6 Excluding all two-time
felons from drug courts in order to help achieve a 25% reduction in
cases makes no more sense, and arguably makes considerably less
sense given the goal of reaching hardcore addicts, than excluding
people whose last names begin with letters from the first quarter of
283. See Criminal Filings Statistics for 1991-98, supra note 257, at 1. Filings dropped
from a peak of 3017 in 1996 to 2825 in 1997 and then dropped even further to 2585 in 1998.
See Ud
284. See supra note 106.
285. The Denver Drug Court's continuing realization that two-time felons are not
necessarily inappropriate for drug court treatment is reflected in several unwritten
policies. For example, if a single drug case involves multiple defendants, some of whom
have two or more prior felonies and some of whom do not, the case remains in drug court.
Similarly, there is a kind of one-way trap door feature to the new exclusion. If a two-time
felon's case accidentally slips into drug court (which can happen fairly easily at the
beginning of a case when there may be uncertainty about a defendant's record), the
unwritten rule is that the case stays in drug court even after the mistake is discovered.
Finally, as a practical matter, it is often the case that the drug court judge does not
discover that a defendant has two or more prior felonies until after that defendant has
already negotiated a disposition, has begun some pre-disposition treatment, and is
appearing for approval of that disposition. When that happens, it is simply easier on all
concerned to proceed with the disposition instead of sending the case to a traditional
criminal court. See Interview with Joseph E. Meyer III, supra note 269.
286. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
2000] 1509
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the alphabet.
Although there is certainly a practical justification for excluding
all purportedly illegal aliens-because they simply cannot participate
in meaningful outpatient treatment while subject to INS holds,,-
their ipso facto elimination from the drug court may have equal
protection implications. At the very least, their exclusion should
make us all wonder about the fairness of a system that makes these
kinds of arbitrary and suspicious distinctions.M
We have, in effect, a fast-track court stimulating an enormous
increase in case filings, and one that is so busy it cannot accommodate
25% of its caseload or any of the trials in the other 75%. Our
experience with trying to reduce the popcorn effect suggests that
there is indeed a limitless supply of drug cases that police and
prosecutors will tap to fill their own capacities, and that those
capacities will continue to outpace the bottleneck of the drug court
itself. 9
E. Exploding Prison Populations
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Denver Drug Court is
that, despite the crucial reformist promise that drug courts will assist
in reducing the numbers of people incarcerated for drug offenses,90 in
Denver more drug defendants are being sentenced to prison than
ever before, by a factor of more than two. In 1993-the last full year
before the Denver Drug Court-265 drug defendants were sentenced
to prison out of the entire Denver District Court, representing nearly
86% of the total number of defendants convicted of drug offenses in
that court in that year. 91 In 1995-the first full year after the Denver
287. See infra text accompanying notes 315-26.
288. For a discussion of People v. Antonio-Antimo, 998 P.2d 655 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999),
in which the Colorado Court of Appeals struck down a Denver Drug Court sentence of an
illegal alien in which the prison sentence was suspended on the condition that the
defendant leave the country, see infra text accompanying notes 323-24.
289. Eliminating two-time felons and non-citizens not only changed the "all-comers"
philosophy of the Denver Drug Court, but it may well have had an impact on recidivism
rates. Eliminating two-time felons from drug court programs arguably decreases drug
court recidivism because the hardest of the hardcore recidivists are being shuffled off to
traditional courts. On the other hand, eliminating non-citizens probably increases drug
court recidivism because many non-citizen drug defendants are deported.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 88-96.
291. See OFFICE OF PLANNING & ANALYSIS, COLO. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
DENVER DRUG COURT CONVICTIONS: D.O.C. SENTENCED OFFENDERS FISCAL YEARS
1993 THROUGH 1997 1 (1998) [hereinafter SENTENCE STUDY] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). In particular, there were 309 drug convictions in the Denver
District Court in fiscal year 1993 and 265 prison sentences imposed for drug convictions in
that same year. Of course, the comparison between the convictions in a given year and the
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Drug Court-434 defendants received prison sentences in the Denver
Drug Court, representing nearly 80% of all drug convictions in the
Denver Drug Court that year. g2 In 1997, 625 drug court defendants
received prison sentences, again representing roughly 80% of all drug
convictions in the Denver Drug Court that year.293 In other words,
although the percentage of drug defendants receiving prison sentences
has remained remarkably constant, both before and during the drug
court era, the raw numbers of drug defendants going to prison has
more than doubled.2 94
The apparent paradox of more drug defendants going to prison
out of courts designed specifically to send fewer drug defendants to
prison is not surprising at all. It is a direct and predictable
consequence of dismal recidivism results coupled with massive net-
widening. Although in theory drug courts should reduce the number
of prison sentences meted out for drug offenses-both by the
prison sentences in that given year suffers from the fact that there is a delay between
conviction and sentence and therefore from the fact that we are not talking about all the
same defendants in any one year. Indeed, many of the prison sentences for drug offenses,
and probably the lion's share of them, are not initial prison sentences, but are instead
sentences imposed after deferred judgments or probationary sentences have been
violated. Thus, the remarkably high and consistent percentage of prison sentences meted
out each year is actually a gross measure of probation recidivism, and the fact that that
percentage has stayed just as high after the implementation of the drug court is a rough
confirmation of the dismal treatment results being achieved there. See supra text
accompanying note 238. It is no defense to say that the Denver Drug Court routinely
imposes very short (120-day) prison sentences on a large category of defendants.
Although that is true, the average length of prison sentences meted out by the Denver
Drug Court (54.6 months in 1995) is actually substantially greater than the average length
of prison sentences meted out in Denver before the drug court (42.7 months in 1993). See
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, CASE PROCESSING
EVALUATION OF THE DENVER DRUG COURT 60, tbl.23 (1999) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
292. See SENTENCE STUDY, supra note 291, at 1. The numbers for fiscal year 1995
were 539 drug convictions and 434 prison sentences.
293. See id. The numbers for fiscal year 1997 were 776 drug convictions and 625 prison
sentences.
294. The effect at the county jail level appears to have been less drastic. Indeed, the
director of that facility reported to me that although they do not keep statistics segregated
by offense, his intuition was that the Denver Drug Court was reducing total jail time for
drug defendants because it was reducing disposition time, and a significant component of
jail resources are consumed by defendants awaiting trial, who cannot make their bonds.
See Interview with John Simonet, Director of Corrections, City and County of Denver, in
Denver, Colo. (Apr. 4, 1999). He also indicated that he believed county jail populations
were being relieved because more drug defendants were going to prison, and going there
more quickly. See id. The speedier deportation of drug defendants also has undoubtedly
contributed to any decrease in total county jail time. See infra text accompanying note
319-22 (discussing the impact of special INS agents assigned exclusively to drug
defendants in significantly reducing the delays before deportation).
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successful treatment of drug defendants and at the very least by
delaying the imposition of prison sentences while defendants attempt
to complete treatment-this theory assumes, quite incorrectly, that
treatment will be moderately successful and that drug court dollars
will be used to treat defendants already in the system rather than to
triple the size of the intake.
Moreover, it is precisely because drug courts are designed to get
defendants into treatment quickly that they accelerate the day on
which the decision is made that treatment has failed and that
defendants should go to prison. Drug court defendants are
monitored closely and are given a finite number of relatively closely
spaced opportunities to fail. When they exhaust all their chances,
they go to prison. As a result, particularly with the poor recidivism
results achieved by most drug courts, drug court defendants are, by
the very nature of the process, more likely to end up in prison than
their traditional cohorts and are certainly more likely to end up there
sooner.
Nevertheless, even if the percentage of drug court defendants
sent to prison were lower than the percentage of traditional drug
defendants sent to prison, popcorn effects of the magnitude suffered
by Denver will overwhelm, and have overwhelmed, this difference.
The simple arithmetic truth is that even massively successful
treatment efforts, on a scale never reported in any reputable impact
study,29 would still be dwarfed by the kind of three-fold increases in
case filings suffered in the Denver Drug Court.
There is no small amount of irony in the fact that one of the most
important promises of the drug court movement-to keep treatable
defendants out of prison-has turned out, at least in Denver, to be
one of its most abject failures. Instead of reversing the 1980s trend of
more and more drug defendants filling our prisons, the Denver Drug
Court is accelerating that trend. In our paternalistic effort to throw
the criminal nets wider and wider in hopes of finding more treatable
defendants, we have harvested a vast number of defendants we deem
untreatable. Our nets are now so wide that there are more
untreatable defendants going to prison than there were in the old
days, when we did not pretend to be able to distinguish the treatable
from the untreatable.
F. Cookie Cutter Sentences
Another by-product of the popcorn effect is that drug court
295. See supra text accompanying notes 211-45.
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judges simply do not have the time to impose individualized
sentences. Even if they did, the very presence of a fixed array of
dispositional and treatment regimens begins to drive a one-or
maybe three-size(s)-fit(s)-all philosophy. The dispositional
algorithm in the Denver Drug Court, at least for defendants charged
with simple possession, is fairly rigid: (1) if you have two or more
prior felony convictions you do not even get into drug court;296 (2) if
you have no prior felonies, and you were arrested with a small so-
called "personal use" amount of drugs,2 7 then you get a deferred
judgment; (3) otherwise, you get probation.298 This is not sentencing,
it is triage.
Drug court proponents resist the charge of cookie cutter
sentencing by protesting that a drug court judge has substantially
more information about a defendant at sentencing than a traditional
court usually has. It is true that a pre-sentence report in the Denver
Drug Court has a whole host of detailed information about a
defendant's drug use garnered during the pre-adjudicative phase of
treatment-including specific levels of drugs in his system at regular
intervals of time, his general reaction to the treatment regimen, and
an expert's guesses about amenability to treatment-that traditional
pre-sentence reports do not contain. But having detailed information
is one thing; having the time and institutional inclination to use it to
fashion individualized sentences is quite another. The drug court
judge uses this information primarily to decide the dispositional track
and treatment level in which to place the defendant. That is, this
detailed individualized information is used simply to pick from a few
different cookie cutters.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83.
297. There is no written policy fixing the levels of "personal use." In general, however,
one or two rocks of crack (less than one tenth of a gram) is treated presumptively as being
for personal use. See Interview with Gregory F. Long, Chief Deputy District Attorney, in
Denver, Colo. (June 18, 1999). But see Interview with Andre L. Rudolph, Magistrate, in
Denver, Colo. (June 22, 1999) (indicating that when Rudolph was a drug court public
defender, he understood that two grams was the presumptive personal use cutoff for both
crack and powdered cocaine). In any event, there is no presumptive level for other drugs;
prosecutors look at all of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the drugs
were for personal use, including the method of packaging and the magnitude of the
particular defendant's drug habit. See Interview with Gregory F. Long, supra; Interview
with Andre L. Rudolph, supra.
298. See Gregory F. Long, Denver Drug Court: New Approaches to Old Problems,
COLO. LAW., Apr. 1996, at 29, 30; Interview with Gregory F. Long, supra note 272.
Actually, there is a fourth dispositional track-prison-but initial prison sentences on
possession convictions are rare in the Denver Drug Court, particularly now that two-time
felons are no longer eligible. See Long, supra, at 30; Interview with Gregory F. Long,
supra note 272.
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I do not fault drug court judges, prosecutors, or public defenders
for falling into fixed sentencing algorithms. Much like traffic courts,
drug courts simply do not have the time to spend on each defendant
to fashion a sentence responsive to individual circumstances. Instead,
we have a few pigeonholes into which we put defendants depending
not on difficult issues like a defendant's character or the particular
circumstances of a crime, but rather on objective and easily
determined factors. In traffic court, we are forced by volume to look
at easily measurable things like the defendant's driving record and
how fast he was going. In drug court, we are forced by volume to
look at easily measurable things like the number of prior felonies and
the quantity and type of drugs used. In both kinds of courts, we then
mete out sentences generally based only on those few variables and
generally falling into only a few categories and ranges. The
difference, of course, is that a defendant in traffic court faces modest
penalties; a defendant in drug court faces a felony conviction and
substantial incarceration.
This willingness to use the threat of prison as a club to induce
treatment, and then to follow through on the threat when defendants
dare not to respond to our enlightened treatment efforts, is one of the
most tragic consequences of drug courts. In our unbridled
enthusiasm to treat defendants, we focus all our energies and all our
sentencing discretion on a single factor-a defendant's amenability to
treatment. Then, when all the ebbs and flows of treatment are tallied
up and labeled as an overall failure, which they are for a depressingly
large percentage of all drug court defendants,2 99 all of the failures are
lumped together and the automatic prison machine kicks into gear.
Deferred sentences are revoked, suspended sentences are reinstated
and diverse drug defendants, who may share nothing but a common
and entirely predictable failure to respond to treatment, are sent to
prison with virtually no further judicial inquiry.
It is as if our dismal treatment efforts are clearing our
consciences about sending drug users to prison. There is a certain
tortured logic to this sort of "equal" treatment of incorrigibles, once
one adopts the flawed drug court axiom that drug abuse is
fundamentally a disease and not a crime, and therefore that when we
299. Unpublished internal statistics of the Denver District Drug Court suggest that the
graduation rate is somewhere near 55%. See Interview with Adam Brickner, Denver
District Drug Court Coordinator, in Denver Colo. (June 25, 1999). Even if this 55%
figure were accurate, one must keep in mind that it is a measure of program retention and
not of ultimate success in terms of no recidivism. See supra text accompanying notes 167-
70.
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sentence defendants to prison we are punishing them for their failed
treatment rather than for their unlawful drug use.
G. Quality Concerns
Treating drug felonies like traffic tickets not only forces us to
impose cookie cutter sentences, it forces us to cut corners at every
other step in the process as well. No judge, no court staff, and no set
of lawyers can consistently deal with 100 defendants each day without
cutting plenty of corners.?° Guilty pleas in the Denver Drug Court
are taken in five to ten minutes30 -half the time it takes to do
traditional felony guilty pleas.3° Probation revocation proceedings
suffer from the same short shrift 303 The quality of the trial and
motions practice-even though all trials and most motions hearings
are handled outside of drug court-is just what you would expect
from lawyers facing an average of 100 cases every day.
With all due respect to its hard-working founder and his
successors, and to the equally hard-working magistrates and lawyers
who must practice there, the Denver Drug Court is out of control.
We simply do not have the time to be the kind of deliberative and
careful judicial officers-or prosecutors or defense lawyers-that all
felony proceedings demand. Two examples will illustrate the point.
When I was on the criminal bench in 1997, I agreed to take a
transfer of a motions hearing from the drug court. The public
300. Even if we make the unrealistic assumptions of a full eight-hour court day with no
lunch break, no recesses, and no down time between defendants, one judge dealing with
100 defendants each day amounts to five minutes per defendant. In 1999, once the second
magistrate was added, the judge's daily docket averaged 30 to 60 defendants. See
Interview with Joseph E. Meyer III, supra note 269. Still, the caseload is daunting. See id.
301. See Interview with Gregory F. Long, Chief Deputy District Attorney, in Denver,
Colo. (May 21, 1999). Magistrate Martinelli reports that her guilty plea advisements take
5 to 10 minutes. See Interview with Lynn E. Martinelli, Magistrate, in Denver, Colo. (June
14, 1999). Magistrate Rudolph reports that he does his in 5 minutes. See Interview with
Andre L. Rudolph, supra note 297.
302. I consider myself a bit on the slow side of guilty pleas: they generally take me
around 20 minutes. Some of my faster colleagues can do them in 10 minutes, but most
take 10 to 15 minutes.
303. Actually, contested probation revocation hearings are so rare in the Denver Drug
Court as to be almost nonexistent. There was one in the first six months of 1999, and two
in all of 1998. See Interview with Joseph E. Meyer III, supra note 269. Contested
probation revocation hearings are certainly not a regular occurrence in the traditional
criminal courts, but they are substantially more common than in the drug court. I submit
this is because the whole idea of drug courts is to impose intermediate, graduated
sanctions when defendants relapse. Presumably district attorneys are offering such
attractive deals in revocation proceedings that the motions to revoke simply never go to
hearing.
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defender and the defendant appeared promptly after I agreed to take
the transfer, but the district attorney (DA-1) never showed up. After
some calling around, my staff determined that DA-1 thought a
different district attorney (DA-2) was handling the hearing, and vice
versa. DA-2 finally showed up (an hour late), did the hearing, and
requested at its conclusion that he be allowed to file post-hearing
briefs-a request I granted. I set a briefing schedule, which DA-2
then missed. When he finally got around to filing his post-hearing
brief (one week late), he inadvertently filed a draft, which had no
caption, no case name, and no signature.
The second example is more troubling. In June 1997, a drug
court defendant confessed that he violated his probation as'part of an
agreement in which he was to receive a four-year community
corrections sentence instead of a prison sentence. °4 But a clerical
error in the minute order, repeated in the mittimus, resulted in the
defendant being given a four-year prison sentence. A surprised
defendant was transported to prison instead of to community
corrections. He sent a letter to the drug court judge complaining
about the mix-up. The overworked drug court judge treated the
letter as a pro se motion for post-conviction relief and summarily
denied it with a form order stating that the defendant had made
identical arguments in previous letters, which of course he had not. It
took an appeal and a subsequent emergency remand to get the matter
straightened out."° In the meantime, the defendant served more than
eighteen months in prison when he should have been in community
corrections. 6 An embarrassed drug court judge (a different one than
the judge who originally imposed the sentence and denied the motion
for post-conviction relief) re-sentenced the defendant to probation
and simultaneously declared the probation successfully completed. °7
I am afraid these examples are not the isolated incidents that
darken even the most diligent of courtrooms. They are what we can
all expect from the volumes that are generated by treating serious
304. See Motion for Limited Remand at 1-2, People v. Gendron (Colo. Ct. App. 1999)
(No. 98CA0789) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
305. See Order, Gendron (No. 98CA0789) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
306. The defendant in this mix-up, Mr. Gendron, was remanded to prison on June 6,
1997. See Minute Orders, Gendron (Denver Dist. Ct. 1997) (No. 96CR5508) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). He was released on mandatory three-year parole on
December 21, 1998. See Interview with Kathy Nelson, DOC Time Computations, in
Denver, Colo. (May 17,1999).
307. See Minute Orders, Gendron (Denver Dist. Ct. 1999) (No. 96CR5508) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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felonies like traffic tickets.
H. Changing Judges
I read with bemusement an announcement in a recent federal
drug court publication that drug courts work so well and drug court
judges are so satisfied at the good work they are accomplishing that
"[m]any of the judges who have served as a 'drug court judge' have
requested an extension of their assignment. '30 8 This certainly has not
been the case in the Denver Drug Court.
Bill Meyer began as the first Denver Drug Court judge in July
1994, and he remained as the presiding judge through December
1996. Since then, we have had four different drug court judges in the
last four years. Although one planned to stay a second year, he
changed his mind and left after one year.
Precisely because the whole drug court mechanism depends so
heavily on the philosophy of the particular judge who is presiding
there at any time, the now annual changing of the drug court judge
will cause, and has caused, its own set of difficulties. For example,
Judge Meyer set many regular and frequent follow-up hearings to
check on a defendant's drug use at various points in the process. His
successor, John Coughlin, decided that too many such hearings were
being set, so he cut them back significantly.3°9 Individual judges also
have exhibited demonstrably different reactions to a defendant's
positive urinalysis or other treatment violations. For example, in
1997, Judge Coughlin sentenced defendants to an average of 50%
more jail time for such violations than his successor, Paul Markson,
did the following year.3 10  Similarly dramatic differences have
appeared at the sentencing end. For example, although Judges
Coughlin and Markson sentenced roughly the same percentage of
defendants to initial deferred judgments, they had markedly different
practices regarding probation, community corrections, and prison.
Judge Markson was twice as likely as Judge Coughlin to sentence a
defendant initially to probation, half as likely to impose initial
308. See A DECADE OF DRUG COURTs, supra note 114, at 1-2.
309. See Interview with John W. Coughlin, District Judge, in Denver, Colo. (Mar. 30,
1999).
310. This 50% difference is not as dramatic as it may seem because in the case of both
judges we are talking about average jail sentences of only a few days. In particular, in
1997 Judge Coughlin sentenced his non-complying defendants to an average of 3.24 days
for positive drug tests and 3.55 days for other non-complying behavior, compared to Judge
Markson's 1998 sentences of 2.22 days for positive drug tests and 2.25 days for other non-
complying behavior. See Drug Court Statistics Sheets, supra note 265, at 1-2.
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community corrections sentences and almost 10% less likely to
impose initial prison sentences.3 '
These are hardly surprising developments or developments
unique to drug courts. All trial judges, and especially trial lawyers,
are quite familiar with the panoply of subtle and not-so-subtle
changes that occur whenever a courtroom changes judges. The
problem with the drug court is that, because of its massive caseload,
its serpentine bureaucracy, and, most importantly, its purpose to
coerce treatment, a few small changes in approach can have
magnified impacts.
. Pennanent Drug Court Bureaucracy
The annual rotation of drug court judges is particularly
problematic when one considers that the judge and the regular three-
person staff (a division clerk, a reporter, and a bailiff or law clerk) are
rotating into a permanent and, at least by individual courtroom
standards, rather large sixteen-person drug court staff. This
permanent staff consists of two magistrates, 12 one drug court
coordinator, nine staff members in the drug court coordinator's
311. The complete breakdown of their initial sentences is reported in the following
table.
SENTENCE MARKSON 1998 [ COUGHLIN 1997
Deferred Judgments 505 (29.8%) 342 (31.2%)
Probation 729 (43.0) 264 (24.1)
Community Corrections 116 (6.8) 175 (16.0)
Prison 346(20.4) 316 (28.8)
TOTAL 1 1696 ] 1097
See id. at 1-2. Another particularly stark difference between these two drug court judges
was in the number of drug cases that went to trial during their respective tenures. In 1997,
Judge Coughlin transferred 60 cases for trial; in 1998, Judge Markson transferred 161 cases
for trial. See id.
312. The magistrates do a wide variety of drug court tasks, including initial
advisements, bond settings, preliminary hearings, compliance reviews, revocation hearings
(on misdemeanors), and guilty pleas. See Interview with Lynn E. Martinelli, supra note
301; Interview with Andre L. Rudolph, supra note 297. Prior to January 1, 2000, however,
there was considerable uncertainty about whether the magistrates had the authority to
take guilty pleas. Before that date, Rule 6(b) of the Colorado Rules for Magistrates set
forth a laundry list of the powers of district court magistrates sitting in criminal cases, and
those powers did not include taking guilty pleas. See COLO. R. MAGIS. 6(b). Effective
January 1, 2000, that Rule was amended to authorize guilty pleas by district court
magistrates with the consent of the defendant. See Memorandum from Steven V. Berson,
State Court Administrator (Oct. 13, 1999) (attaching the amended Colorado Rules for
Magistrates) (to be codified as COLO. R. MAGIS. 6(a)(2)(A)) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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office, and four permanent courtroom personnel? 13 This permanent
bureaucracy is not only permanent in the sense that it remains in
place as drug court judges come and go, but also permanent in the
sense that the presiding drug court judge does not have the power to
hire or fire its members. The drug court magistrates and drug court
coordinator are hired and fired by the chief judge. The nine
permanent staff members are hired and fired by the drug court
coordinator. Thus, the at-will employment powers that district judges
traditionally have enjoyed regarding the hiring and firing of our staff
are substantially curtailed in drug court.
Quite apart from the fact that the drug court judge cannot hire or
fire permanent staff, the presence of this large permanent
bureaucracy presents a very different, and substantially more
complex, organizational challenge than that faced by the traditional
trial judge. The size alone is a problem. The drug court judge's
division clerk, who is used to presiding over a three-person staff, is
suddenly confronted with being the titular head of an eighteen-person
bureaucracy. The permanence of that bureaucracy, particularly in the
face of an annual parade of different presiding judges and division
clerks, risks creating a sort of shadow court, not answerable to the
particular temporary occupant of the drug court bench and resistant
to any attempts by that temporary occupant to effect changes.
To be fair, it does not appear that the Denver Drug Court has
suffered from this kind of bureaucratic inertia. On the contrary, the
first few drug court judges have been quite willing and able to move
the bureaucracy in significant directions, so much so that the way in
which the drug court worked in the first few years has varied in
significant respects from year to year.3 14 Whether this flexibility will
continue as the permanent staff becomes more entrenched remains to
be seen.
J. INS
Most state trial judges are painfully aware of the long shadow
cast on state criminal proceedings by the INS. Particularly in urban
courts in the West and Southwest, a healthy percentage of criminal
defendants are on what is called "INS hold," which means that those
defendants have been identified by the INS as illegal aliens, that INS
313. These figures do not include eight district attorneys, one investigator from the
district attorney's office, five public defenders, one investigator from the public defender's
office, and ten probation officers-all assigned exclusively to the drug court.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 308-11.
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deportation proceedings against them are in progress or to be
commenced, and that they are in a kind of concurrent INS custody
(and, therefore, ineligible to be released on bond). The problem with
the INS is that it is just barely interested enough in state criminal
defendants to throw a monkey wrench into our ordinary pre- and
post-trial proceedings by imposing the INS holds, but not quite
interested enough to deport those defendants seasonably.
In fact, under federal law in effect when the Denver Drug Court
was adopted in 1994, the INS could deport legal aliens convicted of
state crimes only if their crimes met certain designated criteria. 15
Generally, there were four categories of criminal activity defined as
deportable offenses: crimes involving moral turpitude; virtually any
drug convictions (except a single conviction for simple possession of
thirty grams or less of marijuana); firearms offenses; and
miscellaneous crimes against the state, including sabotage, espionage,
treason, and sedition.316
These statutory categories not only formed the boundary for the
deportability of legal aliens, they also created an informal practical
standard for the deportation of illegal aliens. In particular, INS
officials advised our court, at an en bane meeting held when our drug
court was just beginning, that in order to come up on INS radar we
needed to sentence illegal alien defendants to at least five years in the
penitentiary, though the sentence could be suspended. This advice
explains why the various drug court cookie cutter sentences that are
applied to illegal aliens invariably involve at least a suspended five-
year prison sentence, when similarly situated citizens who are first-
time offenders and who wash out of the drug court treatment
program typically receive prison sentences of only one or two years. 17
315. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (Supp. III
1997)).
316. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Aliens convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude
are deportable if they are convicted of a single such crime within five years after their
entry (or 10 years in the case of permanent resident aliens), as long as the crime in
question is punishable by at least one-year imprisonment. See id. § 1251(a)(2). In
addition, aliens convicted at any time after their entry of two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude are deportable, regardless of the punishment range. See id. § 1251(a)(2).
The statute does not define "moral turpitude," and there is a long line of difficult cases
construing this term. See, e.g., Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1995);
Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238,239-41 (9th Cir. 1995); Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 91
(9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262,1274-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
317. See Interview with Andre L. Rudolph, supra note 297; see also infra text
accompanying notes 320-22 (discussing these five-year sentences). In theory, of course,
virtually all illegal aliens are deportable, and the deportability statute expressly includes
them as a separate category of deportable aliens. See § 1251(a)(1).
1520 [Vol.78
THE DRUG CO URT SCANDAL
The practical problem, of course, is that the INS simply does not
have the resources to deport every illegal alien who comes to its
attention, even when those illegal aliens come to its attention because
they are convicted of state crimes. The unwritten five-year trigger
gives them a rough measure of the seriousness of any given state
offense. Even though deportation may not be in the cards for every
illegal alien caught in state criminal proceedings, an INS hold almost
always is. Consequently, an illegal alien who has no previous felonies
and is charged with a non-violent offense-precisely the kind of
defendant we would ordinarily release on bond-not only cannot be
released on bond, but, once convicted, probably cannot be given any
meaningful probationary or community corrections sentence while
the INS hold is still in place. In traditional criminal courts, many
illegal alien defendants languish on INS holds for months and months
without being deported, thereby consuming state resources pre-
conviction, and then are sentenced to prison, thereby consuming state
resources post-conviction. But the INS presence in drug courts is
downright Kafkaesque, not only because under federal immigration
law the conviction of almost any drug offense subjects even legal
aliens to deportation,318 but also because the INS has allocated
personnel specifically to deal with non-citizens in drug court. What
had been exasperating INS neglect in traditional state criminal
courtrooms is now an exasperating INS presence in drug courts.
The Denver Drug Court has its own INS agents assigned
specifically and exclusively to it. These agents are assigned to identify
and deport illegal aliens processed in the drug court. Indeed, even
after the drug court excised illegal aliens from its jurisdiction,319 these
INS agents have continued to operate with the traditional courts in
the deportation of drug defendants. To the credit of the drug court
and the INS, the special attention focused on drug defendants has had
a dramatic and positive influence on deportation delays. Today,
illegal alien drug defendants are removed from the county jail, placed
in INS custody, and deported, all within a few weeks, while other
illegal alien defendants continue to languish in county jail for months
before they are deported. Nevertheless, there are prices to be paid
for this new-found federal efficiency.
The Denver Drug Court judges initially agreed to sentence
illegal aliens convicted for first-time possession offenses to five years
probation, with the condition that they "cooperate" with the INS in
318. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83.
2000] 1521
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
their own deportation.32  The drug court judges agreed that if these
defendants returned to the United States and picked up a second
drug charge, they would be sentenced to five years in prison. 21 As
more and more illegal aliens, however, were clogging up the
probation paperwork-with no reason, given that their INS holds
prevented them from actually complying with probation-several
drug court judges decided to skip the probation phase and sentence
these first-time offenders directly to the Department of Corrections
for five years, suspended on the condition that they "cooperate" in
their own deportation 3 2
These kinds of drug court sentences for illegal aliens not only
institutionalize the federal INS tail wagging the state court dog, but
they also force the state court to dabble in immigration matters in
which it has neither expertise nor jurisdiction. Indeed, in People v.
Antonio-Antimo,3 a which was an appeal of such a sentence out of the
Denver Drug Court, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that state
court judges have no authority to impose such conditions and that a
guilty plea based on such an illegal sentence is invalid3 24
The Denver Drug Court treated citizens and non-citizens
differently in other significant ways as well. For example, a non-
citizen charged with a sales offense was typically offered an
aggravated class-three felony, while a citizen charged with the same
sales offense was typically offered either a non-aggravated class-three
felony or a class-four felony.325 The very reason for this difference
was to trigger the potential for certain serious federal criminal
prosecution should the non-citizen be deported, but later re-enter. 26
Quite apart from the question of whether drug court judges have
authority to impose ersatz deportation as a condition of probation,
320. See Memorandum, Alien Defendants in Drug Cases (n.d.) 2 [hereinafter Alien
Defendants in Drug Cases] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). These
deportation conditions were sometimes crafted by the drug court judges not simply in the
language of "cooperating" with INS but also in more explicit terms by imposing the
condition that defendants leave the United States and not return unless they do so legally.
See People v. Antonio-Antimo, 988 P.2d 655, 655-56 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the
trial court's decision and subsequently reversing it).
321. See Alien Defendants in Drug Cases, supra note 320, at 2.
322. See Interview with Gregory F. Long, supra note 297; Interview with Andre L.
Rudolph, supra note 297.
323. 998 P.2d 655 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
324. The court of appeals stated, "[D]eportation, as a condition of probation, was an
integral part of this defendant's plea agreement. Hence, we conclude that the guilty plea
must be vacated." Antonio-Antimo, 988 P.2d at 56.
325. See Interview with Gregory F. Long, supra note 297.
326. See icL
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these practices of treating citizens and non-citizens differently raises
many other troubling issues. Why does a non-citizen drug court
defendant convicted of buying twenty dollars worth of crack get
deported immediately, while the non-citizen burglar down the hall
does not even come up on INS radar unless he is sentenced to five
years in the penitentiary? Why must a non-citizen forger languish for
months in pre-trial custody on an INS hold, while the non-citizen drug
user is deported within weeks? Why must the non-citizen drug user
agree to a five-year suspended sentence and agree to cooperate in his
own deportation when an identically situated citizen would receive a
deferred judgment or, at worst, simple probation? Most importantly,
why are drug courts so willing to alter their sentencing practices
simply because a defendant is charged with a federal crime,
particularly when the federal government itself is not serious enough
about that particular federal crime to do anything about it? I do not
think it entirely out of bounds to ask ourselves whether drug courts
would be so keen to cooperate with the INS if they did not depend for
their lifeblood on federal funds.
VII. UNEXAMINED INSTrTUTnoNAL CONCERNS: SHOuLD JUDGES
BE MAKING THESE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY DECISIONS, AND
SHOULD THEIR TALENTS BE WASTED IMPLEMENTING THEM?
There is a kind of institutional double-whammy to drug courts.
On the one hand, their mere adoption trumps a whole array of deep
and difficult public policy questions that judges have no business
trumping. On the other hand, their implementation forces judges to
engage in day-to-day work for which they are not suited.
A. Separation of Powers
There is no better measure of the institutional impropriety of
drug courts than their own proponents' expressed ideas about their
purpose. The chief district attorney assigned to the Denver Drug
Court put it as bluntly as anyone by explaining that the purpose of
drug courts is "the cost-effective curtailment of drug abuse. '327 I
respectfully submit that no court's "purpose" should be to curtail a
perceived social problem, no matter how lofty the curtailers' motives
or how scurrilous the perceived problem. Our function is to ensure
that the rule of law is justly enforced. The job of curtailing a
particular crime, or of achieving any other particular social end, is a
327. Long, supra note 298, at 29.
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legislative and executive function, not a judicial one. Only the
legislative and executive branches have the imprimatur of public
consensus. Judges, no matter the strength nor even the accuracy of
our views about policy, have no right to make policy. Yet drug courts
are the living embodiment of judge-created policy.
There is a palpable, day-to-day face to this unholy drug court
alliance between the branches of government. The entire drug court
milieu is constructed as a single, unified institutional response to the
problem of drugs. Prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges are
meant to meld together as a kind of single public service institution
designed to do what is best for drug defendants, or "clients," as they
are referred to in the drug court new-speak. Indeed, it is de rigeur
that drug courts cannot operate successfully without the
"cooperation" of the judge, prosecutors, police, sheriffs, and defense
lawyers. The very instant this "cooperation" is achieved, the
protections inherent in the adversary nature of our system are put at
risk.32
In the Denver District Court, this unholy alliance has evolved
into a daily ritual, euphemistically called "staffing." At these staffing
sessions, the judge, prosecutor, public defender, probation officers,
and sometimes a staff person from the drug court coordinator's office
meet together in chambers to discuss all of that day's dispositional,
sentencing, and revocation hearings. The judge, after hearing from
everyone, reaches a presumptive decision. Defendants are not
present and the staffing meetings are not on the record. Quite apart
from obvious constitutional concerns,3 29 these staffing sessions
symbolize what is wrong with the drug court institution: substantive
decisions about a felony defendant are being made by some
interbranch committee acting more like a support group than a court.
It is one thing for defendants facing a few days or weeks in
county jail for drunk driving or misdemeanor domestic violence to be
confronted by an alliance of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges
unified in an effort to re-educate and treat them. But it is quite
328. Boldt makes this point in the context of defense counsel:
[D]efense counsel [in the drug court] is no longer primarily responsible for giving
voice to the distinct perspective of the defendant's experience in what remains a
coercive setting. Rather, defense counsel becomes part of a treatment team
working with others to insure that outcomes, viewed from the perspective of the
institutional players and not the individual defendant, are in the defendant's best
interests.
Boldt, supra note 1, at 1245.
329. A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all "critical
stages" of a criminal prosecution. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932).
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another thing when the defendants face felony charges that can put
them in the penitentiary for decades. We may be willing to sacrifice
age-old traditions of judicial independence and adversariness for the
former, but should not be for the latter. If we are going to continue
to treat some drug use as a felony, punishable by many years in
prison, then we should treat drug cases seriously-not like parking
tickets in a mill in which the judge, prosecutor, and defense lawyer
spend their days together trying to push as many people through as
possible.
1. Impinging on the Legislative Function
Drug courts are an attempt to answer one of the most beguiling
public policy questions of our time, indeed of any time. Their very
existence represents a policy determination that involuntary
treatment efforts should be undertaken, at least for some
defendants,30 before the full fury of the criminal law is unleashed.
Not only does the exasperating question of drug policy contain within
it a whole host of difficult scientific, legal, and cultural sub-issues, but
the drug court solution raises as many public policy issues as it
purports to answer 3 1 Regardless of one's position on complex issues
like the scope of the drug problem, the disease theory of addiction, or
the legalization of some drugs, surely these are public policy
questions that must be answered by elected lawmakers after open and
vigorous public debate, not by judges operating in the cloak of
pseudoscience. Rather than restraining themselves until public
consensus congeals on these terribly important and difficult policy
issues, many drug court proponents seem to relish their role as
courageous truth merchants stepping into a void left by frightened
legislators unwilling to take the tough political stands necessary to
deal with this issue. I cannot imagine a more elitist, institutionally
tone-deaf, or dangerous expansion of the judicial function.
There are two possible responses to this institutional criticism:
Congress itself has given its legislative blessing to drug courts, and
drug courts are not exercising any powers-bond with conditions,
deferred judgments, or probation with conditions-that traditional
courts do not already have. These responses are disingenuous.
Neither Congress nor any state legislature of which I am aware
330. Only those defendants who meet the criteria as good candidates for treatment, or
in drug courts like Denver's, those fortunate enough not to be subject to arbitrary
exclusions designed to cut down on case filings, qualify for drug court.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 116-66.
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has altered any substantive drug laws in their rush to appropriate
money for drug courts. Appropriating money to one branch so that
that branch may usurp the legislative function does nothing to cure
the separation-of-powers problem. It is precisely because drug courts
raise such touchy public policy questions in such an ultimately
ambiguous way that the legislative branch is so keen on passing the
bucks, literally, to them.
Moreover, drug courts are not simply using the traditional
powers of bond conditions, deferred judgment, and probation
conditions. They are using these traditional judicial powers in a way
that is not only non-traditional, but in fact not even judicial. The very
purpose of the drug court is not to resolve criminal liability, but to use
the threat of criminal liability to coerce defendants into treatment.
Again, maybe this approach is entirely sensible, but it is still an
approach that is fundamentally legislative. If it is such a good idea,
Congress and state legislatures should redefine the crime of drug use
to be use plus a failure to take advantage of a certain number and
quality of treatment opportunities. They have not done so because
there is no public consensus for such an approach.
2. Impinging on the Executive Function
Providing medical treatment to persons convicted of crimes, or
even to persons in custody awaiting trial, is an executive function, not
a judicial one. By mechanically imposing treatment conditions on all
criminal defendants before they have even entered a plea, drug courts
blur the fundamental distinction between the accused and the
convicted, and therefore between the judicial function of determining
guilt and the executive function of carrying out sentences and treating
prisoners.
Courts-whose very function is to determine whether the State
has met its burden of proving whether any criminal conduct has
occurred-are an entirely inappropriate forum to be focusing on
whether defendants have been "cured" of their addictions and
whether for that reason punishment should not be imposed. We are
trained as judges and lawyers to apply the rules of procedure and
evidence to adversarial proceedings. The product of those
proceedings should be a verdict about guilt or liability, not whether
Joe Smith should be treated at Acme House or Metropolis Hospital.
This critique does not simply rest on judges being untrained in
these areas or their judicial talents being wasted, though it certainly
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includes these concerns;332 it is a matter of defining the judicial
function. We are the third branch of government and are given
sobering powers designed to protect citizens not only from one
another, but also from the abuses of the other two branches. We
ought not become robed therapeutic administrators just because we
have convinced ourselves we are acting for the public good.
If we are truly serious about treatment, sufficient resources could
and should be directed to the executive branch's corrections
facilities-at both the pre-conviction (county jail) and post-conviction
(state prison) levels. That is where the push for treatment-voluntary
and semi-voluntary-belongs. Mark Kleiman, whose work on
"coerced abstinence" is often cited in support of the drug court
notion that drug use must be detected early and punished quickly,
actually focused his ideas as much on parole conditions as probation
conditions.333 In other words, treatment and punishment should not
be viewed as mutually exclusive weapons in the war against drugs. If
we continue to believe that possession of some drugs is serious
enough to warrant incarceration, then that incarceration should be
imposed without further therapeutic hand-wringing, but it should be
coupled with intense drug treatment programs in jail or prison and
with draconian parole conditions. Parole eligibility and the threat of
parole revocation can serve an important and entirely appropriate
coercive role in giving inmates and parolees an incentive to take part
in treatment programs after they have been found by judges to be
deserving of some punishment.
I realize that prison is exactly what well-intentioned drug court
proponents want drug defendants to avoid, but that just gets us back
into the crime-disease soup.334  Besides, as discussed above, drug
courts are very likely sending more drug users to prison than ever
before.3 I also realize that there may be substance to the drug court
mantra that early intervention is better than late intervention, but
that proposition is not without constitutional, institutional, and
common-sense limits.
336
In addition to impinging on the corrections function of the
332. See infra text accompanying notes 345-48.
333. See KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 146-49,192-99.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 130-66.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 290-95.
336. For example, I doubt that even the most strident drug court proponents, or other
"therapeutic jurisprudence" do-gooders, would favor rounding up all suspected drug
addicts in the absence of proof rising to the level necessary for criminal conviction and
forcing them to undergo treatment, any more than they would favor rounding up all
bickering spouses and forcing them to undergo marriage counseling.
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executive branch, drug courts tread on, and in large measure
demolish, the traditional executive functions of the prosecutor. It is a
time-honored and jealously guarded right of prosecutors to decide
whether to offer a particular defendant a plea bargain and what
bargain to offer?37 In drug courts, that powerful and sobering
prosecutorial power is reduced to a few different sizes of cookie
cutter pleas.338 The decision of whether to offer any plea bargain at
all-and even the decision about what particular cookie cutter to
use-is driven entirely by a few objective criteria, not by the exercise
of any meaningful prosecutorial discretion.339 The very reason drug
courts need prosecutors to "get on board" is that by doing so
prosecutors are abdicating their prosecutorial discretion to this
amorphous multi-branch thing we call "drug court."340  Even if
prosecutors retain theoretical control over their power to offer
dispositions, the sheer volume and pace of drug court renders that
theoretical control functionally meaningless. Prosecutors are no
more able to make intelligent charging and dispositional decisions in
an unmanageable ocean of cases than judges are able to make
intelligent dispositional and sentencing decisions."
B. Federal Intrusion
Drug courts provide the federal government with an attractive
vehicle through which to interfere unduly with the traditional role of
state and local governments in dealing with crime. It is not so much a
337. Prosecutorial discretion-the right of prosecutors to decide when to charge and
what to charge free from judicial intervention-is a fundamental principle inherent in the
doctrine of separation of powers. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-10
(1985) (discussing the government's power regarding who to prosecute). In Wayte, the
Court stated the following:
This broad discretion [afforded the executive branch] rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general
deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's
relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.
Id. at 607.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 296-98.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 296-99.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 327-29.
341. It is no answer to say that every prosecutor's office has internal standards that
guide their formulation of plea offers in traditional courts. First, those standards are
seldom ironclad. More importantly they are standards formulated by the district attorney,
not imposed structurally by the way a particular court is designed. They are an
institutional expression of the very prosecutorial prerogative forfeited when drug courts
are formed.
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case of blatant federal interference 342 as a matter of indirect
influences exerted through the lure of federal dollars. We have
already seen this phenomenon at work. As a condition of obtaining
federal drug court funds, newly proposed drug courts are now
encouraged to meet a host of design and implementation criteria set
by Department of Justice bureaucrats in Washington.343
Drug courts-born in the laboratories of individual states and
municipalities -have become increasingly federalized and
homogenized. It is a dangerously short distance from the federal
government telling us what our drug courts must look like to telling
us how they should be operated.3
C. Intra-Branch problems
Even as a matter within the judiciary, and ignoring the extent to
which they usurp the legislative and executive functions and invite
federal intrusion, drug courts present daunting institutional problems.
They turn judges into glorified probation officers and institutionalize
a single judge's sentencing philosophy.
1. Glorified Probation Officers
Drug court judges spend much of their time doing things that
could and should be done by probation officers. I do not mean this
criticism to denigrate the efforts of probation officers or to overvalue
342. However, the INS situation discussed above is such a blatant example. See supra
text accompanying notes 315-25.
343. See DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFINING DRUG
COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS (1997) (Sup. Docs. No. J12:99009370).
344. This institutional criticism of drug courts meshes with broader criticisms about the
federalization of state criminal law. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief,
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1148-65 (1995)
(discussing the impact of the federalization of drug-related crimes); Steven Chippendale,
Note, More Harm Than Good, Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 455, 467-74 (1994) (explaining the negative impact that federalization of criminal
law has on law enforcement costs). Chief Justice Rehnquist raised this issue at a speech in
May 1999 before the American Law Institute:
"[M]atters that can be handled adequately by states should be left to them;
matters that cannot be so handled should be undertaken by the federal
government. Reasonable minds will differ on how this very general maxim
applies in a particular case, but the question which it implies should at least be
asked."
Chief Justice Raises Concerns on Federalization, THIRD BRANCH, June 1998, at 1, 1-2
(quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist). After citing several examples of federal legislation that
encroaches upon state powers, Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to state, "'[O]ne senses
from the context in which they were enacted that the question of whether the states were
doing an adequate job in this particular area was never seriously asked ....... Id (quoting
Chief Justice Rehnquist).
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the efforts of judges. On the contrary, our roles have become
muddled in drug court not because judges have stepped into a
vacuum created by incompetent probation officers, but rather
because the very purpose of drug courts is to blend the adjudicative
and probationary functions. 45 It is a blending that not only violates
basic notions of adversariness, but one that makes no practical
organizational sense.
Probation officers are trained, and in my experience most are
very skilled, in performing all of the challenging probation functions
that we demand of them, even though we generally refuse to give
them the necessary resources. Drug courts have crowned the drug
court judge as a kind of chief probation officer, one with direct
probationary responsibility over thousands of defendants rather than
with supervisory responsibility over dozens of other probation
officers. This kind of probationary micro-management makes no
organizational sense whatsoever, even ignoring the fact that the
crowned chief probation officer is by definition an amateur.
I recognize that it is an article of faith central to drug courts that
defendants pay more attention to a judge telling them, in a
courtroom, what they must do to avoid imprisonment than they do to
a probation officer telling them the same thing over the telephone or
in a probation office or home visit. A related article of faith is that a
hands-on approach by judges gives them a working knowledge of
each defendant, which becomes invaluable in making decisions about
that specific defendant. With all due respect to the drug court
believers, the sheer volume of defendants pushed through the drug
court mill each day-not to mention dismal recidivism benefits-
belies these articles of faith.
Judges would have to be blessed with photographic memories, or
egos bordering on narcissism, to believe they have a working
knowledge of the thousands of defendants who appear in drug court
each month. Conversely, drug defendants no doubt are keenly aware
of the irony that a single drug court judge is even less able to retain a
hands-on knowledge of the thousands of defendants in the system
than a probation officer is able to maintain a hands-on knowledge of
hundreds of defendants.
Proponents respond, correctly, that the drug court system as a
whole keeps much closer track of defendants than traditional courts
do. 46 I submit, however, that that success has more to do with the
345. See supra text accompanying notes 332-36.
346. See, e.g., Belenko, supra note 96, at 21-22.
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enormous probation resources poured into drug courts than the
rather ethereal and, I must say, self-important notion that defendants
pay more attention to judges than to probation officers. I suspect that
if traditional courts had the probation resources of drug courts they
could be just as effective in keeping track of defendants and just as
ineffective in reducing recidivism.347
Even if there were an inherent value in a judge, rather than a
probation officer, performing probation functions in drug court, we
must all recognize that we pay an institutional price for that added
value. Judges, trained in the nuances of procedure, evidence, and
substantive law and allegedly appointed for their intellectual abilities
as well as their sense of proportion, compassion, and justice, spend
much of their day in drug court looking at urine sample results and
deciding how many days of jail time to impose on the reluctant
patient. Is this really the kind of work the judicial branch wants its
judges doing? Is it really the kind of work most judges want to be
doing?3
2. Institutionalizing a Single Judge's Sentencing Philosophy
There are many reasons we do not ordinarily organize our multi-
judge criminal courts so that we have specialized burglary judges,
sexual assault judges, or forgery judges, and one of the most
compelling of these reasons is to avoid enshrining a single judge's
sentencing philosophy. 49 The act of sentencing a defendant is a
complex event, in which many factors are brought to bear and filtered
through a particular judge's persona. It is an intensely personal act.
Not only are some judges harsher sentencers in general than others,
347. See supra text accompanying notes 211-44.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 265-71, 300-07. Belenko and Dumanovsky
offer tips to administrators to attract and keep reluctant drug court judges:
Incentives for judges to preside over the special drug court may need to be
created by the judicial administrators if a highly skilled volunteer judge cannot be
found. This assignment may be viewed as boring and repetitive, a certain route
to frustration and burnout.... Therefore, it may be necessary to create
incentives for judges to staff the drug court. For example, the drug court judge
might be selected from among municipal, misdemeanor, or county court
positions and be appointed an acting superior or circuit court judge. Or, a term
on the drug court might provide a step up in seniority status for a felony trial
assignment. Similar incentive issues may apply to the prosecutor's and public
defender's offices.
BELENKO & DUMANOVSKY, supra note 96, at 7-8. Translation: if we cannot bribe
qualified felony-level judges into acting like cogs in the drug court case-processing
machine, we might as well use non-felony judges, who are already used to being cogs in a
case-processing machine.
349. Other reasons include keeping judges fresh and humble.
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but many judges, consciously or unconsciously, develop sentencing
patterns that vary by type of crime or by sentencing alternative.
Some judges treat so-called white-collar crimes much more harshly
than do others, but treat drug crimes much less harshly. Some of us
believe drug dealers, as opposed to drug users, should almost always
go to prison; some of us recognize many drug dealers deal in order to
make money to use drugs. Some of us are more enamored than
others of probation or other alternatives to prison, such as community
corrections. Some of us often impose short county jail sentences as
conditions of probation; others seldom do.
Of course, these differences result in inconsistent sentences on an
individual judge-by-judge and defendant-by-defendant basis. By
continuing to give judges some meaningful sentencing discretion,
most state legislatures have made the judgment that sentencing
inconsistency is a price worth paying for a system that, at least in
theory, has the capacity to make individual adjustments when
necessary in order to achieve a just result. Within limits, one person's
sentencing inconsistency is another's justice.
I believe that an important feature of the awesome sentencing
power with which we are invested is to spread around the sentencing
duties in multi-judge courts-either by ensuring that all judges do all
kinds of cases (the integrated approach) or, in specialized courts, by
ensuring that judges regularly rotate from one specialty to another.
Otherwise, our gain in sentencing consistency is paid for with an
unacceptable concentration of sentencing power in a single judge.
Drug courts are the worst of both of these worlds. They fix a
single judge's sentencing philosophy for a long period of time, and
then the entire bureaucracy must adjust to a new sentencing
philosophy when the drug court judge changes.35° It is true that
traditional courts face this same challenge whenever there is a change
of judge. But the problem is exacerbated in drug courts, not only
because the judges may tend to change frequently351 and may tend to
get burnt out quicldy, 52 but more importantly because drug courts,
unlike most other felony-level criminal courts, occupy an entire
criminal field. For the whole period that Judge Jones sits on the
Metropolis Drug Court, every criminal defendant charged with a drug
crime in Metropolis faces Judge Jones and is subjected to Judge
Jones's particular sentencing philosophy. This arrangement is a
350. See supra text accompanying notes 308-11.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 308-11.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 265-71, 300-07.
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dangerous concentration of judicial power, and one that, in any other
context, most multiple-judge courts are specifically designed to avoid.
Moreover, judicial power is, by its very nature, more sharply
exercised in drug courts than in traditional courts. The purpose of
drug courts is to coerce treatment, and drug court judges are the chief
coercers. Their powers are not only grounded in the inherently
intrusive act of forcing people to undergo certain kinds of quasi-
medical treatment, but those powers are brought to bear much more
frequently than in traditional courts. Drug court judges are, and are
meant to be, a regular and unpleasant force in the daily lives of drug
court defendants. As a consequence, the particular sentencing
peccadilloes of any given judge are much more likely to express
themselves in drug court than in traditional court.
CONCLUSION
We have succumbed to the lure of drug courts, to the lure of
their federal dollars, to the lure of their hope, and to the lure of their
popularity. Drug courts themselves have become a kind of
institutional narcotic upon which the entire criminal justice system is
becoming increasingly dependent. Our police and prosecutors cannot
give them up because they see in them the magic promise of an end to
a drug-tolerant culture, not to mention the somewhat less magical
political allure of skyrocketing rates of arrest, prosecution, and
imprisonment. Our treatment community cannot give them up
because they see in them the magic promise of a world in which drug
addiction is treated instead of punished-and the somewhat less
magical economic allure of millions of treatment dollars. Judges and
politicians cannot give them up because they see in them the magic
promise of finally being able to reconcile these two irreconcilable
views about drugs.
As with drugs themselves, however, the promises of drug courts
do not measure up to their harsh reality. They are compromising
deep-seated legal values, including the doctrine of separation of
powers, the idea that truth is best discovered in the fires of advocacy,
and the traditional role of judges as quiet, rational arbiters of the
truth-finding process. In their mad rush to dispose of cases, drug
courts are risking the due process rights of defendants and turning all
of us-judges, staff, prosecutors, and public defenders alike-into
cogs in an out-of-control case-processing machine.
And what have they delivered in exchange? Reductions in
recidivism are so small that if they exist at all they are statistically
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meaningless. Net-widening is so large that, even if drug courts truly
were effective in reducing recidivism, more drug defendants would
continue to jam our prisons than ever before.
It is time for all of us to take a much harder look at drug courts,
at their awkward placement straddled among the three branches, at
their true effectiveness, and at their real operational and institutional
costs. It is time, especially for judges, to resist the lemming-like dash
toward a society in which bedrock legal principles that have served us
for generations are sacrificed for the immediate gratification of the
latest political fad.
In his wonderfully balanced and insightful book, Against Excess,
Drug Policy for Results, Mark Kleiman summarizes the extremism
that has come to dominate the public policy debate about drugs:
A spirit of fanaticism is evident in much of what is now done
publicly and privately to combat the menace of drug abuse:
more and more extreme efforts with less and less clarity
about why they are undertaken or what benefits they are
expected to produce. Reporters scurry around, writing
stories on the panacea-of-the-month: using the army,
random drug testing, legalization, the death penalty for drug
dealers, boot camps, getting tough with source countries,
treatment on demand.353
I am afraid that drug courts are the latest panacea-of-the-month,
that judges are becoming the latest conscripts in the failed war on
drugs, and that the fanatic popularity of drug courts does not reflect
their potential value as one small tool in an attempt to cope with an
extremely complex problem, but just the latest in a long history of
thoughtless excesses. An observation Mark Kleiman made at the
beginning of his book is particularly apropos to drug courts, and
particularly to the Chicken Soup aspects of our mad dash to them:
"'Fanaticism consists of redoubling your efforts when you have lost
sight of your aim.' " We should spend less time feeding the
fanaticism of drug courts and more time in an honest debate about
the deep moral and social issues inherent in drug use, drug abuse, and
drug control.
353. KLEIMAN, supra note 51, at 4-5.
354. Id at 3 (quoting the American philosopher George Santayana without citing the
original source of publication).
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